



**UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS**  
 MARINE CORPS INSTALLATIONS NATIONAL CAPITAL REGION  
 MARINE CORPS BASE QUANTICO  
 3250 CATLIN AVENUE  
 QUANTICO VIRGINIA 22134-5001

IN REPLY REFER TO:  
 5720  
 B 013/15-7847  
 29 JUL 15

Center for Military Readiness  
 Attn: Ms. Elaine Donnelly  
 17525 Fairway  
 Livonia, MI 48152

SUBJECT: FOIA RESPONSE DON-USMC-2015-007847 ICO DONNELLY

Dear Ms. Donnelly,

This letter is in response to your Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request dated July 24, 2015, which was received by this office on July 27, 2015 and assigned file number DON-USMC-2015-007847. Your request seeks a copy of the command investigation related to the June 2015 relief for cause.


The enclosed document is provided in response to your request.

Upon review of the enclosure, we determined that portions of the information are exempt from disclosure pursuant to 5 U.S.C. 552(b)(5), (b)(6) and (b)(7). These exemptions protect inter-agency and intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with this agency and which protects personnel, medical, and similar files that would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy. The exempt information is appropriately redacted from the enclosure.

In view of the above, you may consider this to be an adverse determination that may be appealed to the Judge Advocate General (Code 14), 1322 Patterson Avenue SE, Suite 3000, Washington Navy Yard, DC 20374-5066. Your appeal, if any, must be postmarked within 60 calendar days for the date on this letter and should include a copy of your initial request, a copy of this letter, and a statement indicating why you believe your appeal should be granted. I recommend that your appeal and its envelope both bear the notation "Freedom of Information Act Appeal."

We have determined you to be a "Media Requester" for the purpose of assessing FOIA processing fees. As such, you are entitled to two hours of search and 100 pages of duplication free of charge but are responsible for the payment of any search and/or duplication fees exceeding your free entitlement. In this instance, the processing of your request at this agency did not exceed your free entitlement and you were not assessed a fee charge for processing your request by this Headquarters.

Questions concerning this action may be directed to Ms. Zanelle Rainey at (703) 784-2399 or via e-mail at [MCBQuantico@usmc.mil](mailto:MCBQuantico@usmc.mil). Please reference our file number, DON-USMC-2015-007847, when corresponding on this matter.

Sincerely,  
  
 A. D. BROUGHTON  
 By direction

216 Pgs.  
 Received  
 Aug. 31  
 2015



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS  
TRAINING AND EDUCATION COMMAND  
1019 ELLIOT ROAD  
QUANTICO, VIRGINIA 22134

IN REPLY REFER TO:  
1920  
C 46S  
JUN 26 2015

MEMORANDUM ENDORSEMENT on (b) (6) Cmd Inv 5830 of 18 Jun 15

From: Commanding General, Training and Education Command  
To: File

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES  
SURROUNDING ALLEGATIONS OF A HOSTILE WORK ENVIROMENT AT THE  
RECRUIT TRAINING REGIMENT, MARINE CORPS RECRUIT DEPOT,  
PARRIS ISLAND

Ref: (i) Legal Sufficiency Review 5800 C 46S dtd 23 Jun 15  
(j) Equal Opportunity Review 5354 EOA dtd 23 Jun 15

Encl: (54) Request for Additional Information 5830 CG dtd 26 Jun 15  
(55) RTR by-name-roster reviewed on 22 June 15

1. Readdressed and forwarded.

2. I have reviewed the Command Investigation in its entirety and find it to be complete and substantially in compliance with reference (a). The findings of fact, opinions, and recommendations, as modified below, are approved.

3. Findings of Fact. The findings of facts (FF) are approved, with the exception of the following modifications.

a. FF 14. Before (b) (6) assumed command, (b) (6) predecessor, as well as the other Battalion Commanders, nominated officers to be considered for the staff secretary and CG's aide position at MCRD PI. 4<sup>th</sup> Recruit Training Battalion nominees were selected for both of these positions. Additionally, (b) (6) (b) (6) predecessor sent one officer to Drill Instructor school and one other officer to Support Battalion as a career enhancing opportunity for each officer. [Encl 13]

b. FF 15. The billets noted in FF 14 are regular standing requirements of the Recruit Training Regiment and did not require 4<sup>th</sup> Recruit Training Battalion to provide a disproportionate number of officers to support billets throughout MCRD PI. [Encl 54]

c. FF 34. (b) (6) counseled (b) (6) on utilizing and coordinating with the chain of command instead of directly contacting MMOA. [Encl 4]

d. FF 40. The Regimental XO, Depot G-1 and the 4<sup>th</sup> Recruit Training Battalion Commander met face to face with every company grade

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monitor at the most recent MMOA roadshow visit to inquire about getting off-cycle (non-summer) assignments of female officers. [Encl 21]

e. FF 42. Fourth Battalion's T/O structure provides 7 drill instructors per series with an average of approximately 132 recruits per series, averaging 18.85 recruits per drill instructor. [Encl 54]

f. FF 43. 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Battalions' T/O structure provides 24 drill instructors per company with an average of approximately 468 recruits per company, averaging 19 recruits per drill instructor. [Encl 54]

g. FF 44. Between 28 June 2014 and 19 June 2015, 46 platoons of 180 male platoons were manned at three drill instructors (25.6%). The other 134 had four or five drill instructor teams. Between 28 June 2014 and 19 June 2015, 7 of 36 female platoons were manned at three drill instructors (19.4%). The other 29 had four or five drill instructor teams. [Encl 54]

h. FF 46. Although 4th Battalion operates on a series track, the schedule does not restrict shifting drill instructors from one to team to another in an emergency or to provide respite. [Encl 54]

i. FF 47. 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Battalions, which train on a company tracks, also have the flexibility to shift drill instructors to cover down temporarily in an emergency or to provide respite. [Encl 4-7, 10, 16, 18]

j. FF 48. Staffing reviews were conducted regularly, and staffing levels, to include inbound and outbound projections, were included in every weekly commanders meeting. The staffing of effective drill instructors from June to October 2014, improved from 95% to over 105% of staffing goal as reflected by the morning report. During the same period, the Officer staffing also improved from early June to 15 July, moving from 81% to 100% of the staffing goal. The Officer manning then fluctuated as it decreased to 81% of staffing goal again on 1 October and rose to 87.5% by 15 October 2014, as reflected by the morning report. [Encl 54]

k. FF 49. In or about April 2015, (b) (6) and (b) (6) (b) (6) conducted a review of the enlisted T/O and the current on-hand staffing of the battalions and regiment. A detailed review of the roster of drill instructors and their status indicated that 4th Recruit Training Battalion was staffed at or very close to staffing goal with effective drill instructors. This review excluded those Marines considered "not effective" for various reasons (mental health, pregnancy, medical conditions, etc.), therefore 4<sup>th</sup> Recruit Training Battalion was overstaffed with drill instructors in the

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aggregate, and properly staffed with effective drill instructors. The most recent of these detailed reviews conducted on 22 June similarly showed that 4<sup>th</sup> Recruit Training Battalion is at the staffing goal for effective drill instructors. [Encl 54 and 55]

l. FF 74. (b) (6) staff drafted a pregnancy policy point paper and presented it to (b) (6). [Encls (3) and (4)]

m. FF 75. (b) (6) had a number of issues with the point paper and directed (b) (6) to make edits and then return to see (b) (6) to discuss further. [Encls (3) and (4)]

n. FF 148. Each battalion was provided one code for their Marines to submit surveys, which is consistent with HQMC procedures for O-6 level commands. [Encl (10) and Ref (j)]

o. All other findings of fact are approved without modification.

#### 4. Opinions

a. Opinions 1 and 2. Approved. I concur with the opinions of the investigating officer (IO) with respect to the two matters into which (b) (6) was directed to inquire. There is no evidence that (b) (6) or (b) (6) staff discriminated based on gender. There is no evidence that (b) (6) or (b) (6) staff created a hostile work environment on the basis of equal opportunity. Assuming that the caveat "[w]ithin the confines of this investigation" in Opinion 2 means that the IO found no evidence of a hostile work environment, that language is approved.

In reaching (b) (6) conclusions on these two matters, the IO examined and rendered opinions on several ancillary subjects.

b. Opinion 3. Approved in part; disapproved in part. I concur that the relationship between (b) (6) and (b) (6) (b) (6) was strained. There are no facts indicating that the strained relationship between (b) (6) and (b) (6) resulted in inadequate support to 4th Recruit Training Battalion from the Recruit Training Regiment Commander or staff.

c. Opinion 4, 5, and 6. Approved. I concur that (b) (6) passion is unquestionable. I concur that the strained relationship between the RTR CO and the 4th RTBn CO resulted from friction created by the way in which (b) (6) pursued (b) (6) initiatives, including (b) (6) relief of (b) (6). I note, however, that these opinions are only relevant insofar as they support opinion 3 as modified.

d. Opinion 7. Disapproved. While the relief of (b) (6) was a factor in the deteriorating relationship between (b) (6) and

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PARRIS ISLAND

(b) (6), the Investigating Officer's subsequent inferences are not justified.

e. Opinion 8. Disapproved. The manning of RTR has historically been a matter of close scrutiny up and down the chain of command since at least the 1950's. The Commanding General, MCRD PI and the TECOM staff have closely monitored the manning at RTR, MCRD PI since my assumption of command, including throughout this period of time. There is no indication of inadequate support at 4th Recruit Training Battalion. TECOM has continued to support initiatives to meet the requirements for manning across the command.

f. Opinion 9. Disapproved. There is nothing in (b) (6) statement (enclosure (4)), nor are there any other facts contained in this investigation indicating a lack of interest or unwillingness on the part of (b) (6) to support 4th Recruit Training Battalion in any way. Similarly, there is no statement by (b) (6) nor any facts contained in the investigation of any hesitance in providing any support to 4th RTBn.

g. Opinion 10. Approved in part; disapproved in part. There was at least an initial inconsistency among the recruit training battalions with respect to the way in which each administered the DEOMI survey, a standard, DOD issued command climate measuring tool. There also is a standard practice throughout the Marine Corps that allows for the potential of one individual to take a survey more than once. I do not believe either of these issues was systemic or skewed the results in such a way as to deem them invalid for the purpose of identifying the need for further inquiry into a unit's command climate.

## 5. Recommendations

a. Recommendation 1. Approved. No disciplinary or administrative action is warranted in this matter.

b. Recommendation 2. Approved in part. Continuous routine monitoring and evaluation of the manning levels at RTR and MCRD PI will continue. No additional review of the manpower at MCRD PI is required.

c. Recommendation 3. Approved in part. The fitness report periods, reporting requirements, and fulfillment of evaluation responsibilities are established by Marine Corps order. This issue is already properly addressed by Marine Corps Order 1610.7 (PES).

d. Recommendation 4. Approved in part. MCRD PI should continue to follow normal DEOMI and Command Climate survey requirements and procedures.

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e. Recommendation 5. Disapproved. I have full confidence that both (b) (6) and (b) (6) will use professional objectivity in completing (b) (6) fitness report.

f. Recommendation 6. Disapproved. I have full confidence in the ability of Commanding General, MCRD PI to identify, advocate, and implement the appropriate policies regarding Drill Instructor readiness necessary to ensure continued mission success.

6. This matter is closed.

(b) (6)

Copy to:  
CG, MCRD PI/ERR  
File



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS  
MARINE CORPS RECRUIT DEPT/ EASTERN RECRUITING REGION  
BOX 19001  
PARRIS ISLAND, SOUTH CAROLINA 29905-9001

IN APPLY REFER TO:

5830

CG

JUN 26 2015

From: Commanding General  
To: Commanding General, Training and Education Command

Subj: REQUEST FOR ADDITIONAL INFORMATION

- Encl:
- (1) Recruit Training Regiment Officer and Enlisted Staffing Brief from June 2014 to June 2015
  - (2) Table of Organization for 4th Recruit Training Battalion
  - (3) Table of Organization for 3rd Recruit Training Battalion
  - (4) 1st Recruit Training Battalion End of Cycle Debriefs from 19 September 2014 to 29 May 2015
  - (5) 2nd Recruit Training Battalion End of Cycle Debriefs from 2 October 2014 through 4 June 2015
  - (6) 3rd Recruit Training Battalion End of Cycle Debriefs from 8 October 2014 through 19 June 2015
  - (7) 4th Recruit Training Battalion End of Cycle Debriefs from 18 September 2014 through 18 June 2015
  - (8) (b) (6) emails of 26 June 2015


1. Enclosures (1) through (8) are provided as additional information regarding officer and enlisted manning at the Recruit Training Regiment and the separate Recruit Training Battalions from June 2014 through June 2015. Enclosure (3) is the Table of Organization for 3rd Recruit Training Battalion and represents the Table of Organization for all of the male training battalions.

2. For additional information, please contact myself or my Chief of Staff, (b) (6)

(b) (6)

# RTR 0911 Staffing – Effective as % of Staffing Goal

Source: Command Brief Slides




4<sup>th</sup> Bn fared better than average, staying above 100% until recently. The recent decline is due to an increase in pregnancies and LIMDU reducing the number of effective DIs.



# 4<sup>th</sup> Bn 0911 Staffing – Effective as % of Staffing Goal


Source: Morning Report



This graph is from the morning report, and shows a similar picture to the last chart, with a recent dip below staffing goal.

# RTR Officer Staffing – Effective as % of Staffing Goal


Source: Command Brief Slides



Officer staffing has been lower than most. Reasons include officers being sent out of the Bn for poor performance, higher HQ using female officers to fill staff billets, providing female officers command opportunity in Supt Bn, and at least one inbound resigning prior to executing inbound orders. We worked with HHQ and MM to address, and provided a male to augment as the Bn S4.

# 4<sup>th</sup> Bn Officer Staffing – Effective as % of Staffing Goal

Source: Morning Report



The morning report also reflects overall low officer staffing. We have 4 remaining inbound officers to arrive during Jun/Jul. This should greatly improve overall staffing, bringing us to SG.







**Recap by MOS**

M32008 - 4TH RECRUIT TRNG BN RTR MCRD PISC

|  | BMOS                         | SES5 | O10<br>E9<br>SES4 | O9<br>E8<br>SES3 | O8<br>E7<br>SES2 | O7<br>E6<br>SES1 | O6<br>E5<br>C15 | O5<br>E4<br>C14 | O4<br>E3<br>C13 | O3<br>E2<br>C12 | O2<br>E1<br>C11 | O1<br>C10 | W5<br>C9 | W4<br>C8 | W3<br>C7 | W2<br>C6 | W1<br>C5 | C4 | C3 | C2 | C1 | Total        |
|--|------------------------------|------|-------------------|------------------|------------------|------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----------|----|----|----|----|--------------|
| 1 CHARGEABLE 1<br>MARINE 1 OFFICER           | 0402<br>8006                 |      |                   |                  |                  |                  |                 | 1               | 1               | 4               | 10              |           |          |          |          |          |          |    |    |    |    | 16           |
| 1 CHARGEABLE 1 MARINE 1<br>OFFICER           |                              |      |                   |                  |                  |                  |                 | 1               | 1               | 4               | 11              |           |          |          |          |          |          |    |    |    |    | 17           |
| 1 CHARGEABLE 1<br>MARINE 5 ENLSTED           | 0111<br>0911<br>3043<br>8999 |      |                   |                  | 8                | 15               | 43              |                 | 1               | 1               |                 |           |          |          |          |          |          |    |    |    |    | 3<br>66<br>1 |
| 1 CHARGEABLE 1 MARINE 5<br>ENLSTED           |                              |      | 1                 | 3                |                  |                  |                 |                 |                 |                 |                 |           |          |          |          |          |          |    |    |    |    | 4            |
| 1 CHARGEABLE 2 NAVY 1<br>OFFICER             | 4100                         |      | 1                 | 3                | 8                | 16               | 44              |                 | 1               | 1               |                 |           |          |          |          |          |          |    |    |    |    | 74           |
| 1 CHARGEABLE 2 NAVY 1<br>OFFICER             |                              |      |                   |                  |                  |                  |                 |                 | 1               |                 |                 |           |          |          |          |          |          |    |    |    |    | 1            |
| 1 CHARGEABLE 2 NAVY 5<br>ENLSTED             | 2401                         |      |                   |                  |                  |                  | 1               |                 |                 |                 |                 |           |          |          |          |          |          |    |    |    |    | 1            |
| 1 CHARGEABLE 2 NAVY 5<br>ENLSTED             |                              |      |                   |                  |                  |                  | 1               |                 |                 |                 |                 |           |          |          |          |          |          |    |    |    |    | 1            |
| 1 CHARGEABLE RESERV<br>AR 1 MARINE 5 ENLSTED | 0911                         |      |                   |                  |                  |                  | 2               |                 |                 |                 |                 |           |          |          |          |          |          |    |    |    |    | 2            |
| 1 CHARGEABLE RESERV AR 1<br>MARINE 5 ENLSTED |                              |      |                   |                  |                  |                  | 2               |                 |                 |                 |                 |           |          |          |          |          |          |    |    |    |    | 2            |
| Summary                                      |                              |      | 1                 | 3                | 8                | 16               | 47              | 1               | 3               | 5               | 11              |           |          |          |          |          |          |    |    |    |    | 95           |

**Billet Organization**  
M32006 - 3D RECRUIT TRNG BN RTR MCRD PISC

| Rec CD        | BIC        | Billet Description                              | Alpha Grade | BMOD ASD1 ASD2 | P M O S | B I T S M R Y T P N P A R | Res Typ | S W C N | CHARGEABLE |               |         |               |              |         |                |               |               |         | NON-CHARGEABLE |       |        |       |         | Manned  |         | A S R | JA C C | F T N |         |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|---------------|------------|---|-------------|----------------|---------|---------------------------|---------|---------|------------|---------------|---------|---------------|--------------|---------|----------------|---------------|---------------|---------|----------------|-------|--------|-------|---------|---------|---------|-------|--------|-------|---------|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|--|
|               |            |   |             |                |         |                           |         |         | Billet SPN | Marine Active |         | Civil Reserve | Other Active |         | Marine Reserve | Civil Reserve | Other Reserve | Manned  |                | A S R | JA C C | F T N |         |         |         |       |        |       |         |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|               |            |   |             |                |         |                           |         |         |            | OH   En       | OH   En |               | OH   En      | OH   En |                |               |               | OH   En | OH   En        |       |        |       | OH   En | OH   En | OH   En |       |        |       | OH   En |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| C             | M320060010 | RTN RTR MCRD                                    |             |                |         |                           |         |         |            |               |         |               |              |         |                |               |               |         |                |       |        |       |         |         |         |       |        |       |         |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| E             | M320060001 | COMMANDING OFFICER                              | LTCOL       | 8006           | 0000    | M                         | O       | A       | A          |               |         |               |              |         |                |               |               |         |                |       |        |       |         |         |         |       |        |       |         |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| E             | M320060002 | EXECUTIVE OFFICER                               | MAJ         | 8006           | 0000    | M                         | O       | A       | A          |               |         |               |              |         |                |               |               |         |                |       |        |       |         |         |         |       |        |       |         |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| E             | M320060003 | SERGEANT MAJOR                                  | SGTMAJ      | 8999           | 8999    | M                         | E       | A       | A          |               |         |               |              |         |                |               |               |         |                |       |        |       |         |         |         |       |        |       |         |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
|               |            |   |             |                | 0911D   |                           |         |         |            |               |         |               |              |         |                |               |               |         |                |       |        |       |         |         |         |       |        |       |         |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| D             | M320060004 | S-3   |             |                |         |                           |         |         |            |               |         |               |              |         |                |               |               |         |                |       |        |       |         |         |         |       |        |       |         |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| E             | M320060007 | ADMIN CHIEF                                     | GYSGT       | 0111           | 0111    | M                         | E       | A       | A          |               |         |               |              |         |                |               |               |         |                |       |        |       |         |         |         |       |        |       |         |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| E             | M320060008 | ADMIN CLERK                                     | CPL         | 0111           | 0111    | M                         | E       | A       | A          |               |         |               |              |         |                |               |               |         |                |       |        |       |         |         |         |       |        |       |         |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| E             | M320060009 | ADMIN CLERK                                     | LCPL        | 0111           | 0111    | M                         | E       | A       | A          |               |         |               |              |         |                |               |               |         |                |       |        |       |         |         |         |       |        |       |         |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| D             | M320060012 | S-3   |             |                |         |                           |         |         |            |               |         |               |              |         |                |               |               |         |                |       |        |       |         |         |         |       |        |       |         |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| E             | M320060013 | COMPANY COMMANDER                               | CAPT        | 9006           | 0000    | M                         | O       | A       | A          |               |         |               |              |         |                |               |               |         |                |       |        |       |         |         |         |       |        |       |         |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| E             | M320060014 | OPERATIONS CHIEF/FIRST SERGEANT                 | GYSGT       | 0911           | 0000    | M                         | E       | A       | A          |               |         |               |              |         |                |               |               |         |                |       |        |       |         |         |         |       |        |       |         |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| E             | M320060166 | ASSISTANT OPERATIONS CHIEF (S-3)                | SSGT        | 0911           | 0000    | M                         | E       | A       | A          |               |         |               |              |         |                |               |               |         |                |       |        |       |         |         |         |       |        |       |         |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| E             | M320060034 | COLOR SERGEANT                                  | SGT         | 0911           | 0000    | M                         | E       | A       | A          |               |         |               |              |         |                |               |               |         |                |       |        |       |         |         |         |       |        |       |         |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| E             | M320060034 | DRILL MASTER                                    | SSGT        | 0911           | 0000    | M                         | E       | A       | A          |               |         |               |              |         |                |               |               |         |                |       |        |       |         |         |         |       |        |       |         |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| D             | M320060041 | BATTALION REASSGN SECT                          |             |                |         |                           |         |         |            |               |         |               |              |         |                |               |               |         |                |       |        |       |         |         |         |       |        |       |         |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| E             | M320060044 | DRILL INSTRUCTOR                                | SGT         | 0911           | 0000    | M                         | E       | A       | A          |               |         |               |              |         |                |               |               |         |                |       |        |       |         |         |         |       |        |       |         |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| E             | M320060045 | DRILL INSTRUCTOR                                | SGT         | 0911           | 0000    | M                         | E       | A       | A          |               |         |               |              |         |                |               |               |         |                |       |        |       |         |         |         |       |        |       |         |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| E             | M320060044 | DRILL INSTRUCTOR                                | SGT         | 0911           | 0000    | M                         | E       | A       | A          |               |         |               |              |         |                |               |               |         |                |       |        |       |         |         |         |       |        |       |         |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| D             | M320060018 | S-4   |             |                |         |                           |         |         |            |               |         |               |              |         |                |               |               |         |                |       |        |       |         |         |         |       |        |       |         |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| E             | M320060018 | LOGISTICS OFFICER                               | 1STLT       | 0402           | 0402    | M                         | O       | A       | A          |               |         |               |              |         |                |               |               |         |                |       |        |       |         |         |         |       |        |       |         |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| E             | M320060004 | SUPPLY ADMINISTRATION AND OPERATIONS SPECIALIST | SGT         | 3043           | 3043    | M                         | E       | A       | A          |               |         |               |              |         |                |               |               |         |                |       |        |       |         |         |         |       |        |       |         |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Section Total |            | C - RTN RTR MCRD                                |             |                |         |                           |         |         |            |               |         |               |              |         |                |               |               |         |                |       |        |       |         |         |         |       |        |       |         |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| C             | M320060015 | CHAPLAIN BRANCH                                 |             |                |         |                           |         |         |            |               |         |               |              |         |                |               |               |         |                |       |        |       |         |         |         |       |        |       |         |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| E             | M320060016 | TAC CHAPLAIN                                    | LCDR        | 4100           | 4100    | N                         | O       | A       | A          |               |         |               |              |         |                |               |               |         |                |       |        |       |         |         |         |       |        |       |         |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| E             | M320060011 | REL PRG SPEC                                    | KPJ         | 2401           | 2401    | N                         | E       | A       | A          |               |         |               |              |         |                |               |               |         |                |       |        |       |         |         |         |       |        |       |         |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Section Total |            | C - CHAPLAIN BRANCH                             |             |                |         |                           |         |         |            |               |         |               |              |         |                |               |               |         |                |       |        |       |         |         |         |       |        |       |         |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| C             | M320060015 | RECRUIT COMPANY (4 CO'S)                        |             |                |         |                           |         |         |            |               |         |               |              |         |                |               |               |         |                |       |        |       |         |         |         |       |        |       |         |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| E             | M320060020 | COMPANY COMMANDER                               | CAPT        | 8006           | 0000    | M                         | O       | A       | A          |               |         |               |              |         |                |               |               |         |                |       |        |       |         |         |         |       |        |       |         |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| E             | M320060021 | COMPANY COMMANDER                               | CAPT        | 8006           | 0000    | M                         | O       | A       | A          |               |         |               |              |         |                |               |               |         |                |       |        |       |         |         |         |       |        |       |         |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| E             | M320060022 | COMPANY COMMANDER                               | CAPT        | 8006           | 0000    | M                         | O       | A       | A          |               |         |               |              |         |                |               |               |         |                |       |        |       |         |         |         |       |        |       |         |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| E             | M320060023 | COMPANY COMMANDER                               | CAPT        | 8006           | 0000    | M                         | O       | A       | A          |               |         |               |              |         |                |               |               |         |                |       |        |       |         |         |         |       |        |       |         |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| E             | M320060024 | EXECUTIVE OFFICER                               | 1STLT       | 8006           | 0000    | M                         | O       | A       | A          |               |         |               |              |         |                |               |               |         |                |       |        |       |         |         |         |       |        |       |         |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| E             | M320060025 | EXECUTIVE OFFICER                               | 1STLT       | 8006           | 0000    | M                         | O       | A       | A          |               |         |               |              |         |                |               |               |         |                |       |        |       |         |         |         |       |        |       |         |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| E             | M320060026 | EXECUTIVE OFFICER                               | 1STLT       | 8006           | 0000    | M                         | O       | A       | A          |               |         |               |              |         |                |               |               |         |                |       |        |       |         |         |         |       |        |       |         |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| E             | M320060027 | EXECUTIVE OFFICER                               | 1STLT       | 8006           | 0000    | M                         | O       | A       | A          |               |         |               |              |         |                |               |               |         |                |       |        |       |         |         |         |       |        |       |         |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| E             | M320060028 | FIRST SERGEANT                                  | 1STSGT      | 8999           | 8999    | M                         | E       | A       | A          |               |         |               |              |         |                |               |               |         |                |       |        |       |         |         |         |       |        |       |         |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| E             | M320060029 | FIRST SERGEANT                                  | 1STSGT      | 8999           | 8999    | M                         | E       | A       | A          |               |         |               |              |         |                |               |               |         |                |       |        |       |         |         |         |       |        |       |         |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| E             | M320060030 | FIRST SERGEANT                                  | 1STSGT      | 8999           | 8999    | M                         | E       | A       | A          |               |         |               |              |         |                |               |               |         |                |       |        |       |         |         |         |       |        |       |         |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| E             | M320060031 | FIRST SERGEANT                                  | 1STSGT      | 8999           | 8999    | M                         | E       | A       | A          |               |         |               |              |         |                |               |               |         |                |       |        |       |         |         |         |       |        |       |         |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| Section Total |            | C - RECRUIT COMPANY (4 CO'S)                    |             |                |         |                           |         |         |            |               |         |               |              |         |                |               |               |         |                |       |        |       |         |         |         |       |        |       |         |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |

Enclosure 3












### Billet Summary

M32006 - 3D RECRUIT TRNG BN RTR MCRD PISC

| Chargeable  | Non-Chargeable  |
|---|---|
| Marine Active Officer: 20<br>Marine Active Enlisted: 140<br><br>Marine Reserve Officer:<br>AR:<br>IMA:<br>SMCR:<br>Total Marine Reserve Officer:<br><br>Marine Reserve Enlisted:<br>AR:<br>IMA:<br>SMCR:<br>Total Marine Reserve Enlisted:<br><br>Navy Active Officer: 1<br>Navy SELRES Officer:<br>Navy Active Enlisted: 1<br>Navy SELRES Enlisted:<br>Army Officer:<br>Army Enlisted:<br>Air Force Officer:<br>Air Force Enlisted:<br>Coast Guard Officer:<br>Coast Guard Enlisted:<br><br>Civ: | Contingency:<br>Marine Officers:<br>Marine Enlisted:<br>Navy Officers:<br>Navy Enlisted:<br><br>Collateral Duty:<br>Marine Active Officers:<br>Marine Reserve Officers:<br>Marine Active Enlisted:<br>Marine Reserve Enlisted:<br>Navy Officers:<br>Navy Enlisted:<br><br>FAP1 Officer:<br>FAP1 Enlisted:<br>FAP2 Officer:<br>FAP2 Enlisted:<br>FAP3 Officer:<br>FAP3 Enlisted:<br><br>Nav Med Aug Officer:<br>Nav Med Aug Enlisted:<br><br>Other Active Officer:<br>Other Active Enlisted:<br><br>Marine Reserve IRR Officer:<br>Marine Reserve IRR Enlisted:<br>NAFI Civ: |

# Company A 1ST RTBN



19-Sep-14

COMPANY COMMANDER

(b) (6)

COMPANY FIRST SERGEANT

(b) (6)

COMPANY EXECUTIVE OFFICER

COMPANY OPERATIONS DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

1064 SERIES COMMANDER

(b) (6)

1068 SERIES COMMANDER

(b) (6)

CHIEF DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

CHIEF DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

1064 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

1088 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

1065 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

1069 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

1066 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

1070 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

PICKUP

28-Jun-14

GRADUATION

19-Sep-14

Enclosure (4)

# Company B 1ST RTBN



17-Oct-14

COMPANY COMMANDER

(b) (6)

COMPANY FIRST SERGEANT

(b) (6)

COMPANY EXECUTIVE OFFICER

(b) (6)

COMPANY OPERATIONS DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

1072 SERIES COMMANDER

(b) (6)

1076 SERIES COMMANDER

(b) (6)

CHIEF DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

CHIEF DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

1072 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

1076 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

1073 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

1077 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

1074 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

1078 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

OPERATIONS DRILL INSTRUCTORS

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

PICKUP

26-Jul-14

GRADUATION

17-Oct-14

# Company C 1ST RTBN



7-Nov-14

COMPANY COMMANDER

(b) (6)

COMPANY FIRST SERGEANT

(b) (6)

COMPANY EXECUTIVE OFFICER

COMPANY OPERATIONS DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

1080 SERIES COMMANDER

(b) (6)

1084 SERIES COMMANDER

(b) (6)

CHIEF DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

CHIEF DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

1080 SDI

(b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

1084 SDI

(b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

1081 SDI

(b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

1085 SDI

(b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

1082 SDI

(b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

1086 SDI

(b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

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OPERATIONS DRILL INSTRUCTORS

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

PICKUP


16-Aug-14

GRADUATION

7-Nov-14



# Company D 1ST RTBN



5-Dec-14

COMPANY COMMANDER

(b) (6)

COMPANY FIRST SERGEANT

(b) (6)

COMPANY EXECUTIVE OFFICER

N/A

COMPANY OPERATIONS DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

1088 SERIES COMMANDER

(b) (6)

1092 SERIES COMMANDER

(b) (6)

CHIEF DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

CHIEF DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

1088

SDI

(b) (6)

DI

(b) (6)

DI

(b) (6)

DI

(b) (6)

1092

SDI

(b) (6)

DI

(b) (6)

DI

(b) (6)

DI

(b) (6)

1089

SDI

(b) (6)

DI

(b) (6)

DI

(b) (6)

DI

(b) (6)

1093

SDI

(b) (6)

DI

(b) (6)

DI

(b) (6)

DI

(b) (6)

1090

SDI

(b) (6)

DI

(b) (6)

DI

(b) (6)

DI

(b) (6)

1094

SDI

(b) (6)

DI

(b) (6)

DI

(b) (6)

OPERATIONS DRILL INSTRUCTORS

DI

(b) (6)

DI

(b) (6)


PICKUP

13-Sep-14

GRADUATION

5-Dec-14

6  
**Company A  
1ST RTBN**



9-Jan-15

COMPANY COMMANDER

(b) (6)

COMPANY FIRST SERGEANT

(b) (6)

COMPANY EXECUTIVE OFFICER

(b) (6)

COMPANY OPERATIONS DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

1000 SERIES COMMANDER

(b) (6)

1004 SERIES COMMANDER

(b) (6)

CHIEF DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

CHIEF DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

1000 SDI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)

1004 SDI (b) (6)  
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DI (b) (6)

1001 SDI (b) (6)  
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1005 SDI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)

1002 SDI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)

1006 SDI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)

PICKUP  
18-Oct-14

GRADUATION  
9-Jan-15

# Company B 1ST RTBN



30-Jan-15

COMPANY COMMANDER

(b) (6)

COMPANY FIRST SERGEANT

(b) (6)

COMPANY EXECUTIVE OFFICER

COMPANY OPERATIONS DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

1008 SERIES COMMANDER

(b) (6)

1012 SERIES COMMANDER

(b) (6)

CHIEF DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

CHIEF DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

1008 SDI

(b) (6)

DI

(b) (6)

DI

(b) (6)

DI

(b) (6)

1012 SDI

(b) (6)

DI

(b) (6)

DI

(b) (6)

DI

(b) (6)

1009 SDI

(b) (6)

DI

(b) (6)

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(b) (6)

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(b) (6)

1013 SDI

(b) (6)

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(b) (6)

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(b) (6)

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(b) (6)

1010 SDI

(b) (6)

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(b) (6)

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(b) (6)

1014 SDI

(b) (6)

DI

(b) (6)

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(b) (6)

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(b) (6)

1 SDI OPERATIONS DRILL INSTRUCTORS

DI

(b) (6)

DI

(b) (6)

2 SDI


PICKUP

8-Nov-14

GRADUATION

30-Jan-15

# Company C 1ST RTBN



6-Mar-15

COMPANY COMMANDER

(b) (6)

COMPANY FIRST SERGEANT

(b) (6)

COMPANY EXECUTIVE OFFICER

(b) (6)

COMPANY OPERATIONS DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

1016 SERIES COMMANDER

(b) (6)

1020 SERIES COMMANDER

(b) (6)

CHIEF DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

CHIEF DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

1016 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

1020 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

1017 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

1021 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

1018 SDI (b) (6)

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1022 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)


PICKUP

Dec 13 2014

GRADUATION

Mar 6 2015

# Company D 1ST RTBN



April 10 2015

COMPANY COMMANDER

(b) (6)

COMPANY FIRST SERGEANT

(b) (6)

COMPANY EXECUTIVE OFFICER

N/A

COMPANY OPERATIONS DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

1024 SERIES COMMANDER

(b) (6)

1028 SERIES COMMANDER

(b) (6)

CHIEF DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

CHIEF DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

1024

SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

1028

SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

1025

SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

1029

SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

1026

SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

1030

SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

PICKUP

17-Jan-15

GRADUATION

10-Apr-15

# Company A 1ST RTBN



1-May-15

COMPANY COMMANDER  
(b) (6)

COMPANY FIRST SERGEANT  
(b) (6)

COMPANY EXECUTIVE OFFICER  
(b) (6)

COMPANY OPERATIONS DRILL INSTRUCTOR  
(b) (6)

1032 SERIES COMMANDER  
(b) (6)

1036 SERIES COMMANDER  
(b) (6)

CHIEF DRILL INSTRUCTOR  
(b) (6)

CHIEF DRILL INSTRUCTOR  
(b) (6)

1032 SDI (b) (6)  
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1036 SDI (b) (6)  
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1033 SDI (b) (6)  
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DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
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1037 SDI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
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1034 SDI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)

1038 SDI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)

PICKUP  
7-Feb-15

GRADUATION  
1-May-15

# Company B 1ST RTBN



29-May-15

COMPANY COMMANDER

(b) (6)

COMPANY FIRST SERGEANT

(b) (6)

COMPANY EXECUTIVE OFFICER

COMPANY OPERATIONS DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

1040 SERIES COMMANDER

(b) (6)

1044 SERIES COMMANDER

(b) (6)

CHIEF DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

CHIEF DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

1040 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

1044 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

1041 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

1045 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

1042 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

1046 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

PICKUP

7-Mar-15

GRADUATION

29-May-15

# Company E 2D RTBN



2-Oct-14

COMPANY COMMANDER

(b) (6)

COMPANY FIRST SERGEANT

(b) (6)

COMPANY EXECUTIVE OFFICER

COMPANY OPERATIONS DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

2072 SERIES COMMANDER

(b) (6)

2076 SERIES COMMANDER

(b) (6)

CHIEF DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

CHIEF DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

2072 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

2076 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

2073 SDI (b) (6)

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2077 SDI (b) (6)

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2074 SDI (b) (6)

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2078 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

PICKUP

12-Jul-14

GRADUATION

3-Oct-14

Enclosure (5)



# Company F 2D RTBN



23-Oct-14

COMPANY COMMANDER-

(b) (6)

COMPANY FIRST SERGEANT

(b) (6)

COMPANY EXECUTIVE OFFICER

(b) (6)

COMPANY OPERATIONS DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

2080 SERIES COMMANDER

(b) (6)

2084 SERIES COMMANDER

(b) (6)

CHIEF DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

CHIEF DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

2080 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

2084 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

2081 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

2085 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

2082 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

2086 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

PICKUP

2-Aug-14

GRADUATION

24-Oct-14

# Company G 2D RTBN



20-Nov-14

COMPANY COMMANDER  
(b) (6)

COMPANY FIRST SERGEANT  
(b) (6)

COMPANY EXECUTIVE OFFICER

COMPANY OPERATIONS DRILL INSTRUCTOR  
(b) (6)

2088 SERIES COMMANDER  
(b) (6)

2092 SERIES COMMANDER  
(b) (6)

CHIEF DRILL INSTRUCTOR  
(b) (6)

CHIEF DRILL INSTRUCTOR  
(b) (6)

2088 SDI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)

2092 SDI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)

2089 SDI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)

2093 SDI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)

2090 SDI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)

2094 SDI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)

PICKUP  
30-Aug-14

GRADUATION  
21-Nov-14

# Company H 2D RTBN



11-Dec-14

COMPANY COMMANDER

(b) (6)

COMPANY FIRST SERGEANT

(b) (6)

COMPANY EXECUTIVE OFFICER

COMPANY OPERATIONS DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

2096 SERIES COMMANDER

(b) (6)

2100 SERIES COMMANDER

(b) (6)

CHIEF DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

CHIEF DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

2096 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

2100 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

2097 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

2101 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

2098 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

2102 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

PICKUP

20-Sep-14

GRADUATION

12-Dec-14

# Company E 2D RTBN



15-Jan-15

COMPANY COMMANDER

(b) (6)

COMPANY FIRST SERGEANT

(b) (6)

COMPANY EXECUTIVE OFFICER

(b) (6)

COMPANY OPERATIONS DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

2000 SERIES COMMANDER

(b) (6)

2004 SERIES COMMANDER

(b) (6)

CHIEF DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

CHIEF DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

2000 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

2004 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

2001 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

2005 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

2002 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

2006 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

PICKUP

25-Oct-14

GRADUATION

16-Jan-15

# Company F 2D RTBN



12-Feb-15

COMPANY COMMANDER

(b) (6)

COMPANY FIRST SERGEANT

(b) (6)

COMPANY EXECUTIVE OFFICER

Vacant

COMPANY OPERATIONS DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

2008 SERIES COMMANDER

(b) (6)

2012 SERIES COMMANDER

(b) (6)

CHIEF DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

CHIEF DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

2008 SDI

(b) (6)

DI (U) (S)

DI (U) (S)

DI (b) (6)

2012 SDI

(b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (U) (S)

DI (b) (6)

2009 SDI

(b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

2013 SDI

(b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (U) (S)

DI (b) (6)

2010 SDI

(b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (U) (S)

DI (b) (6)

2014 SDI

(b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

PICKUP

22-Nov-14

GRADUATION

13-Feb-15

# Company G 2D RTBN



12-Mar-15

COMPANY COMMANDER

(b) (6)

COMPANY FIRST SERGEANT

(b) (6)

COMPANY EXECUTIVE OFFICER

(b) (6)

COMPANY OPERATIONS DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

2016 SERIES COMMANDER

(b) (6)

2020 SERIES COMMANDER

(b) (6)

CHIEF DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

CHIEF DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

2016 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

2020 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

2017 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

2021 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

2018 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

2022 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

PICKUP

20-Dec-14

GRADUATION

13-Mar-15

# Company H 2D RTBN



16-Apr-15

COMPANY COMMANDER  
(b) (6)

COMPANY EXECUTIVE OFFICER

2024 SERIES COMMANDER  
(b) (6)

CHIEF DRILL INSTRUCTOR  
(b) (6)

2024 SDI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)

2025 SDI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)

2026 SDI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)

COMPANY FIRST SERGEANT  
(b) (6)

COMPANY OPERATIONS DRILL INSTRUCTOR  
(b) (6)

2028 SERIES COMMANDER  
(b) (6)

CHIEF DRILL INSTRUCTOR  
(b) (6)

2028 SDI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)

2029 SDI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)

2030 SDI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)

PICKUP  
24-Jan-15

GRADUATION  
17-Apr-15

# Company E 2D RTBN



7-May-15

COMPANY COMMANDER  
(b) (6)

COMPANY FIRST SERGEANT  
(b) (6)

COMPANY EXECUTIVE OFFICER  
(b) (6)

COMPANY OPERATIONS DRILL INSTRUCTOR  
(b) (6)

2032 SERIES COMMANDER  
(b) (6)

2036 SERIES COMMANDER  
(b) (6)

CHIEF DRILL INSTRUCTOR  
(b) (6)

CHIEF DRILL INSTRUCTOR  
(b) (6)

2032 SDI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)

2036 SDI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)

2033 SDI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)

2037 SDI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)

2034 SDI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)

2038 SDI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)

PICKUP  
14-Feb-15

GRADUATION  
8-May-15



# Company F 2D RTBN



4-Jun-15

COMPANY COMMANDER

(b) (6)

COMPANY FIRST SERGEANT

(b) (6)

COMPANY EXECUTIVE OFFICER

(b) (6)

COMPANY OPERATIONS DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

2040 SERIES COMMANDER

(b) (6)

2044 SERIES COMMANDER

(b) (6)

CHIEF DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

CHIEF DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

2040 SDI

(b) (6)

DI

(b) (6)

DI

(b) (6)

DI

(b) (6)

2044 SDI

(b) (6)

DI

(b) (6)

DI

(b) (6)

DI

(b) (6)

2041 SDI

(b) (6)

DI

(b) (6)

DI

(b) (6)

DI

(b) (6)

2045 SDI

(b) (6)

DI

(b) (6)

DI

(b) (6)

DI

(b) (6)

2042 SDI

(b) (6)

DI

(b) (6)

DI

(b) (6)

2046 SDI

(b) (6)

DI

(b) (6)

DI

(b) (6)

PICKUP

14-Mar-15

GRADUATION

5-Jun-15

# Company I 3D RTBN



8-Oct-14

COMPANY COMMANDER

(b) (6)

COMPANY FIRST SERGEANT

(b) (6)

COMPANY EXECUTIVE OFFICER

(b) (6)

COMPANY OPERATIONS DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

3072 SERIES COMMANDER

(b) (6)

3076 SERIES COMMANDER

(b) (6)

3072 CHIEF DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

3076 CHIEF DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

3072 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

3076 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

3073 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

3077 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

3074 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

3078 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

PICKUP

19-Jul-14

GRADUATION

10-Oct-14

Enclosure (6)

Company K  
3D RTBN



31-Oct-14

COMPANY COMMANDER  
(b) (6)

COMPANY FIRST SERGEANT  
(b) (6)

COMPANY EXECUTIVE OFFICER  
(b) (6)

COMPANY OPERATIONS DRILL INSTRUCTOR  
(b) (6)

3080 SERIES COMMANDER  
(b) (6)

3084 SERIES COMMANDER  
(b) (6)

3080 CHIEF DRILL INSTRUCTOR  
(b) (6)

3084 CHIEF DRILL INSTRUCTOR  
(b) (6)

3080 SDI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)

3084 SDI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)

3081 SDI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)

3085 SDI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)


3082 SDI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)

3086 SDI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)

PICKUP  
9-Aug-14

GRADUATION  
31-Oct-14

# Company L 3D RTBN



25-Nov-14

COMPANY COMMANDER  
(b) (6)

COMPANY FIRST SERGEANT  
(b) (6)

COMPANY EXECUTIVE OFFICER  
(b) (6)

COMPANY OPERATIONS DRILL INSTRUCTOR  
(b) (6)

3088 SERIES COMMANDER  
(b) (6)

3092 SERIES COMMANDER  
(b) (6)

CHIEF DRILL INSTRUCTOR  
(b) (6)

CHIEF DRILL INSTRUCTOR  
(b) (6)

3088 SDI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)

3082 SDI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)

3089 SDI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)

3093 SDI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)

3090 SDI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)

3094 SDI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)

PICKUP  
6-Sep-14

GRADUATION  
25-Nov-14

# Company M 3D RTBN



18-Dec-14

COMPANY COMMANDER  
(b) (6)

COMPANY FIRST SERGEANT  
(b) (6)

COMPANY EXECUTIVE OFFICER  
(b) (6)

COMPANY OPERATIONS DRILL INSTRUCTOR  
(b) (6)

3096 SERIES COMMANDER  
(b) (6)

3100 SERIES COMMANDER  
(b) (6)

CHIEF DRILL INSTRUCTOR  
(b) (6)

CHIEF DRILL INSTRUCTOR  
(b) (6)

3096 SDI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)

3100 SDI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)

3097 SDI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)

3101 SDI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)

3098 SDI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)

3102 SDI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)

OPERATIONS DRILL INSTRUCTORS  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)

PICKUP  
27-Sep-14

GRADIATION  
19-Dec-14

# Company I 3D RTBN



22-Jan-15

COMPANY COMMANDER  
(b) (6)

COMPANY FIRST SERGEANT  
(b) (6)

COMPANY EXECUTIVE OFFICER  
(b) (6)

COMPANY OPERATIONS DRILL INSTRUCTOR  
(b) (6)

3000 SERIES COMMANDER  
(b) (6)

3004 SERIES COMMANDER  
(b) (6)

3000 CHIEF DRILL INSTRUCTOR  
(b) (6)

3004 CHIEF DRILL INSTRUCTOR  
(b) (6)

3000 SDI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)

3004 SDI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)

3001 SDI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)

3005 SDI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)

3002 SDI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)

3006 SDI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)  
DI (b) (6)

PICKUP  
1-Nov-14

GRADUATION  
23-Jan-15

# Company K 3D RTBN



26-Feb-15

COMPANY COMMANDER

(b) (6)

COMPANY FIRST SERGEANT

(b) (6)

COMPANY EXECUTIVE OFFICER

(b) (6)

COMPANY OPERATIONS DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

3008 SERIES COMMANDER

(b) (6)

3012 SERIES COMMANDER

(b) (6)

CHIEF DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

CHIEF DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

3008 SDI

(b) (6)

DI

(b) (6)

DI

(b) (6)

DI

(b) (6)

3012 SDI

(b) (6)

DI

(b) (6)

DI

(b) (6)

3009 SDI

(b) (6)

DI

(b) (6)

DI

(b) (6)

3013 SDI

(b) (6)

DI

(b) (6)

DI

(b) (6)

3010 SDI

(b) (6)

DI

(b) (6)

DI

(b) (6)

DI

(b) (6)

3014 SDI

(b) (6)

DI

(b) (6)

DI

(b) (6)

PICKUP

6-Dec-14

GRADUATION

27-Feb-15

# LIMA COMPANY 3D RTBN



2 April 2015

COMPANY COMMANDER

(b) (6)

COMPANY FIRST SERGEANT

(b) (6)

COMPANY EXECUTIVE OFFICER

(b) (6)

COMPANY OPERATIONS DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

LEAD SERIES COMMANDER

(b) (6)

FOLLOW SERIES COMMANDER

(b) (6)

LEAD SERIES CHIEF DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

FOLLOW SERIES CHIEF DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

3016 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

3020 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

3017 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

3021 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

3018 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

3022 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

PICKUP

10 January 2015

GRADUATION

3 April 2015



# Company M 3D RTBN



23-Apr-15

COMPANY COMMANDER

(b) (6)

COMPANY FIRST SERGEANT

(b) (6)

COMPANY EXECUTIVE OFFICER

(b) (6)

COMPANY OPERATIONS DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

3024 SERIES COMMANDER

(b) (6)

3028 SERIES COMMANDER

(b) (6)

CHIEF DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

CHIEF DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

3024 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

3028 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

3025 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

3029 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

3026 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

3030 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

OPERATIONS DRILL INSTRUCTORS

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

PICKUP

31-Jan-15

GRADUATION

24-Apr-15

# Company I 3D RTBN



15-May-15

COMPANY COMMANDER

(b) (6)

COMPANY FIRST SERGEANT

(b) (6)

COMPANY EXECUTIVE OFFICER

(b) (6)

COMPANY OPERATIONS DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

3032 SERIES COMMANDER

(b) (6)

3036 SERIES COMMANDER

(b) (6)

CHIEF DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

CHIEF DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

3032 SDI

(b) (6)

DI

(b) (6)

DI

(b) (6)

3036 SDI

(b) (6)

DI

(b) (6)

DI

(b) (6)

3033 SDI

(b) (6)

DI

(b) (6)

DI

(b) (6)

3037 SDI

(b) (6)

DI

(b) (6)

DI

(b) (6)

3034 SDI

(b) (6)

DI

(b) (6)

DI

(b) (6)

3038 SDI

(b) (6)

DI

(b) (6)

DI

(b) (6)

PICKUP

21-Feb-15

GRADUATION

15-May-15

# KILO COMPANY 3D RTBN



19 June 2015

COMPANY COMMANDER

(b) (6)

COMPANY FIRST SERGEANT

(b) (6)

COMPANY EXECUTIVE OFFICER

(b) (6)

COMPANY OPERATIONS DRILL INSTRUCTORS

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

LEAD SERIES COMMANDER

(b) (6)

FOLLOW SERIES COMMANDER

(b) (6)

LEAD SERIES CHIEF DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

FOLLOW SERIES CHIEF DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

3040

SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

3044

SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

3041

SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

3045

SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

3042

SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

3046

SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

PICKUP  
28 March 2015

GRADUATION  
19 June 2015

# Company O 4TH RTBN



18-Sep-14

COMPANY COMMANDER

(b) (6)

COMPANY FIRST SERGEANT

(b) (6)

COMPANY EXECUTIVE OFFICER

COMPANY OPERATIONS DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

4032 SERIES COMMANDER

(b) (6)

4032 CHIEF DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

4032 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

4033 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

PICKUP


28-Jun-14

GRADUATION

18-Sep-14

Enclosure (7)

# Company P 4TH RTBN



9-Oct-14

COMPANY COMMANDER

(b) (6)

COMPANY FIRST SERGEANT

(b) (6)

COMPANY EXECUTIVE OFFICER

COMPANY OPERATIONS DRILL INSTRUCTOR

4034 SERIES COMMANDER

(b) (6)

CHIEF DRILL INSTRUCTOR

4034

(b) (6)

4034

SDI

(b) (6)

DI

(b) (6)

DI

(b) (6)

DI

(b) (6)

4035

SDI

(b) (6)

DI

(b) (6)

DI

(b) (6)

DI

(b) (6)

PICKUP

19-Jul-14

GRADUATION

10-Oct-14

# Company N 4TH RTBN



24-Oct-14

COMPANY COMMANDER

(b) (6)

COMPANY FIRST SERGEANT

(b) (6)

COMPANY EXECUTIVE OFFICER

COMPANY OPERATIONS DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

4036 SERIES COMMANDER

(b) (6)

4036 CHIEF DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

4036 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

4037 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

PICKUP

2-Aug-14

GRADUATION

24-Oct-14

# Company O 4TH RTBN



6-Nov-14

COMPANY COMMANDER

(b) (6)

COMPANY FIRST SERGEANT

(b) (6)

COMPANY EXECUTIVE OFFICER

COMPANY OPERATIONS DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

4038 SERIES COMMANDER

(b) (6)

4038 CHIEF DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

4038 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

4039 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI

PICKUP

16-Aug-14

GRADUATION

7-Nov-14

Company P  
4TH RTBN



20-Nov-14

COMPANY COMMANDER

(b) (6)

COMPANY FIRST SERGEANT

(b) (6)

COMPANY EXECUTIVE OFFICER

COMPANY OPERATIONS DRILL INSTRUCTOR

4040 SERIES COMMANDER

(b) (6)

4040 CHIEF DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

4040 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

4041 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

PICKUP

30-Aug-14

GRADUATION

21-Nov-14



# Company O 4TH RTBN



4-Dec-14

COMPANY COMMANDER

(b) (6)

COMPANY FIRST SERGEANT

(b) (6)

COMPANY EXECUTIVE OFFICER

COMPANY OPERATIONS DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

4042 SERIES COMMANDER

(b) (6)

4042 CHIEF DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

4042 SDI

(b) (6)

DI

(b) (6)

DI

(b) (6)

DI

(b) (6)

4043 SDI

(b) (6)

DJ

(b) (6)

DI

(b) (6)

DI

(b) (6)


PICKUP

13-Sep-14

GRADUATION

5-Dec-14

# Company N 4TH RTBN



19-Dec-14

COMPANY COMMANDER

(b) (6)

COMPANY FIRST SERGEANT

(b) (6)

COMPANY EXECUTIVE OFFICER

COMPANY OPERATIONS DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

4044 SERIES COMMANDER

(b) (6)

4030 CHIEF DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

4044 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

4045 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

PICKUP

27-Sep-14

GRADUATION

19-Dec-14

# Company O 4TH RTBN



8-Jan-15

COMPANY COMMANDER

(b) (6)

COMPANY FIRST SERGEANT

(b) (6)

COMPANY EXECUTIVE OFFICER

COMPANY OPERATIONS DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

4000 SERIES COMMANDER

(b) (6)

4000 CHIEF DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

4000 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

4001 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

PICKUP

18-Oct-14

GRADUATION

9-Jan-15

# Company P 4TH RTBN



22-Jan-15

COMPANY COMMANDER

(b) (6)

COMPANY FIRST SERGEANT

(b) (6)

COMPANY EXECUTIVE OFFICER

COMPANY OPERATIONS DRILL INSTRUCTOR

4002 SERIES COMMANDER

(b) (6)

4002 CHIEF DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

4002 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

4003 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

PICKUP

1-Nov-14

GRADUATION

23-Jan-15

# Company N 4TH RTBN



13-Feb-15

COMPANY COMMANDER

(b) (6)

COMPANY FIRST SERGEANT

(b) (6)

COMPANY EXECUTIVE OFFICER

COMPANY OPERATIONS DRILL INSTRUCTOR

4004 SERIES COMMANDER

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

4004 CHIEF DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

4004 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

4005 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

PICKUP

22-Nov-14

GRADUATION

13-Feb-15

# Company O 4TH RTBN



27-Feb-15

COMPANY COMMANDER

(b) (6)

COMPANY FIRST SERGEANT

(b) (6)

COMPANY EXECUTIVE OFFICER

COMPANY OPERATIONS DRILL INSTRUCTOR

4006 SERIES COMMANDER

(b) (6)

4006 CHIEF DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

4006 SDI

(b) (6)

DI

(b) (6)

DI

(b) (6)

DI

4007 SDI

(b) (6)

DI

(b) (6)

DI

(b) (6)

DI

(b) (6)

PICKUP

6-Dec-14

GRADUATION

27-Feb-15

# Company P 4TH RTBN



COMPANY COMMANDER

(b) (6)

COMPANY FIRST SERGEANT

(b) (6)

COMPANY EXECUTIVE OFFICER

COMPANY OPERATIONS DRILL INSTRUCTOR

4008 SERIES COMMANDER

(b) (6)

CHIEF DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

4008 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

4009 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

PICKUP

20-Dec-14

GRADUATION

13-Mar-14

# Company O 4TH RTBN



2-Apr-15

COMPANY COMMANDER

(b) (6)

COMPANY FIRST SERGEANT

(b) (6)

COMPANY EXECUTIVE OFFICER

COMPANY OPERATIONS DRILL INSTRUCTOR

4010 SERIES COMMANDER

(b) (6)

4010 CHIEF DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

4010 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

4011 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

PICKUP

10-Jan-15

GRADUATION

3-Apr-15



# Company N 4TH RTBN



17-Apr-15

COMPANY COMMANDER

(b) (6)

COMPANY FIRST SERGEANT

(b) (6)

COMPANY EXECUTIVE OFFICER

COMPANY OPERATIONS DRILL INSTRUCTOR

4012 SERIES COMMANDER

(b) (6)

4012 CHIEF DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

4012 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

4013 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)


PICKUP

24-Jan-15

GRADUATION

17-Apr-15

# Company O 4TH RTBN



30-Apr-15

COMPANY COMMANDER

(b) (6)

COMPANY OPERATIONS DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

COMPANY FIRST SERGEANT

(b) (6)

4014 SERIES COMMANDER

(b) (6)

4014 CHIEF DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

4014 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

4016 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

PICKUP

7-Feb-15

GRADUATION

1-May-15

# Company P 4TH RTBN



DATE

COMPANY COMMANDER

(b) (6)

COMPANY FIRST SERGEANT

(b) (6)

COMPANY EXECUTIVE OFFICER

4018 SERIES COMMANDER

(b) (6)

CHIEF DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

4018 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

4017 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

PICKUP

21-Feb-16

GRADUATION

15-May-16

# Company N 4TH RTBN



29-May-15

COMPANY COMMANDER

(b) (6)

COMPANY FIRST SERGEANT

(b) (6)

COMPANY EXECUTIVE OFFICER

COMPANY OPERATIONS DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

4018 SERIES COMMANDER

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

4018 CHIEF DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

4018 SDI

(b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

4019 SDI

(b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

PICKUP

7-Mar-15

GRADUATION

29-May-15

# Company O 4TH RTBN



18 Jun-15

COMPANY COMMANDER

(b) (6)

COMPANY FIRST SERGEANT

(b) (6)

COMPANY EXECUTIVE OFFICER

COMPANY OPERATIONS DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

4020 SERIES COMMANDER

(b) (6)

4020 CHIEF DRILL INSTRUCTOR

(b) (6)

4020 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

4021 SDI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

DI (b) (6)

PICKUP

28-Mar-15

GRADUATION

19-Jun-15

(b) (6)

**From:** (b) (6)  
**Sent:** Friday, June 26, 2015 16:24  
**To:** (b) (6)  
**Subject:** Response to Request for Information  
**Signed By:** (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Addition response:

Although 4th Battalion operates on a series track, the schedule does not restrict shifting drill instructors from one team to another in an emergency or to provide respite. This happens on an as-needed basis and is typically handled within the company. When the company lacks the flexibility to effect such moves, the requirement is elevated to the battalion and the moves are directed. Very rarely does the battalion lack the flexibility to effect such moves but should that happen, the requirement is then elevated to the Regiment and the moves are effected very quickly to source the requirement.

S/F,

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

Recruit Training Regiment

MCRD Parris Island, SC

Comm: (b) (6)

DSN: (b) (6)

BB: (b) (6)

"We Make Marines"

(b) (6)

**From:** (b) (6)  
**Sent:** Friday, June 26, 2015 16:11  
**To:** (b) (6)  
**Subject:** Response to Request for Information  
**Signed By:** (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Response to FF concerning quota billets:

Officers in the RTR are sourced through MCC 016. This same MCC is also shared by H&S Bn. As officers are transferred in and out of MCRD Parris Island, certain billets open up at H&S Bn and those billets are sourced and filled by Officers that have Recruit Training experience from the Regiment. These billets historically are Staff Secretary, CG's Aide de Camp, Recruit Liaison Section OIC, and Depot Visits Officer. This past year found RTR filling the additional billets of H&S Bn HQ Company Commander, H&S Bn Service Company Commander, Force Preservation Officer, and the Centennial Planning Officer. Nominees are solicited from the Regiment when the sitting billet holders are preparing to PCS. With the exception of the staff secretary which will be filled on 6 July by a female Captain, 4th Recruit Battalion was not asked to provide a nominee because of their shortage of officers. These billets were sourced from the male training battalions and Support Battalion.

S/E,

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

Recruit Training Regiment  
MCRD Parris Island, SC

Comm: (b) (6)

DSN: (b) (6)

BB: (b) (6)

"We Make Marines"



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

Training and Education Command  
1019 Elliot Road  
QUANTICO, VIRGINIA 22134

IN REPLY REFER TO:

5830

IO/(b) (6)

22 Jun 15

From: (b) (6)  
To: Commanding General, Training and Education Command  
Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES  
SURROUNDING ALLEGATIONS OF A HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT AT  
THE RECRUIT TRAINING REGIMENT, MARINE CORPS RECRUIT DEPOT,  
PARRIS ISLAND

Ref: (a) JAGINST 5800.7F (JAGMAN)  
(b) MCO P5354.1D w/ch 1 (Equal Opportunity Manual)  
(c) MCO 1700.23F (Request Mast)  
(d) 4th Recruit Training Battalion's DEOMI Organizational  
Climate Survey (DEOCS) Report of 22 Apr 15  
(e) 1st, 2nd, 3rd, and Support Battalions' DEOCS Reports  
of 22 Apr 15  
(f) RegtO 5041.2K of 16 Jun 08  
(g) U.S. Navy Regulations, para. 1164

Encl: (1) Convening order  
(2) (b) (6) ltrs 5830 JEC of 8, 10, and 15 Jun 15  
(Requests for Information)  
(3) Statement of (b) (6) dtd 16 Jun 15  
(4) Statement of (b) (6) dtd 12 Jun 15  
(5) Statement of (b) (6) dtd 10 Jun 15  
(6) Statement of (b) (6) dtd 11 Jun 15  
(7) Statement of (b) (6) dtd 15 Jun 15  
(8) Statement of (b) (6) dtd 10 Jun 15  
(9) Statement of (b) (6) dtd 10 Jun 15  
(10) Statement of (b) (6) dtd 9 Jun 15  
(11) Performance metrics by battalion from 2011-2014  
(12) FY05-15 Rifle Range Table 1 Initial Qualification  
Percentages for the Recruit Training Battalions  
(13) Statement of (b) (6) dtd 11 Jun 15  
(14) (b) (6) written statement (8 pages)  
(15) RTR Officer Staffing from June 2014 - June 2015  
(16) Statement of (b) (6) dtd 9 Jun 15  
(17) Statement of (b) (6) dtd 11 Jun 15  
(18) Statement of (b) (6) dtd 9 Jun 15  
(19) CG, TECOM's ltr 5040 C46IG of 20 Nov 14 (w/encl)  
(20) CG (CI) MCRD/ERR ltr 5000 CI/SRS of 20 Nov 14



Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING ALLEGATIONS OF A HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT AT THE RECRUIT TRAINING REGIMENT, MARINE CORPS RECRUIT DEPOT, PARRIS ISLAND

- (21) RTR ltr 5730 (w/encl)
- (22) Training Battalion Structure Diagram
- (23) Effective/Non-effective Personnel and Quota Filling by Battalion from June 2014 - June 2015
- (24) Effective/Non-effective Personnel and Quota Filling in 4th Battalion in June 2015
- (25) (b) (6) Biography of 15 Jun 15
- (26) (b) (6) ltr 1000 CO of 18 May 15 (Request Mast)
- (27) Email from (b) (6) to (b) (6) of 23 Sep 14
- (28) (b) (6) Request for CDE-Modification PowerPoint Brief
- (29) (b) (6) memo for the record of 22 Oct 14
- (30) (b) (6) memo for the record of 19 Nov 14
- (31) (b) (6) Letter of Recommendation from (b) (6) of 22 Nov 14
- (32) Email from and to (b) (6) of 19 Dec 14
- (33) (b) (6) ltr 1336 CO of 24 Sep 14 (Performance Review of (b) (6))
- (34) Email from (b) (6) to (b) (6) of 18 Dec 14
- (35) A-PES Printout of (b) (6) In Progress Fitness Reports of 21 May 15
- (36) 4th Battalion Billet Progression Board 2015 Schedule
- (37) Email from (b) (6) to (b) (6) of 4 Dec 14
- (38) Email from (b) (6) to (b) (6) of 3 Apr 15 (w/encl)
- (39) CO ltr 1000 SPCO of 23 May 15 (w/encl)
- (40) CO ltr 1000 SPCO of 20 May 15 (w/o encls)
- (41) Facilities and Maintenance Division Report from 19 Aug 14 - 5 Jun 15
- (42) Email from (b) (6) to (b) (6) of 18 Mar 15
- (43) Email from (b) (6) to (b) (6) of 14 May 15 (w/encl) (4th Battalion Post DEOMI Action Plan)
- (44) CG ltr 1000 CI/SS of 23 Apr 15
- (45) CG ltr 5040 CI/SS of 24 Apr 15
- (46) CG ltr 5040 CI of 19 May 15
- (47) Statement of (b) (6) dtd 11 Jun 15
- (48) Standard Questions Asked by (b) (6) during Inspection of 4th Battalion
- (49) CO ltr 5041 RTR of 23 Oct 13 (RCIP Discrepancy Report)
- (50) Statement of (b) (6) dtd 11 Jun 15
- (51) RTR Policy Statement on Equal Opportunity and Sexual Harassment
- (52) (b) (6) ltr 5830 (b) (6) of 5 Jun 15 (EO Notification)
- (53) (b) (6) ltr 5830 (b) (6) of 15 Jun 15 (Request for Extension)

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES  
SURROUNDING ALLEGATIONS OF A HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT AT  
THE RECRUIT TRAINING REGIMENT, MARINE CORPS RECRUIT DEPOT,  
PARRIS ISLAND

### Preliminary Statement

1. This report represents completion of the command investigation conducted in accordance with reference (a) into the facts and circumstances surrounding allegations of a hostile work environment and gender discrimination at the Recruit Training Regiment, Marine Corps Recruit Depot, Parris Island. Encl (1).
2. Many of the personnel involved were accessible in person or for phone interviews. There were no significant obstacles encountered during the course of this inquiry.
3. There were some conflicts in evidence noted in the investigation. There were inconsistencies surrounding the relieving of (b) (6) N Company commander, (b) (6). During a meeting between (b) (6) and (b) (6) immediately preceding the relieving of (b) (6), (b) (6) claims that (b) (6) was clear that (b) (6) must not relieve (b) (6) before (b) (6) gets an opportunity to talk with (b) (6). (b) (6) interpretation was that (b) (6) was not questioning the intent to relieve, rather (b) (6) wanted to hold off on billet placement since (b) (6) original intent was to return (b) (6) to a series commander billet. An email from (b) (6) forty-five minutes after the conversation implies that there may have been some confusion during their meeting. The evidence supports (b) (6) (b) (6) contention that (b) (6) misinterpreted (b) (6) guidance in the relief of (b) (6).
4. (b) (6), Legal Services Support Section - National Capital Region, Marine Corps Base Quantico, Virginia, provided legal advice, as required.
5. All available evidence has been collected and is provided as enclosures to this report. Encl (2). The below findings of fact are supported by a preponderance of the evidence. Ref (a).

### Findings of Fact

1. (b) (6) assumed command of 4th Recruit Training Battalion (RTB) on 10 June 2014. [Encl (3)]
2. (b) (6) has been the commanding officer of Recruit Training Regiment (RTR) since summer 2013. [Encl (4)]

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING ALLEGATIONS OF A HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT AT THE RECRUIT TRAINING REGIMENT, MARINE CORPS RECRUIT DEPOT, PARRIS ISLAND

3. The following battalion commanders have been in command from at least summer 2014 to present: (b) (6), 1st RTB; (b) (6), 2d RTB; (b) (6), 3rd RTB; (b) (6), Service Battalion; and (b) (6), Weapons and Field Training Battalion. [Encls (5)-(9)]
4. According to (b) (6), the two biggest challenges (b) (6) has experienced as the 4th Battalion commander have been (1) selling (b) (6) Marines on change, and (2) getting support from the regiment, particularly in dealing with manpower issues. [Encl (10)]
5. Change in the battalion was needed because, according to (b) (6), "[i]t was not until I dug into the actual stats did I realize the female battalion was struggling [when compared] with their male counterparts." [Encl (10)]
6. "Credibility of my Marines has been a paramount concern of mine," (b) (6) says. [Encl (10)]
7. Historically, the male battalions have out-performed the female battalion in nearly all aspects of measured performance, such as drill, PFT/CFT, academics, and rifle range. [Encl (11)]
8. (b) (6) determined that the first and most notable major performance metric to address was improving 4th Battalion's initial rifle range qualification rates. [Encl (10)]
9. (b) (6) worked closely in collaboration with the Weapons and Field Training Battalion CO, (b) (6), to improve (b) (6) Marines' initial qualification rates. [Encls (9), (10)]
10. (b) (6) considers (b) (6) relationship with (b) (6) to be the best out of all the battalion commanders and from what (b) (6) has seen (b) (6) was the best overall Recruit Training Battalion commander of the four recruit battalions. "(b) (6) is always visible and engaged throughout recruit training," (b) (6) says. [Encl (9)]
11. Table 1 Initial Qualification rates for 4th Battalion have historically (2005-2013) ranged between 55% - 75%. [Encl (12)]
12. As of March 2015, the initial qualification rate for 4th Battalion for FY15 is 91.68%. [Encl (12)]

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES  
SURROUNDING ALLEGATIONS OF A HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT AT  
THE RECRUIT TRAINING REGIMENT, MARINE CORPS RECRUIT DEPOT,  
PARRIS ISLAND

13. Table 1 Initial Qualification rates for male battalions have historically (2005 - 2013) ranged between 78% - 93% and is currently 94.79%. [Encl (12)]

Manpower Issues (Officer and Enlisted)

14. Before assuming command, (b) (6) predecessor made certain staffing decisions affecting the battalion's on-hand officer end-strength, e.g., filling the billets of the CG's Aide and Staff Secretary, transitioning officers to Support Battalion and Drill Instructor School. [Encl (13)]

15. These staffing decisions relinquished officers from the 4th Battalion to fill quota billets above and beyond the required number. [Encls (10); (14)]

16. Fourth Battalion's officer T/O is 17. [Encl (15)]

17. All male recruit battalions (1st, 2nd, and 3rd Battalions) have a T/O of 20 officers. [Encl (15)]

18. Because of the priority status of Recruit Training Regiment, the Headquarters Marine Corps staffing goal for the battalions is 95% of T/O. [Encl (16)]

19. Fourth Battalion's average on-hand officer end-strength has been approximately 14 from June 2014 to June 2015, which is 82% of their T/O end-strength. [Encl (15)]

20. During the same time period 1st, 2nd and 3rd Battalions have averaged on-hand officer end-strengths of 19, 18, and 19, respectively, which is 90% - 95% of their T/O end-strength. [Encl (15)]

21. Fourth Battalion's on-hand end-strength of officers has not exceeded 15 since at least June 2014. [Encl (15)]

22. In the months of June 2014 and June 2015, during periods of high recruit through-put, 4th Battalion's on-hand officer end-strength was/is 13. [Encl (15)]

23. Manpower issues have been a sporadic regiment-wide problem since at least June 2014. [Encls (3)-(7), (10), (16), (17)]

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING ALLEGATIONS OF A HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT AT THE RECRUIT TRAINING REGIMENT, MARINE CORPS RECRUIT DEPOT, PARRIS ISLAND

24. Because female through-put is smaller, 4th Battalion trains recruits using a series track schedule. [Encls (10), (18)]

25. Within a female company, two series units operate independently from one another and operate in different phases of recruit training (e.g., one series within a company may be training recruits in phase 2 while the other series is conducting training in the final phase with the Crucible). [Encls (10), (18)]

26. 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Battalions train recruits using a company track schedule. [Encls (5)-(7)]

27. A company track schedule means that while the male battalions conduct independent training within the series unit/element, the entire company is on the same training schedule. [Encls (5)-(7)]

28. The difference between company track and series track training translates into approximately twice as many female recruit training events and graduations as the male battalions. [Encls (3)-(7), (10), (18)]

29. Twice as many recruit events reduces the down-time between cycles for the drill instructors and command teams within the 4th Battalion as compared to the male battalions. [Encls (10), (16), (18)]

30. As early as September 2014, (b) (6) and (b) (6) XO, (b) (6) (b) (6), raised the issue of manpower shortfalls (officer and enlisted) as a matter of routine during weekly regimental staff meetings. [Encls (10), (14), (16)]

31. According to (b) (6), in one of (b) (6) weekly XO meetings, "(b) (6) (b) (6)." [Encls (13), (16)]

32. In October 2014, unhappy with the regiment's progress, (b) (6) (b) (6) contacted MMOA to discuss her manpower issues. [Encls (4), (10), (13)]

33. MMOA contacted the Depot's G-1 and the G-1 in turn contacted (b) (6). [Encls (4), (13)]

34. (b) (6) counseled (b) (6) on going around the chain of command to resolve (b) (6) issues. [Encls (4), (10)]

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING ALLEGATIONS OF A HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT AT THE RECRUIT TRAINING REGIMENT, MARINE CORPS RECRUIT DEPOT, PARRIS ISLAND

35. On 26 October, a hotline email complaint was filed with (b) (6) (b) (6), TECOM IG, regarding manpower concerns for the manning of series commanders in 4th Battalion. [Encl (19)]

36. On 20 November, the Commanding General, Training Command, requested a formal response from the Commanding General, Marine Corps Recruit Depot, Parris Island regarding manning shortfalls specifically at 4th Battalion. [Encl (20)]

37. The RTR responded to the hotline complaint noting that "[t]here is not a shortage of trained personnel." [Encl (21)]

38. The RTR response further notes that several personnel have been moved out of the training battalion to the Support Battalion and Drill Instructor School (due to upward mobility opportunities), as well as to billets such as the CG's Aide and Staff Secretary. [Encl (21)]

39. The RTR response further notes, "[t]he topic of additional female officer assignments to MCRD Parris Island has been discussed at the Regimental Staff level and is a current discussion topic between the Depot G-1 and MMOA." [Encl (21)]

40. The regimental XO and 4th Battalion commander each used the most recent MMOA roadshow visit as an opportunity to talk with the monitors about the increased need for female officers. [Encl (13)]

41. From in or about June 2014 to June 2015, 4th Battalion's S-4 officer was a male officer, which allowed a female officer to return to one of the training companies. [Encl (3)]

42. Within the RTB structure, 4th Battalion's T/O structure provides four drill instructors per series. [Encl (22)]

43. 1st, 2nd and 3rd Battalions T/O structure provides five drill instructors per series. [Encl (22)]

44. The manning of series units is typically three drill instructor teams within 4th battalion and four DI teams within 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Battalions. [Encls (5), (6), (10)]

45. The on-hand end-strength of DIs is designed with flexibility in the numbers to accommodate one-year quota billet requirements outside of the battalions and instances of DIs being rendered

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING ALLEGATIONS OF A HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT AT THE RECRUIT TRAINING REGIMENT, MARINE CORPS RECRUIT DEPOT, PARRIS ISLAND

"non-effective" due to medical or misconduct reasons. [Encls (4), (13)]

46. Because 4th Battalion operates on a series track vice a company track, there is limited flexibility to shift drill instructors around in an emergency or to provide respite as necessary. [Encls (10), (16), (18)]

47. While 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Battalions endure similar manning shortfalls to the series drill instructor, in an emergency or to provide needed respite, the company track provides flexibility to drill instructors to cover down temporarily as needed since the entire company is conducting the same training... [Encls (4)-(7), (10), (16), (18)]

48. Between June and October 2014, 4th Battalion's staffing issues became aggravated due to the quota system, pregnancy issues, internal injuries, TAD, and certain support staff requirements for only females. [Encls (10), (15), (16), (18), (23), (24)]

49. In or about April 2015, (b) (6), (b) (6) XO, and the G-1 conducted a review of the enlisted T/O and current on-hand staffing of the battalion, regiment, and Depot. [Encls (4), (13)]

50. (b) (6), (b) (6) XO, and the G-1 concluded that there were no shortfalls in on-hand end-strength for DIs within 4th Battalion. [Encls (4), (13)]

51. (b) (6) concluded that (b) (6) arguments regarding (b) (6) perceived shortfall in DIs is not justified, because HQMC deliberately overstaffs MCRD with female drill instructors in order to ensure the battalion has enough mission "effective" DIs available. [Encl (4)]

#### Recruiting Station Communications

52. (b) (6) has a career background at various Recruiting Station commands. [Encls (10), (14), (25)]

53. As a Capt, (b) (6) served as the operations officer and executive officer for Recruiting Station Orange County, California. [Encl (25)]

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING ALLEGATIONS OF A HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT AT THE RECRUIT TRAINING REGIMENT, MARINE CORPS RECRUIT DEPOT, PARRIS ISLAND

54. As a Maj, (b) (6) served as the Commanding Officer for the Recruiting Station in San Diego, California. [Encl (25)]

55. Based upon (b) (6) experience in serving at various recruiting stations and reviewing the trends in drops/discharges from 4th Battalion, (b) (6) saw value in communicating with the Recruiting Stations when a recruit was dropped or discharged from the battalion. [Encl (10)]

56. In September 2014, (b) (6) contacted several Recruiting Station commanding officers to discuss female recruit drop/discharge trends and how to improve the quality of female recruits arriving at the Depot. [Encls (4), (10), (13), (26)]

57. In one particular instance, (b) (6) email to the Recruiting Station New York commanding officer was forwarded to the Assistant Chief of Staff for Recruiting and the email eventually made its way to (b) (6) [Encls (4), (10), (27)]

58. Initially, (b) (6) ordered (b) (6) to stop contacting Recruiting Stations, and informed (b) (6) that (b) (6) tone was overly aggressive and came across as pompous. [Encls (4), (10)]

59. (b) (6) responded that (b) (6) would not be saying that if a man had written the email instead of a woman. [Encl (3)]

60. After discussing the matter further with (b) (6), it was agreed upon that (b) (6) could continue contacting RS commanders as long as (b) (6) tones down (b) (6) emails and cc's (b) (6) on them. [Encls (3), (4), (10)]

#### Duty Officer Modifications

61. Officers in the battalions are required to stand the Early/Late Check Officer (ELCO) (formerly company duty officer) watch and officers and SNCOs in the battalion are required to stand an Officer of the Day (OOD) watch. [Encl (3)]

62. Drill instructors are exempt from ELCO and OOD watch. [Encl (3)]

63. In or about September 2014, in an effort to reduce duplications and workload requirements for her staff and company leadership, (b) (6) combined the two watches into one. [Encls (3), (4), (14), (17)]



Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES  
SURROUNDING ALLEGATIONS OF A HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT AT  
THE RECRUIT TRAINING REGIMENT, MARINE CORPS RECRUIT DEPOT,  
PARRIS ISLAND

64. The Depot order requires that the ELCO and OOD duties are staffed by separate personnel. [Encl (3)]

65. A Marine from the Command IG office observed during afternoon chow that there were not two duty personnel in the chow hall making rounds. [Encls (3), (4), (17)]

66. The IG Marine reported this back to the IG, who subsequently reported it to (b) (6). [Encls (3), (4), (17)]

67. (b) (6) notified (b) (6) that (b) (6) does not have the authority to circumvent the Depot order and combine these duties, and that (b) (6) must request an exemption to do so. [Encls (3), (4), (17)]

68. (b) (6) briefed (b) (6) on the requirements for both watches and requested to combine and modify the watch duties to encompass all requirements. [Encls (3), (4), (14), (28)]

69. (b) (6) informed (b) (6) that (b) (6) couldn't do anything about it since the issue was governed by a Depot order. [Encls (3), (4)]

70. (b) (6) reverted back to having two separate officers standing two separate duties. [Encl (3)]

#### Pregnancy Policy

71. In the first few months of (b) (6) command, (b) (6) and (b) (6) identified and commented to Regiment leadership the need for a pregnancy policy, mainly due to the strain pregnant Drill Instructors have put on (b) (6) mission "effective" end-strength to support recruit series training. [Encls (3), (10), (14), (18)]

72. There is not a pregnancy policy at the Depot-level, regiment-level, or battalion-level. [Encls (3), (4), (10), (13), (14), (18)]

73. In April, 4th Battalion had five pregnant drill instructors, three of which were returning from their quota billets within Support Battalion. [Encls (3), (10), (14), (16), (18), (24)]

74. Without any regimental progress made on the pregnancy policy, (b) (6) staff drafted a pregnancy policy point paper and presented it to (b) (6). [Encls (3), (4), (10), (13), (14), (18)]

6  
Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES  
SURROUNDING ALLEGATIONS OF A HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT AT  
THE RECRUIT TRAINING REGIMENT, MARINE CORPS RECRUIT DEPOT,  
PARRIS ISLAND

75. (b) (6) returned the draft point paper in April and informed (b) (6) that there were a number of issues and potential political ramifications with which (b) (6) has concerns. (b) (6) requested that they further discuss the re-drafted policy if (b) (6) was still interested in pushing it. [Encls (3), (4), (10), (13), (14)].

76. There has been no further action on the pregnancy policy as of the date of this report. [Encls (3), (4), (10), (13), (14)].

Relationship between (b) (6) and (b) (6) (Battalion XO)

77. In October, problems between (b) (6) and (b) (6) executive officer surfaced and over time the professional relationship worsened. [Encls (4), (10), (14), (16), (18), (26), (29), (30)]

78. During a graduation ceremony in October, (b) (6), a geo-bachelorette, departed for the weekend to spend time with (b) (6) husband. [Encl (10)]

79. During the weekend in (b) (6) absence, (b) (6) approached each of the battalion's company commanders to obtain written/verbal statements concerning their frustrations with (b) (6) (b) (6) and (b) (6) leadership. [Encls (3), (10), (14), (16), (18)]

80. (b) (6) received a phone call from (b) (6) informing (b) (6) of what (b) (6) had done. [Encls (3), (10), (18)]

81. (b) (6) confronted (b) (6) about the fact that (b) (6) was soliciting statements and conducting an informal investigation within the command. [Encls (3), (10), (16), (18)]

82. (b) (6) lost trust in (b) (6) XO beginning in October and directed the company commanders to consult (b) (6) directly on company related matters/issues and informed (b) (6) to focus on battalion staff issues with the regiment. [Encl (10)]

83. In or about November 2014, (b) (6) approached (b) (6) to discuss (b) (6) strained relationship with (b) (6). [Encl (17)]

84. (b) (6) entered (b) (6) office, shut the door, began crying, and discussed (b) (6) frustration with (b) (6) and (b) (6) leadership style/methods. [Encl (17)]

6

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES  
SURROUNDING ALLEGATIONS OF A HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT AT  
THE RECRUIT TRAINING REGIMENT, MARINE CORPS RECRUIT DEPOT,  
PARRIS ISLAND

85. On 22 November, (b) (6) drafted a letter of recommendation for (b) (6), recommending that (b) (6) be selected to serve as the Vice Presidential Aide. [Encl (31)]

86. In or about February 2015, (b) (6) approached (b) (6) the former Eastern Recruiting Region IG and the current Regiment XO, to discuss (b) (6) strained relationship with (b) (6). [Encl (13)]

87. (b) (6) entered the office of (b) (6), shut the door, began crying, and discussed her frustration with (b) (6). [Encl (13)]

88. Around the same time, in April, two out of three of (b) (6) (b) (6) company commanders approached (b) (6) and told (b) (6) that they hated coming to work; that they were scared coming to work; that they wanted to remain loyal to their commander but they couldn't operate under (b) (6) oppressive environment; that they were scared to go to (b) (6) because (b) (6) was completely unapproachable and not receptive to their ideas. [Encl (13)]

89. (b) (6) voiced (b) (6) discontent of (b) (6) and (b) (6) leadership methods in the DEOMI Report of 22 April, as well as in interacting with the Eastern Recruiting Region Command IG. [Encl (16)]

90. (b) (6), during her out-brief with (b) (6), discussed all of the issues (b) (6) has had with (b) (6) since June 2014. [Encl (4)].

91. (b) (6) checked out from the battalion on 15 May 15 and is executing PCS orders to Bahrain. [Encl (3)]

#### Relief of (b) (6)

92. In December 2014, (b) (6) counseled (b) (6) on the relief of one of (b) (6) company commanders. [Encls (4), (10), (32)]

93. (b) (6) was the N Company commander from April 2014 - January 2015. [Encls (10), (14), (32)]

94. On or about 24 September 14, (b) (6) issued (b) (6) a non-punitive letter of caution for the following deficiencies: (1) lack of involvement and enthusiasm in the process of making Marines; (2) failing to track drill instructor performance in

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING ALLEGATIONS OF A HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT AT THE RECRUIT TRAINING REGIMENT, MARINE CORPS RECRUIT DEPOT, PARRIS ISLAND

record jackets and evaluation logbooks; (3) failing to adapt to new command philosophy/intent of expecting excellence, which resulted in a substandard performance on the rifle range; and (4) the perceived negative command climate within her company. [Encls (10), (32), (33)]

95. On 18 December, after approximately three months of counseling and observing (b) (6), (b) (6) notified (b) (6) (b) (6) in (b) (6) office of (b) (6) intentions to relieve (b) (6). [Encls (3), (4), (10), (16), (32), (34)]

96. (b) (6) identified that (b) (6) plan was to return (b) (6) (b) (6) to a series commander billet and move a series commander to a company commander billet. [Encls (3), (4), (10), (32), (34)]

97. (b) (6) told (b) (6) to hold off on doing anything for now. [Encl (4), Preliminary Statement]

98. Forty-five minutes after their meeting, (b) (6) sent an email to (b) (6) stating, "Please do not remove (b) (6) from command until I have an opportunity to research options as I discussed." [Encl (34)]

99. (b) (6), prior to reading the email, relieved (b) (6) (b) (6) before (b) (6) had an opportunity to talk to her. [Encls (4), (10), (32), (34)]

100. According to (b) (6), she misinterpreted (b) (6) guidance, responding to (b) (6) email, "When you and I discussed the issue I did not leave with the impression that you did not concur with the relief but that you wanted to hold off on the new billet." [Encl (10)]

101. In a phone call immediately after the email, (b) (6) told (b) (6) that she had violated a direct order. [Encls (4), (10), (32)]

102. Between on or about 8 December and on or about 8 January 2015, (b) (6) reviewed (b) (6) performance jacket provided by (b) (6). [Encls (3), (4)]

103. During this period, (b) (6) was on leave and was acting as the de facto company commander until (b) (6) approved the relief. [Encls (3), (4), (10)]

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING ALLEGATIONS OF A HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT AT THE RECRUIT TRAINING REGIMENT, MARINE CORPS RECRUIT DEPOT, PARRIS ISLAND

104. On 8 January, (b) (6) concurred with (b) (6) relief of (b) (6) and (b) (6) was officially relieved. [Encls (4), (10)]

105. Since June 2014, (b) (6) has been the only company commander within the Regiment to be relieved for the loss of trust and confidence. [Encl (4)]

106. Two additional company commanders have been relieved within the Regiment since June 2014 due to misconduct. [Encl (4)]

107. The ending date on (b) (6) fitness report is 7 January 2015. [Encl (35)]

108. (b) (6) submitted (b) (6) fitness report to (b) (6) (b) (6) on 15 March. [Encl (35)]

109. To date, (b) (6) has not completed his reviewing officer comments, but is strongly considering non-concurring with (b) (6) (b) (6) comments/markings of (b) (6). [Encls (4), (35)]

(b) (6) Presence at 4th Battalion Events

110. (b) (6) is present at the following weekly major events for all battalions: pick-up brief to the staff, pick-up of actual recruits, graduation, and the Crucible/end-of-cycle debriefs/EGA ceremony. [Encls (4)-(7), (10)]

111. (b) (6) generally attends twice the number of 4th Battalion events than the other battalions simply due to the fact that the 4th battalion operates on a series track and male battalions operate on a company track. [Encls (4), (10)]

112. Fourth Battalion conducts 22 series graduations per year; each of the male battalions conduct 12 graduations per year. [Encl (3)]

113. To date, (b) (6) has not participated in an integrated (female series/male company) Crucible hike. [Encls (4), (10)]

Career Progression Board

114. (b) (6) established and implemented a Drill Instructor Career Progression Program in which Senior Drill Instructors (SDI) were chosen from a pool of candidates for the purpose of insuring

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES  
SURROUNDING ALLEGATIONS OF A HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT AT  
THE RECRUIT TRAINING REGIMENT, MARINE CORPS RECRUIT DEPOT,  
PARRIS ISLAND

that the most qualified drill instructors were to appointed to the Senior DI positions. [Encls (10), (14), (16), (18), (36)]

115. Under the new DI Career Progression Program, SDIs are chosen by a battalion screening board instead of fleeting up automatically after a couple of series or rank promotion. [Encls (10), (14), (16), (18), (36)]

116. The screening board did not have parameters in place to control whether a sergeant DI was/could be selected over a SNCO DI for the SDI position. Within the design of the program, it was possible and acceptable to (b) (6) to appoint a sergeant to serve as a SDI supervising a SNCO. [Encls (3), (10)]

117. When briefing the series staffing plan to the Regimental Command, (b) (6) informed (b) (6) that (b) (6) DI teams could not have a sergeant appointed as a SDI on teams that contained SNCOs. [Encls (3), (4)]

118. (b) (6) established a regimental policy forbidding NCOs to be placed in charge of SNCOs on DI teams. [Encl (4)]

119. As a result of the policy, (b) (6) re-structured the ranks of (b) (6) series DI teams before any series recruit pick-up occurred. [Encl (3)]

#### Female Integrated Hikes/ Socialization

120. There is no female integration policy at the Depot-level, regiment-level, or battalion-level. [Encls (3), (4), (13), (14), (16), (18)]

121. In or about December, (b) (6) expressed a desire to integrate hikes between male companies and female series operating/training on the same cycle. [Encls (4)-(7), (10), (14), (37)]

122. On 4 December, (b) (6) directed the battalions to start integrating 4th Battalion into Crucible hikes. [Encls (4), (10), (37)]

123. First and 4th Battalions conducted the first female integrated Crucible hike in December. [Encls (5), (10)]

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES  
SURROUNDING ALLEGATIONS OF A HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT AT  
THE RECRUIT TRAINING REGIMENT, MARINE CORPS RECRUIT DEPOT,  
PARRIS ISLAND

124. Two battalion commanders expressed concern with integrated hikes over unity of command, safety, and coordination issues, i.e., what will the hike order be between the company and the series formations; who was responsible for taking the lead on route planning and logistics. [Encls (6), (7)]

125. Integrated hikes have occurred for six months with some mixed reviews but mostly positive results from the battalion commanders. [Encls (4)-(7), (10)]

126. On 1 April 2015, after four months of conducting integrated hikes, (b) (6) provided (b) (6) an after action report on "concurrent Crucible foot marches," per (b) (6) request. [Encl (38)]

127. In (b) (6) report, (b) (6) sites concerns with safety, accountability, logistics, and command and control and "determine[s] no value has been added to the training of recruits by executing the final Crucible foot march concurrently with 4th RTBN . . . ." [Encl (38)]

128. (b) (6) expressed concerns over whether from a logistical standpoint the integrated hikes will be successful. [Encl (4)]

(b) (6) Relationship with Battalion Commanders

129. (b) (6) and (b) (6) have a positive personal and professional relationship. [Encls (5), (10)]

130. (b) (6) and (b) (6) have a limited personal and professional relationship. [Encls (6), (10)]

131. (b) (6) and (b) (6) do not interact on a professional or personal level other than integrated hikes and combined graduation ceremonies. [Encls (7), (10)]

132. (b) (6) does not personally like or professionally respect (b) (6) as (b) (6) is not in keeping with "General Lejeune's Marine Corps Order #29:" [Encls (8), (39)]

133. As a Capt, (b) (6) served with (b) (6) at HQMC, M&RA, MMEA for one year. [Encls (8), (39)]

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING ALLEGATIONS OF A HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT AT THE RECRUIT TRAINING REGIMENT, MARINE CORPS RECRUIT DEPOT, PARRIS ISLAND

134. As a Maj, (b) (6) was a student at Marine Corps Command and Staff College; (b) (6) was a military faculty advisor with Marine Corps University. [Encls (8), (39)]

135. For the past two years, (b) (6) served as the Support Battalion Commander under (b) (6) Regimental Command. [Encls (8), (39)]

136. In (b) (6) years of experience working and interacting with (b) (6) (b) (6) as a staff officer, student, and commander, (b) (6) never experienced a sense of gender-bias from (b) (6). [Encl (8)].

137. On 13 September 2014, during a Crucible hike in which (b) (6) (b) (6) was present, (b) (6) reported that (b) (6) commented to (b) (6) that a certain SNCO was the "worst SNCO I have" in the company. This statement occurred within hearing distance of multiple SNCOs including the SNCO that was the subject of the comment. [Encls (8), (40)]

138. During the same hike, (b) (6) observed (b) (6) chastising one of (b) (6) honor graduates for falling out of the hike. [Encls (8), (40)]

#### Facilities and Maintenance Issues

139. In or about January 2015, 4th Battalion had three Marines without heat in their barracks rooms. [Encls (3), (10)]

140. On 20 February 2015, 10 barracks' rooms Depot-wide had heat-related issues. [Encl (41)]

141. On 23 February, 35 barracks' rooms Depot-wide had no thermostats. [Encl (41)]

142. (b) (6) notified Regiment of this issue in January during a staff meeting. [Encls (3), (10)]

143. The barracks room temperature issues were resolved approximately three months later when the Facilities and Maintenance Division began installing thermostats in the Depot barracks. [Encls (13), (41)]



Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES  
SURROUNDING ALLEGATIONS OF A HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT AT  
THE RECRUIT TRAINING REGIMENT, MARINE CORPS RECRUIT DEPOT,  
PARRIS ISLAND

DEMOI Survey and Results of 4th Battalion

144. On or about 13 March 2015, (b) (6) counselled (b) (6) on (b) (6) command climate and approachability. [Encls (4), (10)]

145. On 18 March, (b) (6) emailed (b) (6) Eastern Recruiting Region SgtMaj, expressing (b) (6) frustrations with (b) (6) particularly regarding officer staffing and (b) (6) assessment of (b) (6) leadership. [Encl (42)]

146. In or about April, (b) (6) felt like (b) (6) was at (b) (6) wits end with the Regiment. [Encl (10)]

147. On 22 April, the DEOMI Report of 4th Battalion was released. [Ref (d)]

148. Each battalion was provided one code for their Marines to submit surveys. [Encl (10)]

149. The method by which the survey was administered opened up the possibility for Marines to submit multiple surveys. (b) (6) was told by one Marine that they had completed the survey more than once. [Encls (10), (18)]

150. The short answer questions portion of the Regiment-wide survey included the following questions: 1) Have you witnessed any incidents where members of the unit acted disrespectfully to subordinates?; 2) What one thing would you change to improve communications?; 3) To whom do you feel comfortable reporting an act of discrimination or sexual harassment?; 4) What is your impression of the equal opportunity policies at this unit?; and 5) Do you feel that the unit handles discipline issues fairly? [Ref (e)]

151. Though the DEOMI Survey was conducted Regiment-wide, 3rd Battalion's survey was conducted separately and used a different set of questions for the short answer portion of the survey. [Ref (e)]

152. 3rd Battalion's questions included: 1) What do you recommend to improve the unit's mentorship program?; 2) How effectively do leaders in this unit use their time?; 3) What factors contribute to your decision whether or not to pursue a career in the Service?; 4) How have changes (positive or negative) at this unit

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES  
SURROUNDING ALLEGATIONS OF A HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT AT  
THE RECRUIT TRAINING REGIMENT, MARINE CORPS RECRUIT DEPOT,  
PARRIS ISLAND

during the past year impacted you?; and 5) What do you know about this unit that leadership does not know, but should? [Ref (e)]

153. 4th Battalion has 99 personnel within the battalion and sixty-four surveys were submitted. [Ref (d), encl (3)]

154. In or about April, (b) (6) contacted (b) (6) to schedule a meeting to discuss 4th Battalion's DEOMI Report. [Encls (4), (10), (14)]

155. During the discussion, (b) (6) informed (b) (6) that the Report was not representative of (b) (6) command climate and that the Report reflected comments of but a few Marines colluding against (b) (6). [Encls (4), (10), (14), (26)]

156. According to (b) (6), the plan to correct (b) (6) command climate issues was not sufficient and did not cover the troubled/focused areas identified in the DEOMI Report. [Encls (4), (43)]

157. (b) (6) told (b) (6) to review the results again, develop courses of action to correct the failures, and to brief (b) (6) once (b) (6) was complete. [Encls (4), (43)]

158. (b) (6) and (b) (6) have not had an opportunity to discuss corrective action regarding the DEMOI Report due to the initiation of a command investigation. [Encl (4)]

#### Command IG Inspection of 4th Battalion

159. On 23 April, the Commanding General, MCRD Parris Island notified (b) (6) via inspection notification letter that (b) (6) has directed the Command Inspector General (CIG) to conduct an inspection of (b) (6) battalion to provide an unbiased and objective assessment of the battalion's mission readiness and evaluate its organizational strengths and weaknesses. [Encl (44)]

160. On 24 April, a detailed Inspection Plan letter was signed. [Encl (45)]

161. From 28-30 April, the CIG conducted a unit inspection of 4th Battalion. [Encl (46)]

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING ALLEGATIONS OF A HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT AT THE RECRUIT TRAINING REGIMENT, MARINE CORPS RECRUIT DEPOT, PARRIS ISLAND

162. The unit inspection was motivated by an IG complaint out of 4th Battalion and served as part of the required annual inspection program. [Encl (47)]

163. During the inspection, the CIG interviewed a segment of the 4th battalion population using a specific set of questions related to command climate, including: 1) Do you believe effective communications exist within your unit? Why/why not?; 2) Do members of your command work well together? Why/why not?; 3) Is morale high? Why/why not?; 4) What can your unit improve upon?; 5) What is your unit doing well? [Encls (47), (48)]

164. The CIG could not provide the comments/responses to the questions, nor would he disclose how the participants were chosen for the interviews, i.e., whether the Marines identified for participation in the command climate questions were a targeted sampling or random population sampling within 4th Battalion. [Encl (47)]

165. On 19 May, the CIG issued its Unit Inspection Report. [Encl (46)]

166. The report found 4th Battalion to be mission capable, with the following three functional areas not being mission capable: historical programs, physical security barrier plan, and operational security. [Encl (46)]

167. The Report cited possible concerns with command climate. [Encl (46)]

168. To date, 4th Battalion has been the only battalion inspected by the Command IG. [Encl (47)]

169. The Regiment has not inspected 4th Battalion since 23 Oct 2013. [Ref (f), encl (49)]

**(b) (6)** Mediator Request

170. Before the DEMOI Report conversation took place between **(b) (6)** **(b) (6)** and **(b) (6)**, **(b) (6)** SgtMaj recommended that **(b) (6)** have a mediator in any future conversations with **(b) (6)** because their relationship had become so hostile. [Encl (18)]

171. **(b) (6)** requested a mediator during her DEOMI Report discussion with **(b) (6)**. [Encls (4), (10), (26)]

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING ALLEGATIONS OF A HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT AT THE RECRUIT TRAINING REGIMENT, MARINE CORPS RECRUIT DEPOT, PARRIS ISLAND°

172. (b) (6) either denied or did not acknowledge (b) (6) request. [Encls (4), (10), (26)]

(b) (6) Request Mast

173. On 18 May 2015, (b) (6) requested mast with the Commanding General, Marine Corps Recruit Depot Parris Island. [Encl (26)]

174. In (b) (6) request mast, (b) (6) alleges gender discrimination on the part of (b) (6) and (b) (6) staff. [Encl (26)]

175. According to (b) (6), the "[b]iggest dilemma for me is that [on the one hand] there is gender bias . . . but on the other hand poor leadership and staff work." [Encl (10)]

176. In (b) (6) request mast, (b) (6) also alleges that (b) (6) and (b) (6) staff have created a hostile work environment. [Encl (26)]

177. Of the sampling of interviews pursuant to this investigation, no one identified or could recall any specific instances of gender bias or discrimination on the part of (b) (6) and/or (b) (6) staff. [Encls (5)-(9), (13), (16)-(18), (50)]

Equal Employment Opportunity Manual

178. Pursuant to reference (g), "[e]qual opportunity shall be afforded to all on the basis of individual effort, performance, conduct, diligence, potential, capabilities and talents without discrimination as to race, color, religion, creed, sex or national origin." (emphasis added)

179. 'Discrimination' is "[t]he act, policy, or procedure that arbitrarily denies equal opportunity because of . . . gender to an individual or group of individuals." [Ref (b)]

180. "Discrimination also includes persons condoning, ignoring, or failing to correct negative and hostile working environments . . . during the performance of their duties." [Ref (b)]

181. "Discrimination divides Marines, destroys unit cohesion, and is contrary to our Core Values. . . . Establishing and maintaining equal opportunity and eliminating sexual harassment at all levels are fundamental leadership issues, and essential to a functioning command and healthy command climate." [Encl (51)]

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING ALLEGATIONS OF A HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT AT THE RECRUIT TRAINING REGIMENT, MARINE CORPS RECRUIT DEPOT, PARRIS ISLAND

182. A 'hostile work environment' is "[a] type of harassment that occurs when unwelcome behavior of one or more persons in a workplace produces a work atmosphere which is offensive, intimidating, or abusive to another person using the reasonable person standard." [Ref (b)]

183. 'Unwelcome', according to reference (b), means "[c]onduct that is not solicited and which is considered objectionable by the person to whom it is directed and which is found to be undesirable or offensive using a reasonable person standard."

184. A 'reasonable person standard' is an objective test, "consider[ing] what a reasonable person's reaction would have been under similar circumstances and in a similar environment." [Ref (b)]

#### Command Investigation Appointment

185. On 4 Jun, I notified (b) (6) of my status and the purpose of this investigation. [Encl (52)]

186. On 15 Jun, I requested an extension to submit the investigation to allow adequate time for the required sufficiency reviews from the Staff Judge Advocate and Equal Opportunity Advisor as required by reference (b). [Encl (53)]

187. On 17 Jun, I provided (b) (6) an update on the status of the investigation: [Ref (b)]

#### Opinions

1. (b) (6) and (b) (6) staff did not discriminate against (b) (6) (b) (6) on the basis of gender or any other protected class as outlined in reference (b). [FF (14) - (34), (45) - (51), (56) - (60), (67) - (71), (74) - (76), (92) - (109), (114) - (119), (121), (122), (129) - (139), (142), (144) - (146), (154) - (158), (170), (171), (177)]

2. Within the confines of this investigation, (b) (6) did not create a hostile work environment for anyone within his command on the basis of equal opportunity as it relates to race, color, religion, creed, sex or national origin. [FF (14) - (34), (45) - (51), (56) - (60), (67) - (71), (74) - (76), (92) - (109), (114) - (119), (121), (122), (129) - (139), (142), (144) - (146), (154) - (158), (170), (171), (177)]

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING ALLEGATIONS OF A HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT AT THE RECRUIT TRAINING REGIMENT, MARINE CORPS RECRUIT DEPOT, PARRIS ISLAND

3. With regards to the senior-subordinate commander relationship between (b) (6) and (b) (6) there is the appearance of a strained relationship that was discussed throughout all of the interviews. This perception does have the ability to set the tone for a staff and create a difficult environment from which to interact, perform, and garner the support that would be needed to further initiatives beyond the confines of the battalion command. [FF (33), (34), (51), (56) - (60), (67) - (69), (75), (76), (85), (90), (92), (97) - (102), (104), (109), (117), (118), (144), (154) - (157), (170) - (172)]

4. Throughout (b) (6) time in command (b) (6) has remained passionate about two things: 1) alleviating the workload pressure placed upon (b) (6) officers and drill instructors, and 2) improving the quality of recruits entering and leaving the depot. This desire has permeated almost every decision and initiative that (b) (6) and (b) (6) command have undertaken, to include: 1) requests for additional officer and DI manpower support; 2) combining command duties/watches; 3) proposing and drafting a pregnancy policy; 4) improving the key performance statistics (e.g., PFT, Rifle Range, Drill, Academics); and 5) initiating recruiting station communications to improve the quality of the recruits arriving at 4th Battalion. [FF (1), (4) - (33), (45) - (52), (55) - (76), (114) - (119), (121)]

5. (b) (6) employs a direct, aggressive, action-oriented leadership style. (b) (6) considers many of (b) (6) interactions with (b) (6) (b) (6) to be obstructive and frustrating, to include: 1) (b) (6) communications with the Recruiting Station commanders; 2) (b) (6) communications with MMOA on manpower concerns; 3) (b) (6) relief of (b) (6) for performance-related matters; 4) (b) (6) initiation of the DI career progression board; and 5) (b) (6) perceived indifference of (b) (6) with (b) (6) battalion, particularly with (b) (6) perceived absence at training events and (b) (6) lack of guidance. [PF (1), (4) - (6), (10), (30) - (34), (45) - (52), (55) - (76), (110) - (119), (121)], (129) - (132)]

6. (b) (6) employs a hands-off, consistent, low-key, and deliberate leadership style. (b) (6) considers many of his interactions with (b) (6) to be frustrating and futile. (b) (6) recognizes that (b) (6) actions and initiatives are founded in good intentions, but questions the way in which (b) (6) executes them, to include: 1) the tone of (b) (6) drop/discharge letters to Recruiting Station commands; 2) (b) (6) circumvention of the chain of command by communicating directly with MMOA on manpower issues; 3) (b) (6)

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES  
SURROUNDING ALLEGATIONS OF A HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT AT  
THE RECRUIT TRAINING REGIMENT, MARINE CORPS RECRUIT DEPOT,  
PARRIS ISLAND

decision to combine similar command duties as a way to alleviate workload responsibilities from (b) (6) officers; and 4) the decision to relieve (b) (6) N Company Commander, (b) (6) [FF (2), (30) - (34), (55) - (70), (92) - (119)]

7. The relief of (b) (6) in December 2014/January 2015 solidified and minimized the professional relationship between (b) (6) (b) (6) and (b) (6), which is partially evidenced by the fact that (b) (6) fitness report remains with (b) (6) as (b) (6) is uncomfortable with directly addressing (b) (6) potential non-concurrence with (b) (6) 4th Battalion Commander. [FF (92) - (109)].

8. The manpower situation within 4th Battalion, both officers and enlisted, is a significant issue that continues to go unanswered. The operational tempo of the series track versus the company track, combined with the additional complications with pregnancy rates within the battalion, does not allow for any semblance of comparable respite to the male battalions. [FF (14) - (51)]

9. (b) (6) did not represent (b) (6) to be interested in championing, collaborating, or corraling initiatives that would require outside support for the uniqueness of 4th Battalion. (b) (6) is hesitant in getting ahead of integration, manpower decisions, and/or potential changes being levied on the Depot from higher headquarters. [FF (2), (30) - (34), (55) - (70), (92) - (119)]

10. The circumstances, line of questioning, and method with which the DEOMI survey was administered throughout the regiment raised concerns about the validity of the results. The wording of the set of questions appeared leading and targeted. Additionally, there were inconsistencies among the recruit training battalions in the actual short answer questions used when administering the DEOMI survey to the Regiment, thus making it difficult to compare or contrast results in all cases. Furthermore, the use of a single password for each battalion opened up the potential within the battalion for individuals to complete the survey more than once, thus potentially skewing the results. [FF (144) - (157)] :

#### Recommendations

1. During the course of this investigation, there was no evidence to support allegations of gender bias or a hostile work environment. As such, I do not recommend any disciplinary or administrative action related to these issues.

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES  
SURROUNDING ALLEGATIONS OF A HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT AT  
THE RECRUIT TRAINING REGIMENT, MARINE CORPS RECRUIT DEPOT,  
PARRIS ISLAND

2. Based upon information provided in the form of data, surveys, and personal interviews, I recommend that the 4th Battalion T/O and on-hand end-strength (officer and enlisted), as well as the series track operational tempo, be reviewed. This review may well encompass and incorporate the potential increase in female through-put that is being directed within the Marine Corps.

3. I recommend that (b) (6) be required to complete the fitness report of (b) (6) during (b) (6) tenure while serving with (b) (6) (b) (6) at this command.

4. I further recommend not earlier than 120 days following the date of this report, that another survey with a single entry access password (CMC Command Climate or DEOMI) be administered to the 4th Battalion. This survey should include questions developed in collaboration between the Regimental CO and Battalion CO.

5. With respect to the administration of (b) (6) fitness report, I recommend considering MCO 1610.7 (Performance Evaluation System), Chapter 2, Paragraph 10.f(4) ("Special Situations"), which authorizes commanders to modify the reporting chain on a case-by-case basis when unresolved conflicts and lack of professional objectivity by the reporting officials exist.

6. Finally, I recommend that M&RA and the Eastern Recruiting Region Command, with input from the Regiment and battalions, work collaboratively on a viable policy to address long-term medical conditions that render a DI "ineffective." This policy should address mental health, medical conditions, pregnancy, and any other foreseeable situation that would limit a battalion's flexibility to support the recruit training mission. It should also spell out the conditions under which SDA pay and/or status is removed.

(b) (6)







UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS  
Training and Education Command  
1019 Elliot Road  
QUANTICO, VIRGINIA 22134

IN REPLY REFER TO:  
5830  
C 46S  
3 Jun 15

From: Commanding General, Training and Education Command  
To: (b) (6)

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES  
SURROUNDING ALLEGATIONS OF A HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT AT THE  
RECRUIT TRAINING REGIMENT, MARINE CORPS RECRUIT DEPOT, PARRIS  
ISLAND

Ref: (a) JAGINST 5800.7F (JAGMAN)  
(b) MCO 1700.23F (Request Mast)  
(c) MCO P5354.1D w/ch 1 (Equal Opportunity Manual)

Encl: (1) (b) (6) ltr 1000 CO of 18 May 15 (Request Mast)

1. In accordance with Chapter II of reference (a) you are appointed to inquire into the facts and circumstances surrounding allegations made by (b) (6) of a hostile work environment created by (b) (6), Commanding Officer, Recruit Training Regiment, Marine Corps Recruit Depot Parris Island (MCRD PI).

2. Pursuant to reference (b), (b) (6) requested Mast with the Commanding General, MCRD PI. (b) (6) request, found at enclosure (1), alleged that (b) (6) created a hostile work environment and did not give (b) (6) the proper support required to allow (b) (6) battalion to succeed. Additionally, (b) (6) request made an allegation against (b) (6) and the senior staff of (b) (6) regiment of gender bias. Accordingly, you are directed to investigate these allegations, specifically:

a. Assess the facts and circumstances surrounding the allegation of a hostile work environment created by (b) (6);

b. Assess the facts and circumstances surrounding the allegation of gender-based discrimination by (b) (6), in violation of reference (c); and,

c. Assess the facts and circumstances surrounding the allegation of gender-based discrimination among the senior officers and enlisted Marines within the Recruit Training Regiment, in violation of reference (c).

3. Report your findings of fact, opinions, and recommendations in letter form by 19 June 2015, unless an extension of time is granted.

Enclosure (1)

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES  
SURROUNDING ALLEGATIONS OF A HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT  
AT THE RECRUIT TRAINING REGIMENT, MARINE CORPS RECRUIT  
DEPOT, PARRIS ISLAND

Read Chapter II of reference (a) in its entirety before beginning your investigation.

4. For the duration of your investigation, the TECOM SJA, (b) (6) (b) (6) will provide technical and administrative assistance. Additionally, you will be detailed (b) (6), a judge advocate assigned directly to you, for any legal advice necessary while conducting the investigation and preparing your report. Prior to beginning your investigation, please contact the TECOM SJA for initial guidance.

5. You have the discretion to examine relevant documents, to include obtaining evidence from U.S. Government email and other digital media files and storage; visit relevant locations if necessary; evaluate procedures; conduct inventories; take or obtain pictures, diagrams, or charts; and interview witnesses in person or using video teleconferencing (VTC) capabilities. You are not limited to these investigative means and your Legal Advisor may provide you with additional advice. All witness statements will be in writing and sworn whenever possible in accordance with reference (a). If it is not possible to obtain a written or sworn statement from a particular witness, you will swear to the accuracy of any transcription or summary of such witness testimony within your report in whatever form it appears. Article 136, UCMJ, provides your authority to administer oaths for service members.

6. If in the course of your investigation, you come to suspect persons may have committed a crime, you must properly advise them of their rights before you may solicit self-incriminating information. If you suspect a U.S. service member may have committed a crime, you must advise them of their rights under Article 31, UCMJ, using the form contained in reference (a), and include it in your investigation. You will obtain Privacy Act Statements from all individuals who may have information pertinent to this investigation.

7. Your findings will be as thorough as necessary to capture the facts and circumstances surrounding the scope of this investigation and fully answer the matters posed in paragraph 2. Consider and include evidence in your investigation you deem relevant and material.

8. Develop in your recommendations any courses of action you deem appropriate to resolve any issues raised by your findings. In the event you determine misconduct has occurred, your recommendations may include, but are not limited to, appropriate administrative or disciplinary action for those involved in this investigation, specifying what, if any, further investigation or action is necessary, and any potential changes to regulations, policies, orders, or

Subj: Statement of (b) (6), (b) (6),  
Recruit Training Regiment

that (b) (6) is probably in the upper-half; (b) (6) attitude, work ethic; (b) (6) not a poster book Marine. (b) (6) direct, rough in expressing (b) (6). (b) (6) has a lot of potential. (b) (6) has a tremendous work ethic. I have seen very few officers that are not tremendous officers here.

The relationship between (b) (6) and I started to go south within a few months. We never got together to have the conversation about (b) (6) command philosophy/intent. (b) (6) use of the word "credibility" disturbs me and I never quite understood it. (b) (6) implicit statement was that female Marines lack credibility. I don't see it. I've known nobody but (b) (6) on the Depot that believes there was a credibility issue.

If the most important thing for us to do is to have males and females to think differently, instead of just being a Marine, then something is wrong. I want females to think that they're all Marines, not just male Marines and female Marines. We'll learn how to relate to one another once we have that foundation down.

Not a lot of female integration has been done lately. I have no mandate for change, just a lot of data gathering and experimentation. There were a lot of data gathering regarding pull ups. Infantry training battalion came down but I wasn't allowed to be in the room.

The gender-integrated hikes are local. I'm not sure from a logistics standpoint if it will work. It's a positive thing. Some battalions, 3rd battalion particularly, has provided some resistance. It comes down to leadership style. When it first came down, I got a complaint from (b) (6), saying that I need to tell everybody to arrange their pack for the hikes. We have Crucible order on this topic. I'm not going to mandate how the packs are going to be packed. It came down to that credibility issue with (b) (6) said different packs affect (b) (6) recruits' credibility.

We did have some issues, particularly 3rd Battalion, with their Marines taking off too fast on the Crucible hike. In one hike in particular, the company commanders thought they had it worked all out. Third Battalion commander started his battalion off too fast. (b) (6) didn't comply with my intent, so I needed to tell (b) (6) what I want (b) (6) to do.

A part of my assessment of battalion commanders is the ability to work well with one another. Especially in the big leagues it's important.

A bunch of folks from Headquarters were interested in identifying ways to increase socialization between males and females in boot camp. We had to come up with ideas quickly. I didn't discuss this with my battalion commanders. We had less than 24 hours to get a response to the boss.

Subj: Statement of (b) (6)  
Recruit Training Regiment

(b) (6)

We have a weekly staff meeting on Mondays, followed by a commander's meeting right after weekly staff meetings. There is an open opportunity after the commander's meeting for any then one-on-one meetings. They can grab me at any time. These meetings work well for most of them. I try to balance everything. I want to leave them room to command.

I have two other O-6 commanders. We have a weekly with the CG. I talk most closely with (b) (6). Drill Instructors and (b) (6) instructors are the first ones to interact with the recruits. We have significantly reduced across the board table 1 initial rifle range qualification rates. (b) (6) has done a lot of work.

"Unfortunately my relationship with (b) (6) has degraded over the past year." (b) (6) had a good reputation when I was in manpower. (b) (6) reputation was hard-nosed and difficult to deal with sometimes. (b) (6) came down as a commander and I was pleased to have (b) (6). There were a couple of things as a commander that were troubling: (b) (6) wouldn't follow my guidance and direction. (b) (6) would argue with me sometimes. Making the argument is okay and encouraged, being argumentative is not.

About September time frame, I get complaints from the recruiting side of the house. (b) (6) would send out emails to the recruiting stations. The emails told the RS commanders how she could make them do their business better. My first take was, don't send those emails. (b) (6) was poisoning relationships. (b) (6) needed to understand. (b) (6) said there was nothing wrong with it. I told (b) (6) that I was getting complaints about them. I told (b) (6) to stop sending them. (b) (6) said, "you wouldn't tell me this if I weren't a female." I told (b) (6) to go back over the wording of the emails and cc me on all emails (b) (6) was going to continue sending to the RS Commanders. (b) (6) must build relationships to influence people. Ultimately it smoothed out.

Manning is a challenge amongst all the battalions. When (b) (6) came here, there were a few female officers sent away from the battalion. I worked manpower. They are going to say, we sent you a certain number of officers. It's more of a local management issue. Fourth Battalion sent many officers away before Germano assumed command.

It appeared (b) (6) was the only one without XOs in her companies. Maybe half of the companies in the battalions have XOs. The female battalion potentially would have a greater need for XOs. There's more of a challenge there. We as a regiment understood this issue. We were fighting the issue with Depot and Manpower. We told (b) (6) informally what we were doing. (b) (6) wasn't satisfied. (b) (6) went to Manpower on (b) (6) own and got the exact same answer. I prefer not to have multiple people going to Manpower.

Unlike with officers, there isn't a manpower issue on the enlisted side with DIs. We have either 64 or 65 DIs. The battalion has excess

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES  
SURROUNDING ALLEGATIONS OF A HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT  
AT THE RECRUIT TRAINING REGIMENT, MARINE CORPS RECRUIT  
DEPOT, PARRIS ISLAND

procedures as appropriate. If during the course of your investigation you determine matters worthy of investigation extend beyond the scope of this appointing order, you will continue investigating this case and bring such matters to my attention for consideration.

9. (b) (6) can be reached at (b) (6) or (b) (6). He will act as your primary POC throughout this investigation.

(b) (6)



**UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS**

Training and Education Command  
1019 Elliot Road  
QUANTICO, VIRGINIA 22134

IN REPLY REFER TO:

5830

(b) (6)

15 Jun 15

From: Investigating Officer

To: (b) (6) Marine Corps Recruit Depot Parris Island

Subj: SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST FOR INFORMATION IN THE CASE OF COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING ALLEGATIONS OF A HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT AT THE RECRUIT TRAINING REGIMENT, MARINE CORPS RECRUIT DEPOT, PARRIS ISLAND

Ref: (a) TECOM ltr 5830 C 46S dtd 3 Jun 15 (convening order)  
(b) JAGINST 5800.7F (JAGMAN)

1. Pursuant to the references, I have been appointed to investigate the facts and circumstances surrounding allegations of a hostile work environment at the Recruit Training Regiment, Marine Corps Recruit Depot, Parris Island.

2. The following information is requested to further investigate the aforementioned matters:

a. RTR officer quota statistics by battalion from June 2014 to June 2015.

b. RTR enlisted staffing statistics by battalion from June 2014 to June 2015, broken down by effective/ineffective personnel per battalion and broken down by quotas per battalion.

3. The following information is outstanding from the initial request for information of 8 June:

a. Commanding General unit inspection reports of the battalions between June 2014 and June 2015.

b. DEOMI organizational climate survey reports of the battalions between June 2014 and June 2015.

4. The following information is outstanding from the supplemental request for information of 11 June:

a. Regimental Command Inspection Report for 4th Battalion in FY 2013 and FY 2014.

b. Depot and Regiment policy on GOS/RFC.

Enclosure (2)

Subj: SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST FOR INFORMATION IN THE CASE OF COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING ALLEGATIONS OF A HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT AT THE RECRUIT TRAINING REGIMENT, MARINE CORPS RECRUIT DEPOT, PARRIS ISLAND

c. FY15 training statistics by battalion YTD (i.e., rifle range, MCMAP, academic, drill, PFT/CFT)

5. Please provide the requested information no later than Tuesday, 16 June. In case of any hardship or non-existence of any documents please notify me immediately. I can be reached at (b) (6) or

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

By direction





## UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

Training and Education Command  
1019 Elliot Road  
QUANTICO, VIRGINIA 22134

IN REPLY REFER TO:

5830

(b) (6)

11 Jun 15

From: Investigating Officer

TO: (b) (6) Marine Corps Recruit Depot Parris Island

Subj: SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST FOR INFORMATION IN THE CASE OF COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING ALLEGATIONS OF A HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT AT THE RECRUIT TRAINING REGIMENT, MARINE CORPS RECRUIT DEPOT, PARRIS ISLAND

Ref: (a) TECOM ltr 5830 C 46S dtd 3 Jun 15 (convening order)  
(b) JAGINST 5800.7F (JAGMAN)

1. Pursuant to the references, I have been appointed to investigate the facts and circumstances surrounding allegations of a hostile work environment at the Recruit Training Regiment, Marine Corps Recruit Depot, Parris Island.

2. The following information is requested to further investigate the aforementioned matters:

a. Regimental Command Inspection Report for 4th Battalion in FY 2013 and FY 2014.

b. List of Marines the Inspector General questioned during the CG Inspection of 4th RTB from 28-30 Apr 15.

c. List of questions the Inspector General asked 4th RTB Marines during the CG Inspection from 28-30 Apr 15.

d. Regiment-level statistics on request mast by issue.

e. Congressional inquiry made into officer manpower issues within the Regiment in or about April 2015.

f. Current list of (b) (6) pending fitness reports by RS and RO.

3. The following information is outstanding from the initial request for information of 8 June:

a. Commanding General unit inspection reports of the battalions between in or about June 2014 and the present.

b. DEOMI organizational climate survey reports of the battalions in or about June 2014 to the present.

Enclosure (2)

Subj: SUPPLEMENTAL REQUEST FOR INFORMATION IN THE CASE OF COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING ALLEGATIONS OF A HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT AT THE RECRUIT TRAINING REGIMENT, MARINE CORPS RECRUIT DEPOT, PARRIS ISLAND

c. Regiment's pregnancy order.

d. Regiment's annual training statistics of all battalions between in or about June 2014 to the present.

e. Any evidence concerning the staffing shortfalls of the Regiment between in or about June 2014 and the present, specifically officers

f. Any evidence concerning the existence of company executive officers in the Regiment between in or about June 2014 and the present.

g. (b) (6) written command philosophy, goals, and intent.

h. (b) (6) written guidance to battalion commanding officers.

i. Facilities records concerning a thermostat malfunction in 4th Recruit Training Battalion barracks from in or about December 2014 to April 2015.

4. Please provide the requested information no later than Friday, 12 June. In case of any hardship or non-existence of any documents please notify me immediately. I can be reached at (b) (6) or (b) (6).

(b) (6)

By direction



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

Training and Education Command  
1019 Elliot Road  
QUANTICO, VIRGINIA 22134

IN REPLY REFER TO:

5800

(b) (6)

8 Jun 15

From: Investigating Officer

TO: (b) (6) Marine Corps Recruit Depot Parris Island

Subj: REQUEST FOR INFORMATION IN THE CASE OF COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO  
THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING ALLEGATIONS OF A HOSTILE  
WORK ENVIRONMENT AT THE RECRUIT TRAINING REGIMENT, MARINE CORPS  
RECRUIT DEPOT, PARRIS ISLAND

Ref: (a) TECOM ltr 5830 C 46S dtd 3 Jun 15 (convening order)  
(b) JAGINST 5800.7F (JAGMAN)

1. Pursuant to the references, I have been appointed to investigate the facts and circumstances surrounding allegations of a hostile work environment at the Recruit Training Regiment, Marine Corps Recruit Depot, Parris Island.

2. The following information is requested to further investigate the aforementioned matters:

a. Female integration policies at the region-, regiment-, and battalion-levels on board Marine Corps Recruit Depot, Parris Island.

b. Commanding General unit inspection reports of the battalions between in or about June 2014 and the present.

c. DEOMI organizational climate survey reports of the battalions between in or about June 2014 and the present.

d. Recruit Training Regiment's (Regiment) equal opportunity, sexual harassment, and SAPR policies that has existed between in or about June 2014 to the present.

e. Regiment's pregnancy order.

f. Regiment's policy concerning drill instructor special duty pay and ribbons.

g. Regiment's unit inspection program.

h. Regiment's annual training statistics of all battalions between in or about June 2014 to the present.

i. Any evidence concerning the staffing shortfalls of the Regiment between in or about June 2014 and the present, specifically officers.

Enclosure (2)

Subj: COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES  
SURROUNDING ALLEGATIONS OF A HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT AT  
THE RECRUIT TRAINING REGIMENT, MARINE CORPS RECRUIT DEPOT,  
PARRIS ISLAND

j. Any evidence concerning the existence of company executive officers in the Regiment between in or about June 2014 and the present.

k. (b) (6) written command philosophy, goals, and intent.

l. (b) (6) written guidance to battalion commanding officers.

m. (b) (6) letter of recommendation for (b) (6) regarding Aide de Camp for the Vice President.

n. Facilities records concerning a thermostat malfunction in 4th Recruit Training Battalion barracks from in or about December 2014 to April 2015.

3. I can be reached at (b) (6) or (b) (6)

(b) (6)

5830  
16 Jun 15

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subj: Supplemental Statement of (b) (6)  
(b) (6) 4th Recruit Training Battalion

I assumed command of 4th Battalion on 10 June 2014. We have 99 Marines on our rolls. It includes limited duties, pregnancies, maternity leave, TAD, and medically disqualified that are being GOSd, but it does not include people on quota. I have 86 enlisted Marines; they're not all DIs and they're not all able to do their job. The Regiment and Depot counts everybody, not just DIs. I'm tapped out for officers. I have tried multiple times to talk them through the numbers. There's a disconnect.

(b) (6) told me to stop communicating with RS Commanders. I asked why. (b) (6) said (b) (6) got a complaint from one of his peers. I told (b) (6) the reasons why I was contacting the RS Cos, " (b) (6) told me that I need to be less aggressive." (b) (6) said I sounded pompous. (b) (6) agreed with the intent behind the emails but said that I needed to take certain language out. I started cc'ing (b) (6) based on (b) (6) direction to me with every email I sent to an RS CO. I absolutely did tell (b) (6) that (b) (6) wouldn't have told me that I'm being overly aggressive if I were a male.

CDO/OOD modifications. The OOD is a SNCO (not DIs; SDIs, CDIs, or headquarters staff) or an officer (company officers) and the CDO (now the ELCO (early/ late checks officer)) is an officer that reports directly to the companies. The LCO basically walks the deck, is responsible for being in the chow hall, and ensuring DIs are conducting themselves responsibly. The battalion OOD is like any other OOD throughout the Marine Corps - ensure the safety and wellbeing of the recruits and security of the facilities.

The IG has (b) (6) own enlisted Marines that tours the Regiment. An IG Marine noticed that there weren't two Marines touring the chow hall, and I assume (b) (6) notified the IG. I scheduled a meeting with (b) (6) to discuss combining these duties. I gave (b) (6) a slide presentation going through the requirements of both orders. We can satisfy the duties for the battalion. It would allow me to have more visibility since the ELCOs report directly to the companies.

I wasn't given a reason why these duties couldn't be combined. Since it was in violation of a Depot order (b) (6) couldn't do anything about it. We established two separate duties immediately.

I went to the Regiment when one of my DIs was pregnant with twins as a single parent. (b) (6) told me not to GOS (b) (6). I had a Marine go through 9 months of a pregnancy and 4 months of recovery, all while not being a DI. In April, we had 2-3 Marines come back from quota after a year pregnant. This was the genesis with putting something in

Subj: Supplemental Statement of (b) (6)  
(b) (6), 4th Recruit Training Battalion

writing. At this point, I had 5 pregnant Marines in my battalion. This was the highest number of pregnancies in one month since I've been here. Historically, we average 8 enlisted Marines and one officer pregnant per year.

(b) (6) observed the statements being taken by (b) (6) and then informed me while I was on leave. (b) (6) observed (b) (6) talking to (b) (6). (b) (6) said that it was weird. This was the first time that I took leave. (b) (6) was taking written statements. My company officers told me what they told (b) (6). This was when I told (b) (6) to focus only on staff issues, not company issues. This was the start of a bad time. I have never seen the statements but the XO admitted to taking them. I have no idea what (b) (6) did with them. I never asked (b) (6) for them.

In Oct/Nov, (b) (6) approached (b) (6) about issues with me.

(b) (6) left the battalion 15 May. (b) (6) fitness report has not been completed by (b) (6)

(b) (6) took over N Company before I took command, in April 2014. I relieved (b) (6) 18 December, but (b) (6) didn't make the final decision until 7/8 January. I gave (b) (6) a folder with information about (b) (6), and it took (b) (6) three weeks to review it and concur with my dismissal of (b) (6).

"Hold off and let me see if I can find an interim solution." I interpreted it as hold off and let me make (b) (6) a series commander, not hold off on firing (b) (6). (b) (6) was waiting for me outside my office when (b) (6) left my office during this discussion. I sent (b) (6) (b) (6) fitness report in February.

(b) (6) attends the following events: initial strength tests, end-of-cycle debriefs, Crucible briefs, recruit graduations, EGA ceremonies, retirements, changes of command, Christmas parties. (b) (6) hasn't participated in a hike since I've been here.

Fourth Battalion conducts 22 graduations per year, every other week is generally a graduation. Males have one graduation per month, 12 per year.

The policy was put in place about senior Sergeants before I implemented our career progression program. I approached (b) (6) about putting an experienced Sergeant as a SDI over SSgt DIs. It never occurred. We had to re-structure our teams to have only Sergeants if an SDI is a Sergeant. We adopted the Regiment's policy as our own.

First Battalion has been the most receptive with integrated hikes. I think it was 1st Battalion that did the first integrated hike with us.

Subj: Supplemental Statement of (b) (6)  
(b) (6) 4th Recruit Training Battalion

Facilities Maintenance is owned by the Depot, Regiment and Battalion has a S-4 and G-4 respectively. Our male S-4 just left. We are without an officer in the S-4 now. (b) (6) was in our battalion because (b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

My main concern is the barracks. The processes and procedures we have in place to get anything done doesn't work. It's like you need to know someone to get something done. Our AC went out; common Depot-wide. In January, we had three Marines in barracks that lived without heat. I reported it to the Regiment. It took three months to get these things fixed. Everyone makes fun about facilities maintenance. There's no movement to get anything done. It's a joke at staff meetings. There's no cross-coordination between Regimental staff and the maintenance division.

We started talking maintenance problems with the Regiment in September when one of my DIs had mold in (b) (6) barracks room.

The last DEOMI survey started 10-11 April and lasted a few weeks.

The statement of (b) (6) represents an accurate, summarized narrative into the facts and circumstances of a hostile work environment at the Recruit Training Regiment, Marine Corps Recruit Depot, Parris Island in accordance with JAGINST 5800.7F (JAGMAN).

(b) (6)

5830  
12 Jun 15

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subj: Statement of (b) (6) (b) (6)  
Recruit Training Regiment

My mission is very simple: I make Marines. I talk about my intent every week. I have a scripted battle rhythm. Almost every week Marines pick-up; almost every week Marines graduate; almost every week Marines go through the Crucible. We acculturate young men and women to our Corps values. We make young men and women think differently about themselves.

I talk about three elements of regimental success: (1) take care of the DI; (2) take care of the recruit; and (3) take care of the institution of recruit training.

We need to give DIs the resources to successfully complete a 36-month tour, to leave with a belt and hat, and with enhanced leadership skills so they have a competitive advantage over their peers. Facilities, liberty, equipment, schedule, leadership, and command climate that encourages willful obedience to the command.

We take young men and women and challenge them. That challenge is the essential moment in the transformation process. I'm not about talking about reducing the standards or lowering the hurdles. The opportunity to succeed from leadership, engaging the recruiter, readjustment and management platoon, engaging local recruiting folks,

I use the first bar on the obstacle course as an example. Both techniques are shown on how to get over the obstacle. Mentorship and assistance is crucial.

We need to control the indoctrination into our Corps; the character of our Corps. Do not circle the wagons and keep the bad news in-house. We need to do everything in a way that if an outsider came in and observed a DI interacting with a recruit they would see we are protecting our institution. If we are going to succeed as a regiment, as a Corps, we are going to need to focus on all three of these elements. I discuss these three elements during end-of-cycle briefs, series commander and DI classes, etc.

Indirect indicators of success or failure are performance metrics. I look at the seniors in determining how we're doing. If I define my success as acculturating Marines, I couldn't tell you whether the Marines are successful.

I look for anomalies in statistics in determining battalion success. When I started Third battalion has higher attrition statistically speaking but they perform better. They have a harder culture, which

Enclosure (4)



Subj: Statement of (b) (6)  
Recruit Training Regiment

(b) (6)

results in more misconduct. We are working on this culture issue. My second or third day they were considering disbanding a company entirely for recruit abuse.

Each battalion has their own certain character. During the in-brief with 3rd Battalion commander, we discussed this. It took eight months for (b) (6) to act on it (b) (6). It took a lot of reengaging and convincing. These are O-5, board selected commanders. I want to give them their space.

The way I write fitness reports, I read the description, knowing my baseline and I evaluate. If there was a battalion commander that was slow to come around, I evaluate it accordingly. I'm evaluating the performance of a commander not the metric of that battalion.

I attend the following events for all the companies: pick-up, graduation, EGA, end-of-cycle brief, family day, pre-Crucible brief. I walk around the observe training at the battalions. I try to determine whether the company commander is complying with my guidance/intent. This is a very incentive-focused environment for drill instructors. I visit 4th Battalion more proportionally than the other battalions (nature of series track vs company track.) I talk to their company commanders twice as much as their male counterparts. If a battalion commander asked me to go to an event I would. If my schedule will allow me to be there I will be there.

From my position, it's important that I show up. I haven't completed an integrated hike. We just started them. I've been out at the rifle range when the women were shooting.

My biggest challenge at the regiment is DI/Marine misconduct. I talk to the DIs about this. I have 99.5% of my DIs doing exactly what I want them to. The DIs know which DIs are taking risks, e.g., drinking behind the wheel, have sketchy personal habits, taking risks with their marriage. Misconduct diminishes the special trust and confidence. I need the DIs to watch out for each other.

I have seen the following misconduct while in command: spousal abuse, fighting out in town, illegal drug, sex with a minor, sexual assault, assault, DUI, fraternization, etc. the obvious is recruit training over violations. An RTO violation is unauthorized contact. The hardest piece is the personal conduct piece. I think all the battalion commanders are keeping an eye out for it.

"The toughest thing I have right now is 4th battalion." There's just a dynamic that people eat each other. I do out-calls with key personnel. I will schedule out-calls with battalion XO's.

I had a recent out-call with (b) (6). I knew (b) (6) issues with (b) (6) (b) (6). In the beginning the assumption was that there was a personality conflict. (b) (6) is a solid officer. I would say

Subj: Statement of (b) (6) (b) (6)  
Recruit Training Regiment

of that, and if you take out pregnancies, limited duty, etc. they are at their staffing goal. I went man-by-man with my SgtMaj and determined that they were at their staffing goal. A few weeks ago, 4th Battalion was at 64 effective DIs.

There's a Depot order that lays out what the duty requirements are. Without consulting anybody, (b) (6) consolidated duty requirements with OOD and CDO to reduce the load on her folks. It came to my attention from the IG. I told (b) (6) doesn't have the authority to do that. (b) (6) must request an exception. It got resolved.

(b) (6) has been here since I've been here. (b) (6) not a top officer, "middle of the pack" average officer. As a Captain, (b) (6) works hard; not a bad performer; not a bad attitude. (b) (6) was put in charge of company. In October, (b) (6) told me (b) (6) was having problems with (b) (6). (b) (6) said (b) (6) wasn't being responsive. Before December, (b) (6) and I concluded an end-of-cycle brief. (b) (6) (b) (6) company was graduating the next day. At the end of the brief, I was getting ready to go and (b) (6) asked to talk to me about something. I went into (b) (6) office and (b) (6) told me that (b) (6) was going to relieve (b) (6) and that (b) (6) plan was to return (b) (6) to a series commander and fleet up a series commander to be the company commander. (b) (6) had no XO's. We were looking at (b) (6) manpower board. Before we relieve (b) (6) I told (b) (6) that I needed more specifics. I'm looking at (b) (6) board. It would be inappropriate to make (b) (6) a series commander and to make a series commander a company commander. If (b) (6) can't stay in the battalion it becomes a regimental problem if not a Depot problem back filling a billet. We went back and forth a few times. My specific direction was "do nothing." I told (b) (6) that I needed to find another solution. (b) (6) was getting agitated.

"I want you to do nothing." We needed to work another solution, potentially to keep (b) (6) in place. I didn't see a necessity to relieve (b) (6) at that point. I went directly back at my office and I saw (b) (6) in the area. I sent (b) (6) and email and said do not relieve (b) (6). Later that day, an hour later, I get a phone call saying that (b) (6) didn't get my email and told me that (b) (6) already fired (b) (6). My level of trust wasn't there because there was a willful non-compliance with my directions (RS Commanders). (b) (6) thought I told (b) (6) not to re-assign (b) (6). I specific verbiage was to "do nothing." "Frankly, I was pretty hot about that."

We had IST and graduation the next morning. (b) (6) had some special liberty because (b) (6) was a geo-bachelorette. I didn't want to talk to (b) (6) about the issue at the time. (b) (6) insisted on talking about the issue before (b) (6) went on liberty. I told (b) (6) that my concern is that (b) (6) hears what (b) (6) wants to hear and is not concerned; (b) (6) is a very capable and good officer but (b) (6) fails to listen.

We moved (b) (6) to Support Battalion, and then (b) (6) went on an IA billet. (b) (6) also will receive a fitness report with me as the

Subj: Statement of (b) (6) (b) (6)  
Recruit Training Regiment

RO. I still have that fitness report and there is a high probability I will not concur with the RS. I wanted to wait as I did not want to torpedo the relationship with the RS.

I've had to fire two officers since being here. I've had one company commander in Support Battalion fired for having sex with a PFC in his office. Another officer had an adulterous relationship with a Sgt who ultimately came to DI school.

(b) (6) told me that (b) (6) gave up because (b) (6) was never going to please (b) (6).

(b) (6) saw what was happening between the commander and some of the officers. (b) (6) tried to be a buffer between the commander and those officers. (b) (6) tried counseling the company commanders in how to succeed with (b) (6). (b) (6) rapidly became marginalized in the battalion. (b) (6) was cut out of the decision-making; (b) (6) was treated unprofessionally in public with (b) (6) rolling (b) (6) eyes and huffing and puffing; and (b) (6) felt that (b) (6) wasn't allowed to do (b) (6) job.

As a regiment, we have championed many issues, including staffing issues communicating with Manpower, 50/50 split with officer-enlisted. Facilities are always an issue. It's a running gun battle. Integrated hikes, although risky; two out of three of the male battalions disagreed with the integrated hike issue but I directed it. I sent (b) (6) an email on (b) (6) proposed pregnancy policy. I saw many issues to it. I told (b) (6) to come see me after editing it. (b) (6) still at (b) (6) staffing goals even with pregnant Marines. It's false; it's simply not true. I think the policy is politically unacceptable. If you get pregnant, we'll take away your SDA and process you. It will have to be a Manpower policy; not just a Depot or regiment policy. Ultimately Manpower will have to write this into an order.

I've talked to (b) (6) about (b) (6). I haven't talked to any of my other peers, or the other battalion commanders. I have not been asked nor would I ask another colonel to mentor (b) (6). I think it would be inappropriate for me to get involved in that. This is an issue at the Regiment.

(b) (6) a tremendously talented and capable officer in terms of operations and management. In terms of leadership, I begin to question "your leadership when your battalion XO, company commanders, and several of your senior enlisted are only following you out of a sense of professional obligation." I questioned the leadership (b) (6) employed. I think you can command without leading but not effectively. Can you call yourself a leader without people following you?

(b) (6) smart, operationally very savvy, and personally very driven. But (b) (6) has an inability retaining a positive relationship with just about anybody. (b) (6) believes the (b) (6) to be the spawn of Satan.

Subj: Statement of (b) (6), (b) (6)  
Recruit Training Regiment

(b) (6) leadership style is very dictatorial - "rules through threat." After relieving (b) (6), (b) (6) threatened another company commander that (b) (6) would be next. (b) (6) would publically humiliate (b) (6) Marines, e.g., (b) (6) told a SNCO during a hike that (b) (6) was the worst SNCO in (b) (6) battalion; the reason you failed is because of your leadership to an officer.

I have counseled (b) (6) several times including recently on (b) (6) command climate issues. In that particular conversation (b) (6) argued back at me, point-by-point. (b) (6) said that I was never out-and-about, that (b) (6) listened to only one of two people with skewed perspectives. (b) (6) didn't talk to me for about three weeks after this discussion.

About a week after this command climate conversation, the CG called me asking about 4th Battalion. I have told (b) (6) about (b) (6). I wanted to use the Marine Corp's climate survey, not the DEOMI survey. The CG's EOA issued a blanket DEOMI survey, so I backed out on my survey. No surprises with the other battalions. Fourth Battalion was off the charts bad. The CG looked through 4th Battalions comments.

The survey was significantly worse than the other battalions; it was significantly worse than the previous year's survey; it was significantly worse than the Marine Corps average. The bottom line showed "bad getting worse."

I confronted (b) (6) with the survey results. I sent (b) (6) a copy. I told (b) (6) to review the results, develop COAs, and brief me on it. I heard (b) (6) started pulling people into (b) (6) office to discuss the results. I then told (b) (6) that I needed to meet with (b) (6) immediately. (b) (6) said the report didn't represent the command. (b) (6) said the report was the result of a few people colluding against (b) (6). There wasn't more to talk about at that point.

(b) (6) has done some good things but maybe not the way (b) (6) implemented it. (b) (6) developed a roadmap to become a senior drill instructor. It's very inflexible. I'm not going to tell (b) (6) how to do (b) (6) staffing. (b) (6) also developed a board for company commanders. (b) (6) sits on the board which skews the results.

(b) (6) putting structure in place which is good. (b) (6) has focused (b) (6) folks on marksmanship. Historically, both male and females have halved (b) (6) junk rates. Weapons and Field Training Battalion has restructured their personnel to improve these statistics.

(b) (6) has done a few team building exercises. I'm not sure if the positive has overcome the negative. I think (b) (6) very well-intended. (b) (6) not a bad person. (b) (6) is unable to maintain relationships and it creates problems.

Subj: Statement of (b) (6)  
Recruit Training Regiment

(b) (6)

Another issue I had with (b) (6) was that (b) (6) can't have SSgts working for Sgts. The career progression program was already in place when (b) (6) started doing this. I put out a policy letter to stop (b) (6).

The battalion commanders for the most part get along. I don't do much socially. I never have.

I have never said, "I'm going to give you enough rope to hang yourself." I want to see (b) (6) succeed.

I told (b) (6) to assess (b) (6) DEOMI survey results and we would get together to discuss. (b) (6) sent me a PowerPoint presentation and it didn't talk about what we discussed, i.e., below-average areas in the report. I sent (b) (6) an email back saying the presentation didn't meet my guidance and intent. (b) (6) told me again that the DEOMI survey was invalid; and told me that I didn't know what I was talking about. (b) (6) said (b) (6) didn't want to discuss this issue anymore with me without a third person, not in the chain of command in the room. I asked (b) (6) if (b) (6) wasn't going to do what I tasked you to do? (b) (6) was just saying that (b) (6) wanted a third person in the room. I then tasked (b) (6) and said that I needed to see it by Tuesday and that was it. I never saw (b) (6) that next Tuesday because the other investigation started. We waived off on that meeting and we haven't re-engaged since.

This is an evolutionary, not a revolutionary business. I'm most proud of, if you look across all the performance metrics it remains near 10-year highs; production efficiency remains near 10-year highs. A lot has to do with what we're doing with the DIs, as well as the type of recruits we bring in. The morale is still generally high with these high marks. High efficiency, high performance, generally very positive morale, and sending those DIs and young officers back out in the fleet with a competitive advantage.

I won't say I don't see any gender bias, but it's not a systemic problem. Time to time, it will come up. When I first checked in some male recruits were turning their backs to the female recruits and it was perceived as gender bias. I don't necessarily think we have a systemic gender bias issue.

I don't think we have a hostile work environment. My entire staff is pre-CLS Captains and below that will remain here for a year and then go away. Sometimes issues linger too long with the staff and it causes delays.

The statement of (b) (6) represents an accurate, summarized narrative into the facts and circumstances of a hostile work environment at the Recruit Training Regiment, Marine Corps Recruit Depot, Parris Island in accordance with JAGINST 5800.7F (JAGMAN).

Subj: Statement of (b) (6)  
Recruit Training Regiment

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(b) (6)

5830  
10 Jun 15

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subj: Statement of (b) (6), (b) (6), 1st  
Recruit Training Battalion

I showed up last summer with three other commanders. (b) (6) philosophy is that "every kid deserves a fair shot." (b) (6) wasn't concerned about the statistics, (b) (6) was more concerned that the right individuals crossed the parade deck at the end of the cycle. (b) (6) wanted me to focus more so on the Marines and the recruits will follow. I imparted the same philosophy onto my Marines.

Four of us battalion commanders met at the commander's course. We don't interact much. The 3rd Battalion commander had a lot of experience here; the rest of us didn't. (b) (6) and I talked pretty often, our battalions integrate quite a bit. Staying on top of DI hazing/misconduct has been my biggest challenge. It's never-ending.

Manning has been difficult for my battalion. We're having difficulties with officers now. Our officer numbers are at rock bottom. I'm at 70-75% effective officers. We don't have company XO's. I probably won't ever fill that billet again. An XO is a bit much with company cycles compared to series cycles with the females. The Captain tax is steep. I have similar issues with SNCOs.

We did really well on the DEMOI survey. We took three hits: (1) junior officers don't feel safe at home; (2) DI-on-DI mistreatment; and (3) DI exhaustion.

I inherited a battalion much different than all the other battalions. Historically the battalion was four separate units with their own direction. I have focused on standardizing across the battalion, primarily integrating the new guys. On a day-to-day basis, I generally get chained to my desk a lot. I try to get out to one of the main events, but it's probably not enough. I try to stay out of my company's freedom. I'm probably out and about 30% of each day.

There hasn't been any initiatives in which I've needed support from the Regiment. The female integration issue is the only thing in which we had to work on among battalions. There were some concerns by my peers. I think those concerns involved unity of command during the hikes. 1st and 4th Battalions conducted the first integrated hike together. Many issues integrating with historical segregation, i.e., what to do with hike drops, do male DIs correct female recruits and vice versa. Integration has been easy since starting it.

My relationship with (b) (6) is good, very professional. (b) (6) is extremely consistent. I normally see (b) (6) four times a week. (b) (6) goes

Enclosure (5)

Subj: Statement of (b) (6) (b) (6) 1st  
Recruit Training Battalion

to every initial strength test, graduation, EGA ceremony, family day, and pick-up. And whenever I would ask (b) (6) to attend an event (b) (6) would attend. (b) (6) would attend some Crucibles.

I have a good personal relationship with (b) (6). I think I'm the only LtCol that (b) (6) talks to. As a person, (b) (6) awesome. (b) (6) very disciplined, (b) (6) tough, (b) (6) PT's very hard, (b) (6) goes to everything, and (b) (6) has incredibly high standards. (b) (6) great to talk to as a friend, (b) (6) phenomenal. Professionally is another story. I wouldn't dare get into a professional discussion with (b) (6). (b) (6) doesn't take advice very well. "Everything about [(b) (6)] is the right intent."

The relationship between (b) (6) and (b) (6) is toxic. "It's toxic, it's horrible." It's to a point where (b) (6) doesn't even look at (b) (6). I think 4th Battalion's manpower issues, specifically pregnancies, made their relationship worse. I think "some pregnancies were strategic pregnancies."

The final straw that broke the camel's back was (b) (6) firing (b) (6). (b) (6) was known as a shooting star, a high flier. (b) (6) felt that (b) (6) jumped the gun; "(b) (6) felt that (b) (6) was getting into (b) (6) soup." I think (b) (6) thought (b) (6) (b) (6) was a mutineer; I think (b) (6) thought (b) (6) was doing the best of all the company commanders.

"(b) (6) is cooky, (b) (6) weird." Everybody loved (b) (6) (b) (6) just a different person. (b) (6) competent and extremely approachable. (b) (6) battalion leadership always went to (b) (6) because (b) (6) was not approachable. I think this made (b) (6) mad.

I don't think anything that has happened is based off of gender. "It's personalities; it's leadership styles." I do know, however, that there is generally fear amongst (b) (6) officers and SNCOs.

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(b) (6)



5830  
11 Jun 15.

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subj: Statement of (b) (6)  
(b) (6), 2d Recruit Training Battalion

(b) (6)

I've been the 2d Battalion commander since last summer. We're hybrid battalions. We rotate people into Support Battalion. Support Battalion has some swimming, education, but isn't responsible to the recruits themselves. We are focused on value based training. Numbered battalions are responsible for discipline, i.e., drill, facilitating training, but primarily our guys transforming the character of recruits into disciplined Marines. All four of the numbered battalions have this in common, as well as similar training. The companies have the mission.

My focus is on developing the Marines I receive or in the battalion; the drill instructors develop the recruits. My biggest challenge is developing the drill instructors having them focused on the big picture, and managing their pride, ego, and emotion. The "hat-and-belt" mentality is something I'm constantly fighting indirectly.

I have manning issues on the officer side. It has been a big problem; another big challenge of mine. "I'm speechless when I think about it. It makes no sense to me." Our T/O is 20 and we should be staffed at 95% (19 officers). The problem is the RTR. Our guys work ungodly hours and they have ridiculous duty requirements. There are regulatory requirements to have people here in certain positions. Fourth Battalion has similar manpower issues. On the one hand, they don't have as many recruits, but on the other hand it's harder with the series track.

The officer manning problem has always been a problem but it's now one of my top five problems. For a few months we would get an XO. We currently have none in my battalion. We normally have SSGts fill our Ops Chiefs. Headquarters and the General isn't willing to send any Majors to the battalions to serve as XOs. I was told I'm not getting a Major for the next year.

We had to take the DEOMI survey. On the enlisted side, the results were the same as last year's results. Some enlisted complained about sergeant-seniors. We sometimes have three-, four-, or five-hat teams. The three-hat teams are normally our better teams. The five-hat teams have the benefit of rotation and train weaker, inexperienced hats. Five-hat teams normally have three junior hats being supervising.

Another big challenge for me is the managing of DIs going through Support Battalion. The Regiment's decisions reflect a mindset that the Support Battalion is the main effort. For example, one of Regiment's policies says training companies will not rotate a DI to Support

Enclosure (6)

Subj: Statement of (b) (6)  
(b) (6), 2d Recruit Training Battalion

(b) (6)

Battalion if that DI had any adverse paperwork; however, it doesn't work the opposite way. Many of my DIs go to Support Battalion, get fat or no longer in standards, and return to my battalion. I cannot have a Marine out of standards in front of 90 new recruits. We send all Marines on quota, not just the trash.

The mentality here is that when you come here out of DI school, you establish your reputation during the first cycle - it's how you act as a third or fourth hat. They're the ones running around screaming. The heavy is the one training them and the senior is the one supervising.

The other mentality is that we're all about stats. Performance stats (eight major performance statistics, e.g., PFT, CFT, drill, rifle range, MCMAP, academics, etc.) mean everything. These performance indicators drive everything. I have to constantly remind my Marines we are making a basically trained Marine that meets the training requirements. The DI should be a model for the core values, not necessarily the eight performance statistics. Promotions and evaluations are all about performance stats. Performance statistics drive everything.

"I don't have any true, deep-down concerns from the Regiment." It would be nice if they were more engaged with us. They don't tell us how to do business. It's expected. My internal perception was that we would be micromanaged but in fact we are not. I believe the Depot and Regiment commands trusts us, but taken too far it could be taken as lack of engagement. With four companies I barely get the chance to see everything. I can't get out there enough. I tell my Marines how difficult it must be for the Regiment to be around. I think it's hard for the Regiment to rely on the intangibles when they're not around, so they are forced to rely on the statistics.

(b) (6) comes to scheduled major events, e.g., pick-up, Crucible, and graduation. Every month one of my companies is going through a major event. (b) (6) doesn't come to any other events. (b) (6) would come to an event if I were invited. On average, I see (b) (6) once a week one-on-one. I rarely talk to (b) (6) about recruit issues, mainly Marine issues. Recruit separations go to Regiment; GOS/RFCs go to the Depot.

The Regiment has a recruit abuse policy saying that any allegation has to be investigated and that investigation has to be forwarded to the regimental commander. (b) (6) takes the policy one step further and says that we cannot act on the investigation until (b) (6) has reviewed it, but it normally takes weeks or longer for (b) (6) to act on it. I've had 10 or 11 investigations go to (b) (6) and (b) (6) has always concurred with my recommendations.

I have relieved a chief and a company commander. I notified (b) (6) and never had any issues. (b) (6) leadership style works for me. (b) (6) gives me latitude. Running the investigations through (b) (6) frustrates me. (b) (6) never added anything on the endorsement.

Subj: Statement of (b) (6), (b) (6)  
(b) (6) 2d Recruit Training Battalion

A big concern of my DIs is not being able to allow recruits to use scud brushes to clean the decks. A lot of what we do is pure leadership. It's low budget; there's not much here except Marines and the recruits.

This place is a well-oiled machine. The leadership part is a challenge, but it's what you make of it. You can be as engaged as you want to be.

The battalion commanders don't get together socially. We're not engaged outside of work. We're in our independent worlds. Sometimes we get together for lunches or wander into each other's offices. The Support Battalion commander doesn't like me. As soon as I got here (b) (6) started talking about me. We work together well professionally.

The DI integration plan came out last year from the Regiment. It tells us how us to integrate our new DIs from the schoolhouse into our series team. It's basic leadership skills, to develop our DIs. I believe the plan tells us how to develop our DIs. The Regiment came out with a solution but higher never framed the problem for me. I didn't know the problem we were facing. Now we get the integrated hike thing. No briefing, no asking the battalion commanders. We were just told we had to do integrated hikes. We get into the commander's huddle and I was surprised to hear about the integrated hike. The Regimental commander said we're doing it, but one of the battalion commanders wanted to talk about it.

The Regiment did not support the idea of discussion on the integration of hikes. The first integrated hike was a nightmare. "One problem and one problem only: there is no unity of command." Unity of command creates unity of effort. It's a basic leadership principle. We need to plan together and do confirmation briefs. All the company commanders work real well together. (b) (6), a company commander within 2d Battalion, and (b) (6) a company commander within 4th Battalion, worked very well together on the integrated hikes. There is a crucible hike order that makes no sense, so both Captains worked together on a new order and the next integrated hike worked out great.

It's personal leadership. The females have different motivating factors than males. In the long run it could be a good thing if you deliberately address it. If a female drops out of a hike and is crying on the side of the road they are treated a certain way; however, there are some males doing the same exact thing. They should be treated the same way. From a strategic perspective, for decades the civilian leadership made a decision to continue to have segregated training for males and females. I'm not going to undermine their leadership. Nobody framed the problem, so I don't know why it was just thrown on us last minute. There are 20+ other things we could probably integrate.

"I think all of our commanders are very professional." We get along fine. We don't really engage socially. (b) (6) as a

Subj: Statement of (b) (6) (b) (6)  
(b) (6) 2d Recruit Training Battalion

person is personable; very professional; very committed. (b) (6) has a much tougher job than any of us other battalion commanders. (b) (6) recognizes the challenges each females recruits will face in the fleet, and (b) (6) has seized the opportunity to make the female recruits more credible. (b) (6) knows everyone is looking at (b) (6) battalion. (b) (6) wants to exploit this opportunity.

"My sense is that (b) (6) is the right person" for the job. I don't agree with (b) (6) logic all the time but it works. I would work for all the battalion commanders as well as (b) (6)

(b) (6) has voiced her frustration with (b) (6) "(b) (6) doesn't particularly like (b) (6)" (b) (6) very discreet about it though. (b) (6) hasn't told me details about it. I disagree with (b) (6) sometimes but I would never say anything (b) (6) done has been unreasonable or unprofessional.

(b) (6) and (b) (6) are both professional. I have never seen anything between them that I would consider unprofessional.

I don't perceive any gender bias in the Regiment. I was surprised when I heard about the gender bias issue. (b) (6) made it clear in the beginning that the perception may be that (b) (6) spends more time with 4th Battalion.

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(b) (6)

5830  
15 Jun 15

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subj: Statement of (b) (6) (b) (6)  
(b) (6) 3rd Recruit Training Battalion

I took command on 25 June 2014. I have been here before as a series commander as a lieutenant and as a Captain, in 1997 and 1998. Accountability for me is everything. It's the #1 tenant by which I lead.

I have some strong lines when it comes to DI touching. Third Battalion has a reputation for being a physical battalion. It attracts a lot of Type A personalities. Over the past year, I have tried to change the personality/culture, modify it a bit, and tried to maintain some climate. I have a zero tolerance with unnecessary, unwarranted DI touching. There is little tolerance in RTO violations, especially with DI touching. I have made the RTO more restrictive. I naturally took a hit in command climate when I changed the touching policy. I have 10 allegations of DI touching; I have punished two.

The American public is everything to me. Everything here is a public event. The public has a vote.

A challenge for me, as well as with every other battalion commander, is having DIs rebound from past mistakes (e.g., DIs rebounding from a DUI; PTSD/depression/family/legal issues). These issues will manifest itself more clearly here. It's a fishbowl environment; we're constantly being observed; a lot of pressure here. If someone comes here with some deficiencies it becomes evident very quickly.

I would carry about 100 more recruits per company than the other battalions. We are currently short staffed. I do not have enough people. It's a challenge for me. The only support I truly need from Regiment is manpower support. Currently, we have to have at least three DIs per platoon, plus support staff, and we still have to fill billets in the Depot, in the Regiment, and in the Support Battalion. I could use another 20 drill instructors.

We are short across the board for officers. We are getting some due to summer rotations. My T/O is 20 officers. I do not have XO's. Officer staffing is an issue that has been addressed at the Depot level.

In the DEOMI survey I took a hit in trust and leadership for the investigations I have conducted. It was expected but not wanted. There's a lot of pride and cohesion in the battalion. There's a lot of goodness in that. Our stats are highest across the board compared to all of the other battalions.

Enclosure (7)

Subj: Statement of (b) (6), (b) (6)  
(b) (6) 3rd Recruit Training Battalion

There's no investigation that can be handled at the battalion level without the Regiment involved, i.e., concurrence/endorsement on the investigation. Before I take action on an investigation, I would inform the RTR CO. Investigations have an effect on command climate. When I decide to take an issue to special court-martial it has a ripple effect across the battalion.

Most issues regarding regiment support has been internal within the battalion. There's nothing that I have initiated that is worthwhile for the regiment.

I have daily interaction with the Regimental commander. And not all of it is negative; very positive interaction. The beauty of (b) (6) is that (b) (6) has a predictable battle rhythm. I know the events that (b) (6) will be at. I know what opportunities where I can engage with (b) (6). Aside from the weekly meetings and offline talks, we have a pick-up discussion with (b) (6) we have Crucible events together; and end-of-cycle events.

I expected more cross-talk amongst battalions, but it's evident to us that our issues become our issues. We work within our fiefdoms. I'm sure there are issues common amongst battalions. We don't interact much.

There is no interaction between me and (b) (6). It was done on purpose. Several of the first interactions with us weren't positive so I basically ended it. I saw it as just another commander at Camp Lejeune. Aside from consolidated hikes and consolidated graduations, that is the extent of our interaction.

(b) (6) is not the type of guy that will care and feed you. (b) (6) will indirectly counsel you. (b) (6) is not a micromanager. (b) (6) is very specific with what (b) (6) desires are. In every meeting there was never a doubt in my mind what he expects. (b) (6) not very emotional; very courteous; very respectful; not a very direct person. (b) (6) keeps battalion issues battalion-specific. Some individuals like a lot of feedback. (b) (6) won't give you that in a direct fashion.

Investigations are an issue common to all of us battalion commanders when dealing with (b) (6). There are many times in which I notified (b) (6) of an investigation but I would get silence, i.e., no return email. I view silence from (b) (6) as, "carry on commander, you're doing the right thing." (b) (6) would rarely provide direct feedback. (b) (6) views us with a lot of respect having been board selected to command.

If I was too aggressive in my approach, (b) (6) would calmly provide me different approaches. Every direction from (b) (6) has been an indirect direction.

Subj: Statement of (b) (6) (b) (6)  
(b) (6), 3rd Recruit Training Battalion

If I am going to address the over-aggressiveness of 3rd Battalion's culture, it was going to take several commanders to correct it. With only one year with this commander, I have to prove to (b) (6) that I'm doing something to correct the problem. When I took some action I took a direct hit in the command climate. Regiment has an indirect influence over my command climate.

I've come close twice firing an officer. In one instance, I felt as though external to the battalion there was pressure to relieve this particular company commander. There were multiple allegations from the same company. I knew where the issues were and it was not solely on the company commander. In this environment, you have to identify a specific layer at which accountability starts and stops. There will be times at which the company may handle the issue. I stepped in before I believed (b) (6) was going to act on this company commander. We discussed relieving this officer, and we were 50/50, so (b) (6) deferred to me. I kept this officer and (b) (6) been great since.

"I don't see it," referring to gender bias. (b) (6) and (b) (6) staff never talk about the other battalions. I never sensed it at any of the meetings. In one specific meeting, we discussed consolidated hikes, and I have concerns about it regarding safety issues. I understand the intent behind it and I've addressed it with the boss. Never did I sense from (b) (6) that it was a gender issue.

Before (b) (6) assumed command I suspect the ladies may have been taking shortcuts. There's no doubt in my mind that (b) (6) is a phenomenal, physically fit, intelligent Marine officer. I think with (b) (6) prior recruiting perspective (b) (6) felt that the ladies could do the same thing as the male recruits. Consolidated hikes or PFTs would be the best way to show this equality, I speculate. Consolidation would motivate the ladies to do better.

In December, we tried the consolidated hike for the first time. I would normally carry 570 men and a staff of 50 during a Crucible hike. The ladies weren't demonstrating the concept of "lets keep up with the men." One female fell out of a hike and started crying. There were issues on how to deal with this. I didn't like it.

I have issues with every event we do in the battalion, from logistics to administration to execution, etc. The added complexity of adding females to the hikes created concerns for me. Another issue in consolidating hikes is resources. My support resources would be all the way in the back.

I notify my company commanders to push their recruits, especially during the last recruit event. We were locked in with what the slowest recruit would do. I saw more value with how we normally do things. I am more concerned in the summer months with more recruits.

Subj: Statement of (b) (6)  
(b) (6) 3rd Recruit Training Battalion

The only regimental initiative in the last year is the consolidated hike, and (b) (6) got what (b) (6) wanted.

I went to OCS with (b) (6). I didn't know (b) (6) in the fleet. I heard of (b) (6) reputation; probably the most physically fit person on the island, no doubt. (b) (6) very intelligent; very aware of things in the Marine Corps. (b) (6) given a tough job, the only all-female battalion in the Marine Corps during a politically tough time.

We are training the world's finest but perhaps there are some concessions we have to make and sometimes (b) (6) not making. We all come into Parris Island with expectations of perfection. You're the odd man out if you're less than perfect.

I think (b) (6) is one of the best COs I've ever had. I have space to breathe with (b) (6). I enjoy the fact that (b) (6) trapped behind (b) (6) desk sometimes.

These issues are distracting. Anything that happens in one battalion affects all of us. We need to put this investigation to bed.

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(b) (6)



5830  
10 Jun 15

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subj: Statement of (b) (6)  
(b) (6), Headquarters and Service Battalion

I assumed command on 14 June 2013. My change of command is 2 July 15. I'm heading to the National War College. My goal as the commander is to have my battalion work as a team, a servant-driven leadership. "Group dynamics play a huge piece," at the Recruit Depot. I normally use a Major League Baseball analogy. Players get traded; we have to work together to make the Regiment work.

My first impression of 4th Battalion's leadership was (b) (6) and (b) (6) stopping by my battalion to meet the Marines. They were enthusiastic about meeting the Marines.

"Initially, I could talk to (b) (6) but things became difficult quickly." The very first pick-up should have been my indicator. It's standard for me and my SgtMaj to be present during receiving. At this particular pick-up I'm speaking with one of my Marines, (b) (6), during which (b) (6) came up to me and told me to be quiet." I walked out and didn't want to be unprofessional. That built up for a while. Three weeks later, I discussed the issue with (b) (6) and tried being welcoming. We were going head-to-head. (b) (6) told me that I'm not happy, that people don't like coming to me." It became professional when we connected on the loss of (b) (6) mother and eye surgery of my mother.

I told (b) (6) that I would like to join (b) (6) battalion on one of (b) (6) Crucible hikes. (b) (6) asked me if I was a part of a "lean-in circle". (b) (6) was all about female unity. The Crucible hike made me not ever want to go to 4th Battalion again. I started the hike in the front. We hit the first major stop and (b) (6) said (b) (6) wanted to go to the back of the hike. I said I wanted to join (b) (6) in the back of the hike. I then see a SSgt who had been in Support Battalion as a family readiness officer. I talked with (b) (6) about this SSgt. (b) (6) loudly said, "(b) (6) the worst SNCO I have," so that everyone around us could hear, including the SSgt.

During the same hike, an honor graduate was falling out and (b) (6) (b) (6) said loudly, "look at this, (b) (6) the honor grad and (b) (6) falling out." (b) (6) keeps digging in on this particular recruit, a very small (b) (6). Another recruit started to motivate another recruit. I reiterated the positives about this motivation. Shortly after this comment, I stayed in the back of the hike when (b) (6) moved to the front of the hike. "We finished the hike and I just walked away."

Enclosure (8)

Subj: Statement of (b) (6)  
(b) (6), Headquarters and Service Battalion

I've never had a requirement to pull a commander off of a recruit except (b) (6). I normally attend all the initial strength tests on Fridays. In March 2015, there was a recruit (b) (6) who did not complete the 1 1/2 mile run within the required time. The Regiment had just left. (b) (6) lit up the recruit like a third hat. It was less than one arm's distance. Nobody in (b) (6) staff was stepping in. I stepped in and asked to speak with (b) (6). We get three feet away and started talking about why (b) (6) was lighting up recruit (b) (6). (b) (6) told me that the recruit spit on some glow belts. Four or five weeks later, I notified (b) (6) about the incident.

During one particular staff meeting, I heard (b) (6) say, "see, if you don't get what you want from higher you go around them." My staff told me that we would never go back to another 4th Battalion staff meeting because (b) (6) encouraged (b) (6) subordinates to forego the chain of command. I have never heard another battalion commander say this.

I am aware of two personnel (b) (6) has had issues with: (b) (6) (b) (6) and (b) (6). (b) (6) was spunky. (b) (6) really cared about (b) (6) Marines. I was very concerned about (b) (6) though, primarily due to what I heard from (b) (6), my former XO. Right before (b) (6) (b) (6) departed, (b) (6) came to me and said that (b) (6) was concerned about the mental health of a long-time, good friend, (b) (6). I recommended to (b) (6) that (b) (6) confront (b) (6) about (b) (6) feelings. I heard (b) (6) did that and their relationship improved.

I know about (b) (6). (b) (6) came to Support Battalion around January. (b) (6) currently on an IA billet. (b) (6) fellow company grade officers had great things to say about (b) (6). They told me to "fight to keep (b) (6)."

(b) (6) and I have served together while I was a Captain, a Major, and over the past two years here. (b) (6) has treated me and my battalion very well. There have been high points, amazing mentorship, but we had a rough patch during the first year I was in command.

During a mandatory PME regarding the Bastion air field, I felt that (b) (6) threw (b) (6) under the bus. "I would cut my arm off for (b) (6)." I was livid about the PME, so I approached (b) (6) (b) (6) after the PME and we sat down together for 1-2 hours. I told (b) (6) "I had lost all faith and confidence in you as a leader." I understand (b) (6) point that (b) (6) was trying to educate company grade officers that the recruit is at the center of our training and that we must be guardian angels. Our job is to step in and assess. After the conversation, we hashed things out and moved forward.

I observed friction between (b) (6) and (b) (6). "I believe (b) (6) is a very capable officer. I believe (b) (6) doesn't like to

Enclosure (8)

Subj: Statement of (b) (6)  
(b) (6), Headquarters and Service Battalion

hear anyone criticize her." They had a "professional, but frosty" relationship. I think the qualification rates on the rifle range is an example of their frosty relationship.

(b) (6) has told me, "(b) (6) is the worst regimental commander," and that (b) (6) can't wait until the new CO arrives. (b) (6) told me that (b) (6) biased against women, but I told (b) (6) that I'm not getting that from (b) (6).

There were so many issues over the past 3-4 years that have strained the 4th Battalion, e.g., experimental working groups, testing integration policies. (b) (6) has told me that he wants 4th Battalion to just be another number and not viewed as the female Battalion. (b) (6) frustration is that the female battalion is being looked at as an experimental group, not a functioning recruit battalion.

I have had occasion to observe the other battalion commanders. This group of battalion commanders doesn't get together. The group dynamics aren't healthy. The group before this group did get together. (b) (6) (b) (6) when (b) (6) just checked in, tried counseling all of us on how to be good battalion commanders. (b) (6) had just stepped in and was trying to tell me how to be a good commander when I've been on deck for a year.

My battalion got support from the Regiment and Depot regarding many initiatives, including the martial arts program, water qualification program, athletic trainer data reports (injury rates, return to training rates).

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(b) (6)

5830  
10 Jun 15

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subj: Statement of (b) (6) (b) (6)  
Weapons and Training Battalion

My battalion does all the marksmanship training and the field training (basic infantry stuff). "Every Marine is a rifleman and it doesn't happen without our battalion." I'm the supporting command to the Regiment. (b) (6) controls the recruits, I control the coaches. Historically, the relationship between RTR and Weapons has been hit or miss but I think it has improved recently. I do not fall under the RTR. I work for the General.

I have a relationship with all of the battalion commanders. I have the best relationship with (b) (6) and (b) (6), I have an okay relationship with (b) (6) and my relationship with (b) (6) (b) (6) is almost non-existent. I talk to (b) (6) whenever there are any issues. I know (b) (6) thinks the world of (b) (6). (b) (6) is driven and doesn't suffer fools. I think (b) (6) is the only friend (b) (6) has.

I know there has been some friction between (b) (6) and (b) (6) (b) (6). I discussed this issue with (b) (6) since I was close to (b) (6), maybe mentor (b) (6). (b) (6) didn't seem interested although (b) (6) didn't say anything.

I think the sour relationship between (b) (6) and (b) (6) began when (b) (6) relieved one of (b) (6) company commanders ((b) (6) (b) (6)). (b) (6) believed there wasn't enough depth at 4th Battalion to relieve a company commander. (b) (6) misunderstood (b) (6) intent and relieved (b) (6).

(b) (6) is a very smart (b) (6) very analytical, genuine, deliberate, low key, and incredibly smart. I think (b) (6) is trying to do the right thing but (b) (6) has a ton of paperwork. I do think (b) (6) gives (b) (6) commanders a lot of latitude, maybe too much latitude with (b) (6) company commanders.

(b) (6) is incredibly strong willed, focused, objective-driven commander." "I think the Marine Corps needs to make (b) (6) a General." (b) (6) doing a fantastic job in (b) (6) battalion. (b) (6) ensures recruits are leaving with a basic foundation as Marines.

On (b) (6) second day on the job, (b) (6) called me and discussed how to improve rifle training. I thought it was professional. First Battalion also reach out to me; 2d and 3d battalions did not. Historically, initial female qualification rates are around 70%, but they are now up to 90%. Male initial qualification rates are about 95%. (b) (6) goal is to have the females catch up to males. It's impressive what (b) (6) doing.

Enclosure (9)

Subj: Statement of (b) (6)  
Weapons and Training Battalion

(b) (6)

I consider (b) (6) approachable. I've heard (b) (6) isn't too approachable with (b) (6) peers. I have seen some funny, non-verbal communication between (b) (6) and some of (b) (6) peers.

"I personally believe (b) (6) is the best battalion commander," or maybe (b) (6) I think she's driven, (b) (6) focused, (b) (6) spot on in what (b) (6) trying to achieve. "I see (b) (6) out all the time [with her Marines] more so than the other battalion commanders by a long shot." I haven't seen (b) (6) out much over the last month.

I don't think there's a gender bias. (b) (6) is a good officer, (b) (6) (b) (6) is a good officer. I think there is just a personality issue.

I don't interact with Regiment much.

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(b) (6)

5830  
9 Jun 15

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subj: Statement of (b) (6) (b) (6)  
(b) (6) 4th Recruit Training Battalion

Upon selection for command, I heard difficult experiences coming from 4th Recruit Training Battalion. Most people would tell me that "it's just different". My predecessor walked away from command feeling "paranoid" and "wishing (b) (6) would have done things differently". According to (b) (6), (b) (6) felt like (b) (6) was not out there enough with (b) (6) Marines.

Personally, "I thought this would be my redemption tour in the Marine Corps." I didn't think I had to be a hammer like I have always been. I figured this would be the best place to retire out of the Marine Corps. I plan on retiring in the next year.

When I first arrived at Parris Island (my first command), I immediately became aware of courts-martial and investigations out of the battalion stemming from drill instructor hazing and recruit abuse. The first thing I did as the commander was conduct a battalion-wide PME, comparing the abuses at Abu Gharib with similar misconduct that occurred in the battalion. I also issued a hazing policy. I have not had any issues of DI hazing/ recruit abuse since assuming command last summer.

My focus in the beginning was to continue where my predecessor left off, and to hold Marines accountable by using the same leadership tools as other battalions use in the Marine Corps. In addition to DI hazing and recruit abuse, I noticed the female Marines had never done well on the rifle range compared to their male counterparts. I believe we must improve our rifle range scores in order for the Marines to be viewed as credible after graduation. Credibility of my Marines has been a paramount concern of mine. As a result of our comparably lower rifle scores, I met early on with the (b) (6) of Weapons and Training Battalion, (b) (6), to rectify this.

"(b) (6) is awesome. (b) (6) is amazing." (b) (6) had two primary marksmanship instructors fly out here from the west coast to train my battalion. Having two outsiders come in really woke my Marines up; it got us on the right track early. This was a major reason why our rifle scores have improved so much over the past year. But the rifle range was not the only area in which the female battalion underperformed their male counterparts.

"It was not until I dug into the actual stats did I realize the female battalion was struggling with their male counterparts." Complacency in the past was unacceptable and I made sure to instill aggressive policies to combat this.

Subj: Statement of (b) (6)  
(b) (6) 4th Recruit Training Battalion

(b) (6)

With my experience having been on recruiting duty twice, I was aware that not always were the highest caliber females sent to the Recruit Depot. I therefore spent a lot of time with my Marines. In fact, I spent two-thirds of every day with my Marines. They were first suspicious because they weren't used to having their commander around, but after a few months they realized that I wasn't a spy; I was there doing what was right.

Looking back over the past year in command, the two biggest challenges I have experienced have been (1) selling the Marines on change, and (2) difficulties getting support from the Regiment. As to the former challenge, the battalion staff for years have been told that they are making good Marines when in fact the female Marines don't measure up to their male counterparts. Change was needed in the battalion, however, many Marines were resistant to change.

My command philosophy is to treat my Marines like Marines, not like females. I experienced difficulties with many Marines within the battalion due to this philosophy. There seemed to be cognitive dissonance from Marines who have been here awhile - Marines who believe that being cruel towards recruits makes the recruits stronger. "The old way of doing business," if you will.

The second challenge has been getting support from the Regiment. The "manning piece was the first thing that hit me in the face" upon checking in as the commanding officer. We're the smallest battalion, yet we are accountable for the same proportional number of quotas, which leaves us with a disproportionately smaller staff. I have 117 T/O in my battalion, 60 being drill instructors. Additional quota requirements sometimes force my DIs/SDIs to stand duty every other day for seven days straight.

This manning issue creates a morale and safety problem for me. I can't send Marines to PME's; I can't allow them to take leave to decompress, visit family, or to have their birthdays off. Additionally, a lack of rest turns into other problems, such as DI misconduct, illness, falling asleep at the wheel, etc. A rest plan is very important to me. Pregnancy issues, as discussed below, only aggravate this problem.

"There has never been a reason why [this issue] couldn't be fixed." "I get nothing from the Regiment even when I lay it out in black and white." After failed attempts at the Regiment-level, I called MMOA for which "I got my hand slapped by (b) (6)." (b) (6) has been doing a good job on the enlisted side.

I currently have five DIs that are pregnant, creating additional duty requirements on my other Marines. With manpower already being a problem, I approached (b) (6) about a pregnancy policy in September 2014. With no action taken between September 2014 and April 2015, I drafted a pregnancy policy and presented it to (b) (6) some time in May. "Everything I tried to do was based on facts, not emotion." It

Subj: Statement of (b) (6)  
(b) (6), 4th Recruit Training Battalion

(b) (6)

was a generic pregnancy policy, similar to the MSG's pregnancy policy, but it got nowhere. (b) (6) was not satisfied with my drafted policy and said, "it needed work." (b) (6) told me to come see (b) (6) if I still wanted to push the policy. To this day, I still haven't heard anything about the policy. I wasn't going to push the issue since "I didn't need another nail in my coffin from him."

I feel that we are making institutional decisions at the battalion-level. The lack of responsiveness from the Regiment makes things worse. There's "no ownership" at the Regiment.

Another challenge I experienced as the commander was on the issue of special duty assignment pay and drill instructor ribbons. Many Marines in my battalion have been diagnosed with mental health or stress-related issues - many of those Marines are now in the S-1 shop. These Marines will never be able to perform as DIs. I told the XO to process these Marines for good-of-the-service but she never did (nor did my predecessor), so I had to. Upon notification of good-of-the-service separation, I stopped their SDA pay, which the Regiment generally supported as it was approved by the General.

The DI ribbon policy, although there is a Depot policy in effect, created issues within my command. Many Marines don't believe it's fair. The 30-month time requirement to earn the ribbon is inclusive of time on quota, as well as time in maternity and pregnancy. Some Marines were returning from their quota only to get pregnant and reach the 30-month requirement with only half of that time being a DI.

The "[b]iggest dilemma for me is that [on the one hand] there is gender bias. . . . but on the other hand poor leadership and staff work." Nobody in the Regiment wants to touch the difficult issue of integration of rifle ranges, of training events, such as crucible hikes and PFTs, or of the pregnancy policy. I don't know why nobody wants to touch these issues. They are "afraid to touch" these issues.

I tried to integrate marches and PFTs. I pushed it and the Regimental CO only integrated the Crucible hike - the only thing he supported me on. (b) (6) expected there to be a consensus on the integration issues, a democracy; he did not order the integration of the Crucible hike, (b) (6) merely ensured us commanders agreed on it. One of my peers bought off on it, one of my peers was on the fence about the idea, and another peer has adamantly opposed it since the beginning, (b) (6) (b) (6) doesn't feel integration is necessary. In fact, some of 3rd battalion's policies are directly contradictory to (b) (6) policies. (b) (6) calls my recruits distractions in an email to the Regiment CO. (b) (6) did nothing with that email.

(b) (6) has not once seen training in my battalion," although (b) (6) has attended initial strength tests and end-of-cycle debriefs. I know (b) (6) hasn't been around because I spend two-thirds of my day out during



Subj: Statement of (b) (6)  
(b) (6), 4th Recruit Training Battalion

training. I'm not sure if (b) (6) also doesn't see the other battalions train. I think (b) (6) perspective on me as a leader is not based on first hand observation, rather it is based on second hand observations from my peers, (b) (6) staff, and my subordinates.

Since assuming command I have not been provided any guidance by (b) (6) (b) (6) "I got nothing." "I did not receive any guidance from anyone."

"I don't get along with (b) (6)." It started in September 2014 regarding communications I had with Recruiting Station Commanders. I contacted many RS Commanders to discuss the trends we see at the Depot, i.e., underperformance of female recruits, and how to nip it in the butt. Apparently one of my emails was forwarded to (b) (6) (b) (6) approached me and told me I was being overly aggressive and too forward with RS Commanders. Never in my Marine Corps career have I been told that I was being too aggressive. My counterparts are the same way and they are never told this. (b) (6) told me that I was wrong and that I'm the problem. "Every issue that I've had here is that I'm the problem."

I have been in (b) (6) office only six times in the last year, aside from weekly staff meetings and commander huddles. Every time has been regarding a negative thing.

(b) (6) never sees the balance. (b) (6) has a preconceived notion about who I am as a leader, and takes no consideration of my perspective. (b) (6) doesn't give the recognition that my battalion deserves. (b) (6) doesn't do that with any of the other battalions; however, my battalion has improved the most while the other battalions are just trucking along.

This place is different than any other place I've ever been at in my life; no team building at Regiment level. I know Regiment staff has talked about me. The day (b) (6) counseled me on the (b) (6) thing (read below) (b) (6) SgtMaj told my SgtMaj about me not having "playground skills". That phrase came from (b) (6). The Colonel's XO told him about the (b) (6) issue (read below).

(b) (6) created a lot of issues between (b) (6) and myself. I observed a pattern of misbehavior by (b) (6) in the past nine months. (b) (6) continued to struggle as a company commander. One of (b) (6) Marines got a DUI after the birthday ball and (b) (6) failed to get the police report. (b) (6) didn't take care of the Marine with (b) (6) court case out in town. (b) (6) seemed very detached; (b) (6) never saw training; (b) (6) failed to supervise her Marines.

In September, 4-5 months after my assumption of command, I realized N Company was my bad company. I had enough and gave (b) (6) a NPLOC and had daily counselings with (b) (6) over the next 30 days. We would sit down to discuss scheduling and leadership, training plans, and we read leadership articles. It looked like (b) (6) was getting it after 30 days,

Subj: Statement of (b) (6)  
(b) (6) 4th Recruit Training Battalion

(b) (6)

so I stopped the counselings. Within two weeks though, her 1stSgt came in and said (b) (6) was quitting, said (b) (6) couldn't work with (b) (6) anymore. At this point I decided to relieve (b) (6). I still remember what (b) (6) had told me during one of our counselings, "I don't know why I disregard what you tell me. You just rub me the wrong way."

(b) (6) was aware of the problems I was having with (b) (6). (b) (6) was at 4th Battalion for an end-of-cycle debrief when I told (b) (6) that I was planning on relieving (b) (6). I told (b) (6) that (b) (6) would have to be a series commander because there's nowhere else to put (b) (6). (b) (6) then said to hold off on that and see if there was another option. I thought (b) (6) wanted me to hold off on making (b) (6) a series commander, not hold off on relieving (b) (6) as the company commander.

After (b) (6) leaves my office, I sent (b) (6) on leave to visit family and to deal with any stress/ mental health-related issues. About 45 minutes later I get an email from (b) (6) saying that under no circumstances am I to relieve (b) (6). I told (b) (6) via email that I already relieved (b) (6) and then I called (b) (6). I didn't know that was (b) (6) intent. The phone call was one of two times he has yelled at me. (b) (6) said I had violated an order. (b) (6) then said that (b) (6) needed to go to a meeting and that (b) (6) couldn't talk about it anymore.

The next day, we had initial strength test. In front of my Marines, (b) (6) told me that we needed to talk. I then told (b) (6) that I was going to fly to Charleston on leave. (b) (6) stopped and yelled at me in front of my Marines and said I violated a direct order." (b) (6) said upon returning from leave, (b) (6) needed to see me to sign paperwork. I was sick to my stomach coming back. When I returned, I had a meeting with (b) (6) and (b) (6) counseled me about listening.

One month later, (b) (6) wanted to see (b) (6) training jacket. During this time (b) (6) stayed in position. After reading (b) (6) training jacket, (b) (6) concurred in relieving (b) (6). It is unusual for (b) (6) to relieve company commanders. My peers do it with no problems.

(b) (6) fitness report has been sitting in the Colonel's box for 3-4 months waiting for the RO portion. I have six FITREPS that have been sitting in (b) (6) box for some time. I think (b) (6) trying to use the fitness reports to substantiate what the DEMOI results show - that I don't treat my officers and SNCOs the way that I should.

The crucible hike was the only thing the Regiment supported me in. It seems that the Regiment is passive-aggressive. They just want us to be quiet. They'll give my Marines every opportunity to complain to them and not back the battalion up. The Regiment hasn't actively tried to stop any initiatives; they just haven't supported our initiatives. To date, no initiatives have gone through except integrating the crucible hike. The Regiment still hasn't acknowledged discrepancies between

Subj: Statement of (b) (6)  
(b) (6), 4th Recruit Training Battalion

(b) (6)

females underperforming their male counterparts. I think (b) (6) doesn't understand the credibility issue with my Marines.

Along manpower issues again, all of the male battalions have XOs. Not every single company has an XO, but the battalions have consistently had XOs. I don't have company XOs. I have never had company XOs. I was told we had to provide staff secretary names because "we're good administrators" I'm told. When the first staff secretary billet couldn't be filled we had to provide another name to fill the billet.

I get no facilities support from Regiment. I had three Marines without heat for three months this winter. I have some Marines with double clogged sinks; some with an air conditioning dripping. I finally got support from Regiment after one month. The barracks are horrible. I don't believe gender bias applies to the facilities issues. Facilities issues become a joke during staff meetings.

The first DEOMI survey results were not surprising given how women generally communicate. The second survey "results was surprising, it was devastating." A lot of the comments were personally directed toward me. I know it's an annual requirement but (b) (6) directed it with questions (b) (6) and (b) (6) staff created. The most concerning comments are that I don't return salutes and that I treat officers/SNCOs terribly. I believe the survey was used to get back at me; I believe that with all my heart and my mind. I believe my old XO was behind it.

They gave everyone one password, so people could go into the survey and take it multiple times. I briefed Regiment on the DEOMI results, and I believe the survey gave (b) (6) the legitimacy based on (b) (6) prior beliefs of me being too aggressive, too forward. (b) (6) took the survey results as gospel." While briefing (b) (6) told me I didn't listen, that (b) (6) believed the comments to be true. I regret not having every Marine in my battalion fill out the survey.

(b) (6) and I had problems since September 2014. I'm a geo-bachelor and I try to go home monthly or every other month. I remember being home in November and (b) (6) had questioned my officers about how I was treating them. I confronted (b) (6) and (b) (6) said (b) (6) was trying to help me. (b) (6) doesn't understand that change is hard. (b) (6) undermines my ability to make changes in the battalion.

(b) (6) had a good sense of humor and that was it. From day one (b) (6) did not have a good grasp on the role of an XO; (b) (6) didn't know when to be professional and when to be funny; (b) (6) always said the wrong thing at the wrong time"; (b) (6) used off colored jokes in front of me; and (b) (6) asks a lot of simple questions. Early on briefed (b) (6) on my expectations of what a XO should be.

At every opportunity, however, (b) (6) would talk to other officers about me in the battalion. (b) (6) would always find a way not to do something I tasked (b) (6) Before November, I told (b) (6) to vent up, not

Subj: Statement of (b) (6)  
(b) (6) 4th Recruit Training Battalion

vent down. I believe (b) (6) colluded with other officers in the battalion to undermine my authority. "I honestly believe every single problem I have right now is because of those relationships" created by (b) (6) (b) (6).

Another issue I had with (b) (6) is a fitness report concerning one of my Staff Sergeants. My predecessor sent (b) (6) to NJP for adultery when (b) (6) became pregnant with (b) (6) boyfriend's baby while still married to (b) (6) husband. (b) (6) refused NJP, so I gave (b) (6) a 6105 counseling, for which (b) (6) requested mast to be transferred out of the battalion. (b) (6) ended up being transferred to Weapons and Training Battalion, but I wanted to make sure (b) (6) fitness report was adverse to reflect the misconduct.

I kicked the adverse report back to (b) (6) after (b) (6) wrote a 6-page rebuttal. I told (b) (6) to call MMSB which (b) (6) failed to do. (b) (6) sends the fitness report back to me and didn't do anything to adjudicate anything. I called MMSB and they said it would get pulled, so I called (b) (6) into my office and told (b) (6) to work on it again. After 5 months, we finally finished the report. (b) (6) (b) (6) tried to get the report pulled but it didn't work due to our solid record keeping. The 6105 wasn't in the SSgt's record, so I tasked the XO with mailing it. (b) (6) failed to mail it.

I'm not sure the extent of the relationship between (b) (6) and (b) (6) (b) (6). I do know that (b) (6) wrote (b) (6) a letter of recommendation to be the Aide de Camp to the Vice President without my knowledge. (b) (6) knew about my problems with (b) (6) but still wrote the letter of recommendation. I also know that (b) (6) talked to the RTR XO about me not getting along with (b) (6).

My SgtMaj and I spent the first six months trying to convince ourselves that we weren't crazy. (b) (6) believed (b) (6) should be less aggressive, taking a more diplomatic approach, but after six months (b) (6) realized (b) (6) peers wouldn't support the battalions initiatives. "Being diplomatic wasn't getting anything done." We've been together over the past year; (b) (6) a good counterpoint to me; (b) (6) a good sanity check; (b) (6) is awesome.

I went to (b) (6) in March/April due to perceived gender bias issues at the RTR. "I felt like I was at my wits end." I have no prior relationship with (b) (6) but (b) (6) always seemed very approachable. (b) (6) was a no-nonsense, very factual Marine. (b) (6) asked me about the manpower piece, specifically about DIs, which (b) (6) started looking into.

I have had a good relationship with all the battalion commanders except (b) (6). (b) (6) was the acting RTR CO when I checked in and I found out quickly that (b) (6) told one of my company commanders about 4th Battalion's drama. My Captain notified me of this and I confronted (b) (6)

Subj: Statement of (b) (6)  
(b) (6), 4th Recruit Training Battalion

(b) (6)

about it. The conversation ended with "have a nice fucking day" and (b) (6) hung up on me. "I don't talk to (b) (6) at all."

The Regiment has not done inspections with any battalions since I've been here. When I received the final letter from the IG's inspection I was disheartened by comments in the back of the report. I was not associating this inspection with the DEOMI survey, because I believe the survey was an opportunity for disgruntled Marines to make their opinions known. I was provided 48-hour notice of the IG inspection, although I've known about the inspection checklist since checking in. The inspection found us mission capable with the exception in three areas. I don't recall all three areas, but I remember thinking that one area, historical programs, was a regiment issue.

There is limited Regiment interaction outside of work. I have been to one Super Bowl party and one other social but that's it. I do recall the Depot CG starting monthly boss's night.

My fitness report was just completed by (b) (6). (b) (6) said I was the last LtCol in (b) (6) profile. (b) (6) doesn't mention improvement in my battalion; nothing on the career-progression initiatives I have taken. (b) (6) hasn't signed it yet, but it's due to the General by Friday.

The statement of (b) (6) represents an accurate, summarized narrative into the facts and circumstances of a hostile work environment at the Recruit Training Regiment, Marine Corps Recruit Depot, Parris Island in accordance with JAGINST 5800.7F (JAGMAN).

(b) (6)

| 2011              | 1st    | 2nd     | 3rd     | 4th    | Overall |
|-------------------|--------|---------|---------|--------|---------|
| CFT Ave           | 285.40 | 280.06  | 280.43  | 280.77 | 281.67  |
| PFT Ave           | 247.44 | 246.12  | 248.84  | 252.65 | 248.77  |
| Rifle Ave         | 295.00 | 296.30  | 295.00  | 281.00 | 292.00  |
| Qual % T1 Initial | 87.35% | 88.11%  | 87.75%  | 65.30% | 82.13%  |
| Qual % T1 Final   | 99.38% | 99.68%  | 99.68%  | 97.07% | 98.96%  |
| Qual % T2 Initial | 91.86% | 99.82%  | 99.82%  | 98.57% | 97.52%  |
| Qual % T2 Final   | 99.93% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 99.88% | 99.95%  |
| Final Exam        | 94.07  | 92.70   | 94.68   | 91.56  | 93.25   |
| PracApp           | 93.32  | 94.66   | 95.31   | 94.26  | 94.54   |

| 2011 Attrition % |        |
|------------------|--------|
| Male             | Female |
| 7.08%            | 14.81% |

| 2012              | 1st    | 2nd     | 3rd     | 4th    | Overall |
|-------------------|--------|---------|---------|--------|---------|
| CFT Ave           | 289.75 | 283.36  | 286.75  | 280.61 | 285.24  |
| PFT Ave           | 258.44 | 251.60  | 254.81  | 262.02 | 256.72  |
| Rifle Ave         | 292.00 | 294.00  | 294.00  | 279.00 | 290.00  |
| Qual % T1 Initial | 88.03% | 90.05%  | 90.92%  | 63.75% | 83.19%  |
| Qual % T1 Final   | 99.63% | 99.68%  | 99.68%  | 96.71% | 98.92%  |
| Qual % T2 Initial | 99.47% | 99.66%  | 99.77%  | 98.40% | 99.33%  |
| Qual % T2 Final   | 99.99% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 99.96% | 99.99%  |
| Final Exam        | 97.71  | 98.13   | 99.13   | 97.60  | 98.14   |
| PracApp           | 96.26  | 96.77   | 96.50   | 96.06  | 96.40   |

| 2012 Attrition % |        |
|------------------|--------|
| Male             | Female |
| 5.04%            | 10.56% |

| 2013              | 1st     | 2nd     | 3rd     | 4th     | Overall |
|-------------------|---------|---------|---------|---------|---------|
| CFT Ave           | 289.40  | 285.93  | 287.03  | 277.24  | 283.81  |
| PFT Ave           | 256.78  | 247.89  | 253.98  | 257.82  | 253.34  |
| Rifle Ave         | 274.19  | 295.96  | 292.63  | 285.86  | 294.24  |
| Qual % T1 Initial | 91.95%  | 91.98%  | 93.19%  | 74.21%  | 84.34%  |
| Qual % T1 Final   | 99.02%  | 99.86%  | 99.76%  | 98.46%  | 99.18%  |
| Qual % T2 Initial | 92.16%  | 99.74%  | 98.16%  | 98.92%  | 98.51%  |
| Qual % T2 Final   | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% | 100.00% |
| Final Exam        | 94.61   | 96.17   | 95.48   | 93.33   | 95.59   |
| PracApp           | 96.04   | 96.41   | 96.85   | 95.12   | 95.11   |

| 2013 Attrition % |        |
|------------------|--------|
| Male             | Female |
| 5.94%            | 13.50% |

| 2014              | 1st     | 2nd    | 3rd    | 4th     | Overall |
|-------------------|---------|--------|--------|---------|---------|
| CFT Ave           | 290.19  | 287.03 | 288.77 | 281.19  | 287.41  |
| PFT Ave           | 257.13  | 252.91 | 255.47 | 257.01  | 255.42  |
| Rifle Ave         | 296.46  | 299.61 | 299.45 | 289.27  | 297.09  |
| Qual % T1 Initial | 91.82%  | 92.74% | 93.68% | 78.64%  | 98.73%  |
| Qual % T1 Final   | 99.73%  | 99.78% | 99.54% | 97.79%  | 98.73%  |
| Qual % T2 Initial | 99.79%  | 99.75% | 99.05% | 99.73%  | 99.85%  |
| Qual % T2 Final   | 100.00% | 99.96% | 99.15% | 100.00% | 99.85%  |
| Final Exam        | 97.23   | 96.42  | 95.79  | 94.00   | 95.02   |
| PracApp           | 96.68   | 97.50  | 96.83  | 94.12   | 95.56   |


| 2014 Attrition % |        |
|------------------|--------|
| Male             | Female |
| 7.92%            | 14.56% |

| 4 yr Ave          | 1st    | 2nd    | 3rd    | 4th    | Overall |
|-------------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|---------|
| CFT Ave           | 288.69 | 284.10 | 285.75 | 279.95 | 284.53  |
| PFT Ave           | 254.95 | 249.63 | 253.28 | 257.38 | 253.56  |
| Rifle Ave         | 289.41 | 296.47 | 295.27 | 283.78 | 293.33  |
| Qual % T1 Initial | 89.79% | 90.72% | 91.39% | 70.48% | 87.10%  |
| Qual % T1 Final   | 99.44% | 99.75% | 99.67% | 97.51% | 98.95%  |
| Qual % T2 Initial | 95.82% | 99.74% | 99.20% | 92.73% | 98.80%  |
| Qual % T2 Final   | 99.98% | 99.99% | 99.79% | 99.58% | 99.95%  |
| Final Exam        | 95.91  | 95.86  | 96.27  | 94.12  | 95.50   |
| PracApp           | 95.58  | 96.34  | 96.37  | 94.89  | 95.40   |

| 4 yr Ave Attrition % |        |
|----------------------|--------|
| Male                 | Female |
| 6.50%                | 13.36% |

# Rifle Range – Table 1 Initial Qual

Percent Initial Qualification for Table 1, by battalion



5830  
11 Jun 15

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subj: Statement of (b) (6) (b) (6)  
(b) (6), Recruit Training Regiment

My predecessor had about 3-4 months with (b) (6) and the new group of battalion commanders before I took over. I was the former Depot IG. I got here July 2013 and was the command inspector until I came to the Regiment in September 2014.

(b) (6) has three pillars: (1) take care of the DIs; (2) take care of the recruits; and (3) take care of the institution. (b) (6) reiterates this every chance (b) (6) gets in front of the Regiment.

The battalion commanders sometimes use me to bounce off ideas, as a litmus test. They go right to the Colonel for more important things. I deal primarily with the XOs. Internally within the Regiment, I run the Regiment staff. I write all of the fitness reports and the Colonel reviews them. The staff understands they also have a direct line to the Colonel, but they primarily go through me.

(b) (6) "has a pretty packed schedule." (b) (6) gets out to the battalions on a weekly basis for four primary events: pick-up brief to the staff, pick-up of actual recruits, graduation, and the Crucible/end-of-cycle debriefs/ EGA ceremony. (b) (6) gives (b) (6) intent to the company staff during the pick-up brief. (b) (6) at a battalion event every week. I sometimes would attend in (b) (6) stead. I got out more to these events as the IG than as the Regiment XO.

On Mondays at 0900, we have a commander's huddle which I attend. We go through the staff meeting presentations, talking operations, personnel, and logistics. After the meeting, we break up into our respective groups. The Colonel would have a huddle with his commanders. On Tuesdays, the CG has his staff meeting. The Chief of Staff normally leads that meeting since the CG is always gone.

The battalion commanders come up to the meeting. (b) (6) is about the straightest arrow kind of (b) (6) you'll ever meet." There's no ambiguity with (b) (6). (b) (6) level-headed, not emotional about things, and (b) (6) consistent across the board with everybody. (b) (6) consistently the same all day every day." (b) (6) treats all of his commanders the same.

(b) (6) has been up to (b) (6) office on occasion but not nearly as much as the other battalion commanders. (b) (6) (b) (6) is in (b) (6) office more than anyone. (b) (6) has an open door policy, especially with his battalion commanders.

Female integration has been all talk and planning. Three months ago the CG asked (b) (6) to develop a point paper on what it would mean

Enclosure (3)



Subj: Statement of (b) (6) (b) (6)  
(b) (6), Recruit Training Regiment

for the Depot if we were to integrate completely, much like what the other services are doing. (b) (6) submitted a two-page paper and it may now be with TECOM. I'm not sure if he approached the battalion commanders about the issue.

(b) (6) strives to make (b) (6) relationship with (b) (6) the same as the other battalion commanders. (b) (6) "not at all approachable." (b) (6) tends to shut (b) (6) off if (b) (6) believes he isn't in her favor. "(b) (6) would just stop talking to (b) (6) (b) (6) would give (b) (6) the cold shoulder. (b) (6) avoids (b) (6) " (b) (6) had to struggle with that. (b) (6) doesn't avoid (b) (6) (b) (6) not shy. (b) (6) approach (b) (6) if (b) (6) has something to discuss with (b) (6). "(b) (6) doesn't shut (b) (6) out in the same way that (b) (6) shuts (b) (6) out. (b) (6) is a cold person to begin with." In staff meetings (b) (6) just won't communicate.

(b) (6) often mentions personnel issues in (b) (6) situation report. For enlisted personnel, (b) (6) at (b) (6) staffing level but (b) (6) consistently reports that (b) (6) is having enlisted personnel staffing issues. (b) (6) not short. It's an internal issue where (b) (6) places (b) (6) Marines. I have not discussed her enlisted shortfalls with (b) (6). On the officer side, I have been intimately involved with since coming on board.

I was told upon checking in as the RTR XO that 4th Battalion's officer numbers weren't good. (b) (6) predecessor made some staffing decisions that weren't good for the battalion. For example, several of the officers were sent to become either the CG's aid de camp, a staff secretary, or a support battalion company commander. I've been hands off with 4th Battalion since I checked in; I haven't taken any officers from (b) (6) battalion. (b) (6) battalion is getting healthier lately. (b) (6) will have 15 (out of 17) officers in (b) (6) battalion by the end of the summer.

All of the battalions have officer issues. Only 3rd Battalion has company XOs. I'm not sure why only 3rd Battalion has XOs. We are currently five officers (two field grades) short in the RTR. We have overages in other ranks. MMOA takes only the aggregate number. We have the officers we just don't have the right rank structure.

There are no challenges with 1st, 2d, and Support Battalion. Third Battalion has had a rash of DI misconduct, probably because of receiving quota Marines. I have no idea what it was over there; it was crazy stuff; it was pretty brutal; it was flat out assault on recruits. (b) (6) discussed this with me and wanted time to fix the problem. (b) (6) has been and continues to be very generous with (b) (6). We're about a year into (b) (6) (b) (6) time as a commander. The "give me time" is out right now.

Fourth Battalion has done very well on training statistics, most notably on the rifle range. Historically, female recruits have not

Subj: Statement of (b) (6), (b) (6)  
(b) (6) Recruit Training Regiment

shot as well as male recruits. (b) (6) and (b) (6) has worked well together to get marksmanship scores up. It wasn't until second phase when the recruits would see snap-in barrels and marksmanship instructors. The recruits are learning the fundamentals of marksmanship earlier on in the training. I'm not sure if (b) (6) (b) (6) influence has had anything to do with that.

The challenges with 4th Battalion is with the battalion commander. (b) (6) biggest challenge is (b) (6). (b) (6) has the best intentions "but it's (b) (6) delivery that sometimes gets (b) (6) in trouble." Around October 2014, we were dealing with officer shortfalls and (b) (6) believed that nobody above (b) (6) was addressing these shortfalls. (b) (6) then went directly to MMOA, which was communicated back down to our G-1. The G-1 was upset and so was (b) (6). In the email, (b) (6) said nobody in (b) (6) higher headquarters was helping (b) (6). This was my first indication that (b) (6) is pretty strong-willed.

(b) (6) had addressed manpower concerns with (b) (6) before (b) (6) contacted MMOA. In my weekly XO meetings I addressed these concerns with (b) (6). In every meeting (b) (6) said, "(b) (6) (b) (6)." We were working that issue very hard. Notably, (b) (6) battalion is the only battalion with an officer in the S-4 section.

The second instance (b) (6) got counseled on was regarding (b) (6) communications with Recruiting Station Commanders. At one point (b) (6) communicated with the RS New York Commander telling (b) (6) that (b) (6) was all screwed up because of the recruits he was sending (b) (6). (b) (6) said (b) (6) was here to help him be a better commander. We had the Assistant Chief of Staff of Recruiting come down and talk to (b) (6) to unscrew (b) (6).

(b) (6) idea may have worked but (b) (6) delivery was poorly executed." (b) (6) immediately puts up a wall of defenses and (b) (6) immediately has a counterargument to why (b) (6) is right. "There is no receive mode to (b) (6) with guidance." (b) (6) doesn't grasp what (b) (6) tells (b) (6). (b) (6) comes to me with frustration because of this. The other battalion commanders are receptive whereas (b) (6) throws up a wall and it's not received no matter what it is.

Around the end of December 2014 (b) (6) came to (b) (6) to say that (b) (6) was displeased with (b) (6) performance. (b) (6) said that (b) (6) was considering relieving (b) (6). (b) (6) sat down with (b) (6) (b) (6) and discussed it. (b) (6) explicitly said do not relieve (b) (6) until I've had the opportunity to talk to (b) (6). (b) (6) wanted to talk to her first. The very next day (b) (6) relieved (b) (6) (b) (6) without (b) (6) talking to her. This upset (b) (6). (b) (6) claimed that (b) (6) didn't understand (b) (6) intent and that it wasn't clearly communicated to (b) (6). (b) (6) said, "what do you not understand about 'do not relieve (b) (6) until I get a chance to talk to (b) (6)'?"

Subj: Statement of (b) (6), (b) (6)  
(b) (6) Recruit Training Regiment

(b) (6) was relieved and put into the battalion's headquarters. During this timeframe we started to get the rumblings of the hostilities in 4th Battalion's leadership. (b) (6) was then transferred to Support Battalion to get out of that environment.

(b) (6) was upset about this because the perception was that (b) (6) was getting rewarded instead of punished for (b) (6) relief. An IA billet soon came up out of CENTCOM to (b) (6) and I said it was perfect for (b) (6). (b) (6) was upset about this as well because (b) (6) feel that we were rewarding (b) (6) for (b) (6) failings.

Relieving (b) (6) was never (b) (6) decision to make. He wasn't going to say don't relieve (b) (6) just hold off until I get the opportunity to speak with (b) (6). (b) (6) gives the battalion commanders the flexibility they deserve. No other officer has been relieved since (b) (6) other than for misconduct. There have been 2-3 officers relieved due to misconduct since December.

(b) (6) didn't believe in the relief of (b) (6). I'm not sure specifically what (b) (6) disagreed with. I believe (b) (6) is a good officer.

I am very familiar with the relationship between (b) (6) and (b) (6). (b) (6) came to me in the February timeframe. Right after an XO's meeting, (b) (6) shut the door and sat down with me. (b) (6) burst into tears. (b) (6) explained about how bad things were between (b) (6) and (b) (6). The CO and SgtMaj were ganging up on (b) (6). (b) (6) said. They were verbally berating (b) (6) in front of the battalion staff. (b) (6) continued telling me that (b) (6) was forbidden from talking to the officers in the battalion. (b) (6) thought (b) (6) was poisoning the well. (b) (6) vehemently denied this and said (b) (6) was adhering to the commander's intent. (b) (6) felt that (b) (6) was given very little room to maneuver as the XO. (b) (6) didn't feel like an XO.

(b) (6) expressed that other officers were suffering under (b) (6) (b) (6) command. (b) (6) did everything (b) (6) could to get out of the battalion. (b) (6) finally got orders to Bahrain and PCSd on 18 May.

After the first meeting in February, about a month later, (b) (6) approached me again. I told (b) (6) that (b) (6) could respectfully disagree with (b) (6) commander. I told (b) (6) to stand up for (b) (6).

During the April timeframe two out of three of (b) (6) company commanders informed approached me and told me that they hated coming to work; that they were scared coming to work; that they wanted to remain loyal to their commander but they couldn't operate under (b) (6) oppressive environment; that they were scared to go to (b) (6) because (b) (6) was completely unapproachable and not receptive to their ideas. It's a "my way or the highway" mentality with (b) (6).

Subj: Statement of (b) (6) (b) (6)  
(b) (6) Recruit Training Regiment

(b) (6), one of those company commanders, had lost 25 pounds around this time. (b) (6) looked emaciated because of the stress; (b) (6) seemed like a battered (b) (6) thinking that (b) (6) was always doing poorly; (b) (6) was beat down; (b) (6) was close to being totally defeated; (b) (6) wasn't sleeping; (b) (6) was engaged to be married to another company commander and said (b) (6) only around here because of (b) (6).

The Regiment has done everything we can to provide support to (b) (6) battalion. The infrastructure on this Depot is bad. Everything is old and worn down. Our Facilities and Maintenance Division (FMD) works very hard on all of these issues. (b) (6) facilities issues exist at all of the battalions. There was a period of time this spring when the temperature started to get warmer and the FMD started installing thermostats in the barracks. There were some problems with the heat and some problems with the air. We haven't had any heating and air issues in the past two months

(b) (6) submitted an info/point paper to (b) (6) about a pregnancy policy. In (b) (6) proposed policy, the Marines agreed to not get pregnant while here, and if they did they would be processed for good-of-the-service. (b) (6) read the policy and thought there were political ramifications to (b) (6) policy. (b) (6) felt there was a penalty for pregnancy. (b) (6) sent it back to (b) (6) (b) (6) for more information. That's the last thing I've heard about it.

I think (b) (6) training statistics are excellent. (b) (6) battalion is doing very well, as good as any other battalion. I have had this conversation with (b) (6) many times. (b) (6) (b) (6) is a good commander statistics-wise, but it's the other things we can't get past, i.e., (b) (6) treatment of her Marines.

There is no gender bias at the Regiment with the staff. "Absolutely not." (b) (6) has not created a hostile working environment.

The statement of (b) (6) represents an accurate, summarized narrative into the facts and circumstances of a hostile work environment at the Recruit Training Regiment, Marine Corps Recruit Depot, Parris Island in accordance with JAGINST 5800.7F (JAGMAN).

(b) (6)

STATEMENT BY (b) (6)

In March and May 2014, I conducted turnover with (b) (6). (b) (6) Throughout our conversations, (b) (6) stated many times that this was a "weird" place and that (b) (6) was so paranoid about the unit and the conduct and complaints of the Marines that (b) (6) had considered the installation of cameras in the battalion headquarters spaces to determine if the Marines were going into (b) (6) office and looking at confidential documents like investigations. (b) (6) said that the culture of the battalion was one in which inappropriate relationships between officers and enlisted Marines and recruits were commonplace, and in which the conduct of the female Marines was anything but normal. (b) (6) stated point blank that trying to change the culture had become her number one priority and that (b) (6) had not felt that (b) (6) had talked to the battalion enough as the (b) (6).

As a result of (b) (6) feedback and the input of many others, I came in to this job knowing the risks associated with trying to normalize the (b) (6) in order to raise performance and conduct standards. I was committed to spending as much time as possible every day observing my Marines training recruits. My (b) (6) had also made it clear to me that many of the stereotypes about a battalion of all women were real and had persisted on the Depot for some time. I had already had (b) (6) (b) (6) and I was determined to use the hard won lessons I had learned during that tour to both better take care of and develop my Marines and take care of the Institution by employing all of the leadership tools at my disposal. I was also aware that in order to improve the caliber of female Marine we graduate, we also needed to focus on improving the performance of the drill instructors through the development of defined metrics for success and a clear career progression plan to ensure only the most competent Marines were placed in leadership billets. I was convinced that the (b) (6) could change the perception of women in the Marine Corps and culture in the battalion by setting the example, holding ourselves accountable first, and being firm but fair.

Based on several investigations from 2014 regarding drill instructor and recruit abuse, one of the first things I did to change the culture of the battalion was conduct a mandatory PME with all of our Marines focused on the similarities between the treatment of prisoners at Abu Ghraib and the maltreatment of drill instructors and recruits in our battalion. A copy of this brief was provided to the investigating officer. I also took the opportunity to brief every single Marine on my command philosophy in order to build confidence, accountability, and pride in our battalion. My goal was to ensure that the drill instructors understood that I expected them to treat each other and our recruits as human beings first and foremost, which would require a greater deal of empathy at every echelon of the command. Some of the Marines, to include N Company Marines, interpreted this as me being soft on the recruits, and rejected the change. The supreme irony in this is that even when we were abusing recruits because it was normal, their graduation stats were well below those of their male counterparts.

Shortly after I arrived, I also conducted a DEOMI command climate survey and briefed the Marines on the results during our first quarter all hands PME. (b) (6) was just checking into the command at the time, but we agreed that we needed to solicit the Marines for their feedback and then brief them on all of the mechanisms (b) (6) and I had or planned to put into place to fix the issues in the survey. A copy of the PowerPoint presentation was provided to the investigating officer.

Our goal for the PME was to address the Marines' concerns and reduce the amount of disharmony and lack of trust in the command. Our perspective was that nothing would get better in the battalion if we did not openly discuss our issues and problems, and that communication needed to be improved at every level of the command. As demonstrated by the 2014 survey and feedback from Marines who had previously been assigned to the battalion, trust had clearly been an issue for the only all-female unit in the Marine Corps for years. (b) (6) and I believed that constant communication and the early identification of risks and potential solutions at the lowest levels of the chain of command would be paramount to our success as a command. As a result, we actively sought to push authority and responsibility down to the company and series officers to the greatest extent possible, with mixed results. I also actively engaged the (b) (6) to try to get relief from the most important issue influencing the Marines of the battalion- namely personnel staffing levels.

When I first took command, we averaged 8 drill instructors and one officer getting pregnant per year, and we also had a total of seven drill instructors working in the S-1 and S-4 but still drawing special duty assignment (SDA) pay. These Marines had been diagnosed with mental health and stress issues but had not been processed for good of the service relief, causing significant friction in the rest of the battalion. As a result of the number of ineffective drill instructors in the command, the vast majority of our teams were three hat teams. This was a cause of great concern due to the operational tempo, implications on rest, and the duty requirements for the series and battalion. To improve our manning level, I stopped the SDA pay for the ineffective Marines and then processed them for good of the service reliefs. My hope was that this would focus the rest of our Marines on doing the job which they were sent here to do and reduce friction. We also implemented yoga classes, which I have been paying for out of pocket, to give the Marines a chance during the week to break away and rest. Of note, since stopping the SDA pay and processing these Marines for relief, we have not had to process another Marine for a good of the service relief. However, despite appealing to the (b) (6) for assistance in the development of a proposed policy regarding pregnant drill instructors, we have not received any support. As a result of the continued lack of a pregnancy policy, we now have five ineffective pregnant drill instructors on our rolls, three of whom returned to us from quota either already pregnant or planning to get pregnant despite the fact that they each had substantial time remaining on their tours on the drill field.

Significantly, none of our companies had Executive Officers and there were zero inbound officers projected for the command. Previous to my arrival, several of the (b) (6) had been assigned to various billets throughout the Depot, despite the fact that we were already undermanned in the battalion. According to (b) (6), the battalion had "given up" these (b) (6) to fill external billets because they were not considered to be good (b) (6) - an approach with which I disagreed. My perspective was that someone at the (b) (6) should have identified the adverse impact such a shortage would have on the battalion and should not have allowed the battalion to bear such a disproportional share of the quota billet burden. I also believed that the (b) (6) should also have emphasized the responsibility of the commander to train and mentor those officers in order to improve their performance rather than shuffling them off elsewhere. I addressed my concerns

regarding officer and enlisted staffing with (b) (6) during my first meeting with him and asked for assistance in getting our manning levels to 95%.

To allow my Marines maximum time to rest, I also requested the consolidation of duty requirements for the Early Morning Late Check Officers and Battalion Officer of the Day. A copy of the brief provided to (b) (6) on the duty issue was submitted to the investigating officer. The request to consolidate our duty requirements was not supported by the (b) (6) and unfortunately, we saw no progress on the officer staffing issue despite repeated calls for assistance. As with most issues I brought up to my (b) (6) my concerns were met with skepticism and silence. In fact, due to the lack of support from the (b) (6) in September 2014, I engaged the monitors at Headquarters Marine Corps to come up with a staffing plan myself, much to the frustration of (b) (6).

In August, I also began to dig into performance metrics to assess how we could improve the caliber of our graduates. I was stunned by what I discovered. After reviewing the data for all of the training battalions for the past decade, I found that the recruits from 4<sup>th</sup> Battalion have never measured up to their male counterparts in terms of academics, the rifle range, drill, or physical fitness. Most significantly, it did not appear that anyone had ever posed the question as to why we had consistently underperformed. Instead, underachievement by female recruits simply became expected. In fact, despite the slogan "Every Marine a rifleman", the battalion's initial qualification rate on the rifle range had for decades hovered between 67 and 72%, compared to the males average in the high 80s and low 90% range for the same period. To attack this problem, I met with the (b) (6) (b) (6) in the summer of 2014 and we established a plan to improve our performance in this training category first.

After teaming up with our primary marksmanship instructors, we began to see progress on the range, but to further our goals in the other categories, our second quarter PME included a comparison of stats for all of the battalions spanning 10 years. We spent a great deal of time discussing why changes to how we train were important and what it would mean to the Marines and their graduates. My earnest hope was that in making stronger, faster, smarter Marines, we would reduce female stereotypes and gender bias both on the Depot and in the Marine Corps and better prepare our graduates for the challenges associated with the future integration of most, if not all, combat arms specialties. I was absolutely convinced that this was possible and that the Marines would buy off on the need for improvement and the plan to get there. I also stressed that I expected each series commander to play a greater leadership role in the achievement of performance improvement within their teams. Consequently, in the past 11 months, we have seen significant improvement across every single category except drill, which is an indication that most of the Marines believe in what we are doing. Not surprisingly, the series with strong officers in charge who believe in why change is necessary have seen the greatest results, resulting in our initial qualification rate on the range reaching just under 91% in less than a year. Those who are disgruntled continue to see their series achieve stats below the Regimental averages as evidenced by (b) (6) until the arrival of the (b) (6) (b) (6) (b) (6) and (b) (6).

Over the past year, I also focused on ensuring my expectations for the performance and conduct of my officers were clearly defined and articulated. We established a bimonthly PME schedule for the company commanders along with quarterly team building events and I counseled them every 90 days on their performance (good and not so good). We also implemented a quarterly officer seminar program. I





Through their words, actions, and omissions, the malcontents within my unit have been empowered to foment dissent as demonstrated by the very pointed and similar comments about me in the recent DEOMI survey. (b) (6) sole focus on their complaints in exclusion to the broader facts, his complete disregard of the accomplishments and motivation of the rest of my Marines, and (b) (6) back door communications with those who seek sympathy from him have solidified in their minds that they have been mistreated, as opposed to simply having been held accountable for their actions. This has resulted in a climate where female Marines who seek out (b) (6) to complain that the battalion leadership is mean are treated with kid gloves (feelings vs facts). This is most pronounced in my officers and senior enlisted, whom I do hold to a higher standard for leadership, taking care of and knowing their Marines, and meeting high expectations for the performance of their Marines and recruits. The irony is that everything we are doing to improve the credibility of our Marines and recruits is focused on ensuring we earn equality in treatment rather than perpetuating the double standard of demanding equality but not being able to measure up to our counterparts. This type of behavior has been typical of 4<sup>th</sup> Battalion for a very long time, and I was cautioned even before I got here that I needed to "watch my back." I found this insulting at the time, but now I know that I should have paid more heed to the warning.

My intention has always been to improve the climate in our battalion through open communication and the provision of timely, fact based positive and negative feedback to the Marines. As indicated by the four page battalion goal document provided to the investigating officer, (b) (6) and I have taken considerable action since we checked into the command to improve the lives and performance of our recruits and Marines. Throughout the first 11 months of my command, we held regular PME sessions with all hands, and implemented investigation debriefs for those teams, series, and companies involved. I even debriefed (b) (6) after relieving the (b) (6) to explain why I had made that decision and ensure they were aware that I felt wholly responsible for her failure. The goal was to improve the transparency in the battalion, ensure the Marines were aware of why decisions had been made regarding significant events, and discuss how to prevent future problems. We also mandated the attendance of a Marine from each company at every nonjudicial punishment to prevent rumors about what transpired and why. We sought to reduce drama by relying on facts and not emotions when making decisions. To reinforce the command philosophy, every single time I got in front of the Marines, whether during new join briefs, investigation debriefs, PME, or the request mast debrief with P Company 11 May, I always started the conversation with the fact that I understand that I am accountable for everything we do or fail to do. I believed that by establishing that fact right up front I would be setting the example and my Marines would be more willing to participate in honest dialogue regarding our deficiencies and how we could improve.

Ironically, the sole purpose of the (b) (6) request mast debrief was to prevent any retaliation against or continued mistreatment of (b) (6). When I met with (b) (6) 8 May 2015, (b) (6) disclosed to me that (b) (6) felt that (b) (6) had been demeaned and mistreated by Marines in the company. About three weeks prior, (b) (6) had pulled me aside during recruit PT to tell me (b) (6) was having trouble adapting to (b) (6) role as a (b) (6). At that point, I told (b) (6) what (b) (6) was feeling was common, and that we would do everything we could to train (b) (6) as long as (b) (6) kept (b) (6) head in the game and had a thick skin. I then spoke to the (b) (6) and requested that (b) (6) specifically keep an eye on (b) (6) to ensure (b) (6) was handling stress appropriately and was being trained and mentored by (b) (6) (b) (6). Since (b) (6) had a new (b) (6) I also emphasized to (b) (6) the importance of empathy being demonstrated by the (b) (6). A short time later, (b) (6) (b) (6) was (b) (6) and was (b) (6) for which (b) (6) felt the Marines in (b) (6) series blamed (b) (6).

During (b) (6) request mast a few weeks later, (b) (6) stated that (b) (6) did not feel that (b) (6) (b) (6) was doing anything to train (b) (6) or ensure (b) (6) was BDR qualified. (b) (6) mentioned that (b) (6) senior was never around, that (b) (6) (b) (6) was often in the office, and that (b) (6) did not feel that (b) (6) could trust the (b) (6) leadership to address (b) (6) issues. (b) (6) stated that (b) (6) also felt (b) (6) had been targeted by the Marines in the series and labeled as weak simply because (b) (6) had asked for help and had been placed on (b) (6). As a result, I elected to move (b) (6) to a different company where (b) (6) is now excelling. As previously discussed, the tendency in the battalion for years had been to haze new drill instructors and I knew that (b) (6) would continue to be mistreated unless I stated publicly to the entire company that such conduct is unacceptable and not in keeping with the command philosophy. I wanted to ensure the Marines in (b) (6) Company all understood that every one of us, starting with me, down to the company staff and series teams, had a responsibility to better support and train (b) (6). During the debrief, I mentioned the command climate as a way to reinforce the point that we all need to do a better job of practicing what we teach the recruits- namely using small unit leadership and informal conflict resolution skills to solve problems at the lowest level. My main point was that by the time an issue came to my attention, I had a leadership obligation to try to solve the problem, but that 99% of our issues should and could be resolved at the lower echelons of the chain of command.

Informal conflict resolution was something that (b) (6) and (b) (6) had struggled with since they took their positions and was an area that (b) (6) and I had gone to great lengths to address. The (b) (6) leadership was present during the debrief and was given the opportunity to comment, but they said nothing. The request mast debrief was never intended as a form of retaliation or reprisal against the company. As previously discussed, we had been doing this type of debrief to reduce rumors and drama in the battalion for a full year. Since this was the first request mast that I had heard at my level, I believed there would be a benefit to the Marines to discuss what had occurred and make it clear that I would not accept any future mistreatment of the Marine who made the complaint. Unfortunately by that point, (b) (6) had already heavily influenced (b) (6) characterization of my leadership, which affected both how (b) (6) perceived my comments during the debrief and my previous recommendations to improve (b) (6) performance. The fact that (b) (6) received an end of tour Navy and Marine Corps Commendation Medal (drafted in (b) (6) despite having problems in (b) (6) company should support the fact that I didn't categorize her performance solely by those problems, nor did I use (b) (6) complaints against me as a reason to discredit (b) (6) accomplishments as a (b) (6). I also paid \$300 out of pocket for a framed guidon in recognition of the successful completion of (b) (6) tour. Finally, (b) (6) received a solid fitness report for (b) (6) performance as a (b) (6) which (b) (6) and I reviewed together prior to (b) (6) (b) (6).

The command climate survey was also a topic of conversation during an all hands event several days later. At the request of several Marines from (b) (6) Company in April, we had scheduled an all hands for the middle of May. At the time (b) (6) and (b) (6) stated that they did not want the company leadership present because they wanted to be able to talk to (b) (6) (b) (6) alone. During the all hands, which followed our monthly awards formation, we discussed the command climate survey with the sole purpose of fostering an understanding that we absolutely must do a better job of small unit leadership and informal problem resolution. Marines from every company, to include the Headquarters, were present. Due to complaints in the DEOMI survey about Marines with jeopardy (6105s or NJP) who had been board selected to fill senior and chief drill instructor billets, we discussed the fact that at some point, every single Marine in the room will screw something up, and that we need to be better about second chances. I even used my own story about

being picked up for (b) (6) when (b) (6) as a way to reinforce this point. Had I not been given a second chance, I would not have been allowed to join the Marine Corps. The Marines were given the opportunity to ask questions, which we answered. Throughout the forum, we also discussed the need to treat each other better, since we continue to have new Marines feel that they are not being welcomed to their teams or properly trained. Finally, we talked about the fact that the battalion is under a great deal of scrutiny right now because of the DEOMI survey. I mentioned that it was such a serious issue that I could be relieved as a result of the negative comments. My intention was to provide honest and open feedback to the Marines and reiterate the importance of communication and problem resolution at the lowest levels of the command, not to use the survey as a brow beating tool. In fact, I find it difficult to understand how I can positively address issues related to trust in the battalion without reference to the very survey others are using to judge my leadership and our climate. Since we had conducted PME's with the Marines last year on the results of the last survey without any blowback, I did not believe I would be wrong for discussing the results of this year's survey, even if I didn't believe that the survey to be completely valid. Following the all hands, I emailed a summary of the discussion points to (b) (6) to ensure they were aware and to again, increase the transparency in the command.

I would like to point out that it is no coincidence that, despite being my largest company, (b) (6) does not have personnel problems. They have a strong, cohesive (b) (6) team who work closely with their Marines, talk through significant issues, and apply solutions and resources before problems spin out of control. (b) (6) is extremely proactive in keeping me abreast of issues and applies reason and good judgment when determining courses of action. As a result, the Marines in (b) (6) feel that their leadership cares about them and their families and they each have a vested interest in the continued success of the company. Their Marines have not had any substantiated RTO violations this year, nor have they had to take any judicial or administrative actions as a result of misconduct. (b) (6) morale is consistently high despite being the largest company with the most challenging operational tempo. My relationships with those Marines, from the (b) (6) and (b) (6) down, have been shaped by their proven performance, trustworthiness, and demonstrated results. The same cannot be said for some of the Marines in (b) (6) and (b) (6).

Companies (b) (6) and (b) (6) have struggled over the past year, largely due to the failure of the company staffs to anticipate issues and apply resources early to solve personnel problems. I consider this to be nothing more than engaged leadership- leadership we would expect anywhere else in the Marine Corps. (b) (6) and I have focused on mentoring the (b) (6) and (b) (6) in order to improve their performance, accountability, and leadership skills. However, we have routinely had to intervene into what normally would be company business because of the leadership's failure to resolve problems at their level or ask for help. When (b) (6) were forced to intervene, we were consistently decisive and firm. In the end, I relieved (b) (6) for reasons detailed in the supporting documents provided to the investigation officer. For (b) (6) Company, the tendency of the (b) (6) to waffle on (b) (6) decisions when asked questions, coupled with the tendency of the (b) (6) to characterize Marines who needed help as weak, necessitated our direct involvement. The "suck it up" mentality and the failure by (b) (6) and (b) (6) to apply solutions and resources early to assist their Marines caused numerous problems over the past year.

The most serious of these issues was when one of the (b) (6) was (b) (6) (b) (6) for a week for (b) (6). She was later also treated for alcohol abuse and stated that the Marines on her team were aware that she was having problems but had done little to nothing to help. Throughout the past 11 months, the company consistently failed to

ensure that new drill instructors were being properly assimilated into the company and were trained as part of a well-defined and closely supervised progression process (as in the case of (b) (6) ). Routine screening of the counseling entries made in the drill instructor jackets by (b) (6) (b) (6) consistently indicated a lack of supervision and mentorship by the senior leadership in the company- this despite the fact that the officers of the battalion had received training 13 March 2015 on engaged listening, "mean girl" behavior and how to prevent it, expectations for their involvement in the counseling process, and finally, how to influence performance and behavior during the first series/company commander seminar .

Change for some can be difficult and (b) (6) and I anticipated some complaints from the ranks as we tried to steer the battalion into new territory. However, I never imagined that such complaints would be automatically presumed to be true without any scrutiny of the facts simply because individuals at (b) (6) believe me to be lacking in "playground skills", as stated by (b) (6) . My firm belief is that the (b) (6) opened the door for complaints about my leadership in November 2014 when they did nothing to address a rogue (b) (6) and her investigation into the treatment of my officers while she was serving in an acting capacity. Because nothing was done at the (b) (6) level to back me up and curb this type of inappropriate behavior by (b) (6) it essentially allowed my officers to feel that they were justified in feeling slighted or mistreated. There was never any consideration of facts or attempt to delay judgment until my side of the story could be heard. No matter how much documentation I had to factually substantiate deficiencies and the actions I had taken to correct them, no one ever considered that anything other than what was reported by those individuals could be anything other than true.

I often wonder how different things in the battalion would be if at the time, (b) (6) been told by the (b) (6) that (b) (6) actions had been completely inappropriate. I am not aware of any other unit in the Marine Corps where such conduct would be considered acceptable. Instead, my leadership has constantly been called into question, allowing Marines to excuse their lack of results by saying I mistreat them. Unfortunately, these Marines feel entitled to seek out the (b) (6) to complain that the battalion leadership is "mean" (feelings vs facts) or unfair and are then treated with kid gloves by (b) (6) . This behavior has been most pronounced in my officers and senior enlisted, whom I do hold to a higher standard for leadership, taking care of and knowing their Marines, and meeting high expectations for the performance of their Marines and recruits. Without any factual information, the Regiment has consistently sided with the complainers and undermined my credibility. As stated in my request mast, the irony in this situation is that everything we are doing to improve the credibility of our Marines and recruits is focused on ensuring we earn equality in treatment. Instead, we continue to perpetuate the double standard of demanding equality but not measuring up to our counterparts as demonstrated by decades of training statistics here on the Depot. Rather than the focus being on reinforcing our efforts to strengthen the Institution by making our female Marines smarter, stronger, faster, and more accountable, a disconcerting degree of scrutiny is being paid to the command team who has allegedly made females feel they have been mistreated or maligned.

A success story in the battalion's effort to ensure only the most competent officers are assigned to company command billets is that of (b) Company. Following my relief of the previous (b) (6) (b) (6) (b) (6) the company was in complete disarray. In the past year, the (b) (6) (b) (6) have been the subjects of more investigations and substantiated allegations of recruit abuse than the two other training companies combined. Their performance stats have all consistently been below the Regimental averages, the morale of the company was extremely low, and the relationship between the (b) (6) and (b) (6) was dysfunctional at best. Since

(b) (6) assumed command and her new (b) (6) checked in, we have seen a dramatic decline in negative incidents in the company, along with a substantial increase in accountability and morale. This is an indication that things are headed in the right direction, and that many changes implemented (b) (6) are having a positive impact on the individual Marines and the Institution. As with (b) Company, my relationships with (b) (6) and (b) (6) are the result of my trust in their leadership and their decision making skills. They are proactive and are not afraid to hold their Marines accountable at their level while keeping me informed. Their empathetic and firm yet fair approach to leadership will no doubt ensure the success of their drill instructors and is a good example of what can happen when leadership decisions are reinforced at every level of the chain of command. Unfortunately, through this entire process, the focus has shifted away from the good things we have accomplished and those Marines who have risen to the occasion because they see the value in the Institutional changes we are trying to make.

Regardless of the outcome of this investigation, I remain committed to every action we have taken to try to strengthen the caliber and improve the credibility of our Marines and drill instructors. Questions regarding this statement can be addressed to (b) (6) at (b) (6)

RTR Officer Staffing June 2014-June 2015

|              | Jun-14 | Jul-14 | Aug-14 | Sep-14 | Oct-14 | Nov-14 | Dec-14 | Jan-15 | Feb-15 | Mar-15 | Apr-15 | May-15 | Jun-15 |
|--------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| RTR (9)      | 10     | 9      | 8      | 9      | 9      | 9      | 9      | 10     | 10     | 10     | 10     | 10     | 10     |
| 1RTBn (20)   | 19     | 17     | 17     | 18     | 19     | 19     | 19     | 20     | 19     | 19     | 20     | 20     | 19     |
| 2RTBn (20)   | 20     | 19     | 19     | 16     | 18     | 17     | 18     | 18     | 18     | 18     | 16     | 17     | 19     |
| 3RTBn (20)   | 19     | 20     | 20     | 21     | 21     | 21     | 20     | 20     | 18     | 18     | 17     | 16     | 18     |
| 4RTBn (17)   | 13     | 15     | 15     | 15     | 14     | 14     | 14     | 14     | 15     | 15     | 14     | 14     | 13     |
| Support (14) | 11     | 11     | 11     | 14     | 14     | 12     | 12     | 12     | 13     | 13     | 13     | 13     | 13     |

Enclosure (15)

**RTR Current Officer Staffing**

|                            | <b>RTR HQ</b> | <b>1<sup>st</sup> Battalion</b> | <b>2<sup>nd</sup> Battalion</b> | <b>3<sup>rd</sup> Battalion</b> | <b>4<sup>th</sup> Battalion</b> | <b>Support Battalion</b> |
|----------------------------|---------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|---------------------------------|--------------------------|
| 1.                         | (b) (6)       | (b) (6)                         | (b) (6)                         | (b) (6)                         | (b) (6)                         | (b) (6)                  |
| 2.                         |               |                                 |                                 |                                 |                                 |                          |
| 3.                         |               |                                 |                                 |                                 |                                 |                          |
| 4.                         |               |                                 |                                 |                                 |                                 |                          |
| 5.                         |               |                                 |                                 |                                 |                                 |                          |
| 6.                         |               |                                 |                                 |                                 |                                 |                          |
| 7.                         |               |                                 |                                 |                                 |                                 |                          |
| 8.                         |               |                                 |                                 |                                 |                                 |                          |
| 9.                         |               |                                 |                                 |                                 |                                 |                          |
| 10.                        |               |                                 |                                 |                                 |                                 |                          |
| 11.                        |               |                                 |                                 |                                 |                                 |                          |
| 12.                        |               |                                 |                                 |                                 |                                 |                          |
| 13.                        |               |                                 |                                 |                                 |                                 |                          |
| 14.                        |               |                                 |                                 |                                 |                                 |                          |
| 15.                        |               |                                 |                                 |                                 |                                 |                          |
| 16.                        |               |                                 |                                 |                                 |                                 |                          |
| 17.                        |               |                                 |                                 |                                 |                                 |                          |
| 18.                        |               |                                 |                                 |                                 |                                 |                          |
| 19.                        |               |                                 |                                 |                                 |                                 |                          |
| 20.                        |               |                                 |                                 |                                 |                                 |                          |
| T/O                        | 9             | 20                              | 20                              | 20                              | 17                              | 14                       |
| Outbound Through Dec 2015: | (b) (6)       | (b) (6)                         | (b) (6)                         | (b) (6)                         | (b) (6)                         | (b) (6)                  |
| Inbound By Dec 2015:       | (b) (6)       | (b) (6)                         | (b) (6)                         | (b) (6)                         | (b) (6)                         | (b) (6)                  |

\*\*Denotes Officers currently in Series Commanders Course

5830  
9 Jun 15

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subj: Telephonic Statement of (b) (6), (b) (6)  
(b) (6), 4th Recruit Training Battalion

I was the XO of 4th Recruit Training Battalion from 13 June 2014 to 18 May 2015. I'm in the process of PCSing to Bahrain.

I enlisted in 1997 as a supply clerk reservist. In 1998, I went to OCS and commissioned as a logistics officer. I deployed twice to Iraq and once to Afghanistan. I was the commanding officer of CLP 23 at MCAS Beaufort before PCA'ing to the Depot. I arrived here on 28 Apr 2014.

I feel that I have been mistreated under (b) (6) command. I have voiced this via interacting with the IG and participating in the DEOMI survey. (b) (6) "wants yes men"; there is perceived favoritism; (b) (6) not approachable; (b) (6) uses "absolute language" (extreme language); (b) (6) yells at Marines; and (b) (6) rolls her eyes at Marines. I've heard about one crucible hike in which (b) (6) yelled at (b) (6) in front of Marines. Overall, I enjoyed working at 4th Battalion, just not with her. (b) (6) is a toxic leader."

"Our statistics are great but so many people are unhappy." (b) (6) (b) (6) gave me a piece of paper with (b) (6) intent/philosophy but it wasn't coherent. After a few months as (b) (6) XO, (b) (6) gave me a two-page billet description, thoughts on what (b) (6) wanted from an XO. I didn't understand (b) (6). I tried talking to (b) (6) about it, but (b) (6) got mad at me. I couldn't talk to her about things.

"It was just very difficult to talk to (b) (6) for me." (b) (6) would talk to me with contempt." It was very frustrating. It never seemed that I was right. (b) (6) would always tell me that "that was emotional, that's not fact-based." (b) (6) gets very mad if you don't agree with her.

For example, we don't agree on uniforms. I think female Marines should wear the same uniform as male Marines. (b) (6) doesn't think so. (b) (6) got mad at me because we didn't agree on this topic. Another example is that (b) (6) was interested in history of women in the Marines. I think we all have the same history.

I thought (b) (6) career progression process was reasonable; it makes sense. The only concern is the lack of flexibility in the process. The case-by-case basis for deviating from the written process, although sometimes not favored, worked.

Our battalion didn't have flexibility due to low manning. (b) (6) (b) (6). "Everyone is pulling females away from us. There are issues with Marines being on leave, being investigated, pregnant, injured, undergoing

Enclosure (1b)



Subj: Telephonic Statement of (b) (6)  
(b) (6), 4th Recruit Training Battalion

(b) (6)

rehabilitation/treatment. I talked with the RTR XO about manning issues. The issues exist Regiment-wide. We're supposed to be staffed at 95%, but we've never been at the level. Depot is supposed to be 95%, not us. The series-track, not company-track, creates additional operational concerns; other series commanders can't cover down. The male battalions have similar manning issues, but the female battalion has it worse due to our unique series-track.

In April of this year, we had five pregnant DIs. With one pregnancy in particular, this SSgt spent nine months on quota and got pregnant by artificial means right before reporting back to the field.

"I think (b) (6) felt that women weren't good enough in the Marine Corps." We needed to improve our stats to improve our credibility. I agree we needed to improve our stats; I've never felt that my credibility was jacked up until I arrived at 4th Battalion.

Regarding integrated Crucible hikes, if the battalion commander wanted it, I'd support it. Some battalion commanders wanted it, some didn't. That's the challenge. Convoys, public affairs, etc. are all integrated in the Marine Corps. Why isn't recruit training? The battalions have the same training schedules with few minor exceptions (health clinic, PFT chin ups).

We've been doing crucible hikes for six months now. (b) (6) has said something before regarding the distance of the Crucible hikes. (b) (6) recognized that the hikes were not reaching the nine-mile requirement. (b) (6) took steps to correct it based upon the route of the hike.

The RTR CO seems fine with integrated hikes. (b) (6) is the only one against integrated hikes; hikes should be company-level events according to him. It doesn't have anything to do with gender, only that it's a company-level event.

Regarding rifle range improvements, up 10% from (b) (6) predecessor, I think there has been a paradigm shift in society. Women are now being seen as carrying rifles and being Marines. Statistics have changed because expectations and attitudes have changed.

Another major issue I had with (b) (6) was her treatment of (b) (6) commanding officer of N Company. About September 2014, (b) (6) had some problems with Marines in her company, particularly (b) (6). The CO didn't like how (b) (6) was handling (b) (6) DUI incident out in town. Particularly, the CO didn't like how (b) (6) was doing DI evaluation books. The CO viewed one of (b) (6) DI evaluation books and noticed that nothing was documented. The CO became visibly upset.

(b) (6) prepared to brief the CO regarding (b) (6) during a meeting. The meeting, however, ended up concerning only (b) (6)

Subj: Telephonic Statement of (b) (6), (b) (6)  
(b) (6), 4th Recruit Training Battalion

(b) (6) SDI. The CO and SgtMaj did not like (b) (6). (b) (6) (b) (6) wasn't prepared to talk about (b) (6) and it became evident during the meeting. The hour-long meeting did not go over well. Most of the problems with (b) (6) originated there.

From that meeting, the CO made up her mind that (b) (6) was a problem. After issuing (b) (6) a two-page NPLOC, and counseling her daily over a 30-day period, she relieved her. I've never seen anything like this happen before; it seemed excessive.

I could regularly hear the CO yelling at (b) (6). I would normally see (b) (6) leave those meetings crying. (b) (6) told me that she would do anything to just not be yelled at. I was frustrated on (b) (6) behalf. I reported (b) (6) treatment to the RTR XO, (b) (6). I felt like (b) (6) was being mistreated by (b) (6) (b) (6). When the IG came on deck, I reported the (b) (6) incident to (b) (6).

I didn't understand why (b) (6) relieved (b) (6). (b) (6) (b) (6) company was the first successful integrated hike, and (b) (6) company statistics were high. The RTR CO finally fired (b) (6) in December before Christmas, but (b) (6) is still in the Regiment. Nobody knows what happened to (b) (6).

(b) (6) always said "no emotions, only facts" but (b) (6) always takes things personally and makes emotional decisions. "(b) (6) is a measured man, more deliberate." The leadership styles of the two were just different. (b) (6) did not have a good opinion of (b) (6) (b) (6); she used to say that the RTR meetings were stupid.

In one example of different opinions, (b) (6) wanted to make a (b) (6) supervise a (b) (6). (b) (6) rejected the idea, which made (b) (6) pissed.

I didn't have a problem with anyone other than (b) (6). I attended monthly staff officer call socials, as well as monthly/quarterly RTR PMEs, Depot PMEs, weekly CO meetings when (b) (6) (b) (6) was not on deck, and bi-weekly regimental XO meetings.

I didn't perceive any gender bias on behalf of the RTR or any other battalions. I never felt gender bias. All the battalions have similar manpower issues. I remember responding to a Regiment request on manpower issues a few months ago. It involved a Congressional Inquiry.

I never had any issues with Regiment. Regiment was always helpful; our battalion S-3 and S-4 shops had great relationships with regiment. I don't recall a maintenance issue where Marines were left without heat for 3-4 months due to a defective thermostat. There were some minor maintenance issues during my time as the XO but nothing major.

Subj: Telephonic Statement of (b) (6)  
(b) (6) 4th Recruit Training Battalion

(b) (6)

(b) (6) controls conversations and (b) (6) wants things (b) (6) way. If it's not (b) (6) way, (b) (6) gets mad and difficult. All of these issues didn't bother me too much since I knew I'd be out of there in a year. I'm not concerned about my fitness report from (b) (6). The only thing I'm concerned about is how (b) (6) treats other Marines, particularly (b) (6).

The statement of (b) (6) represents an accurate, summarized narrative into the facts and circumstances of a hostile work environment at the Recruit Training Regiment, Marine Corps Recruit Depot, Parris Island in accordance with JAGINST 5800.7F (JAGMAN).

(b) (6)

5830  
11 Jun 15

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subj: Statement of (b) (6) (b) (6)  
(b) (6) Recruit Training Regiment

I arrived at the Regiment July 2012 and left the Regiment last September. I was the XO for little over a year. (b) (6) took over July 2013. I'm currently at Supply and Services.

"(b) (6) was one of the most professional (b) (6) I've ever known." I've known (b) (6) since 2008. (b) (6) provided some loose guidance on reportable instances as well as his general command philosophy. "I loved working with (b) (6)."

I left during the transition of the battalion commanders. The old group was a good group, a tight group. I was there for the first three months of the transition. It was an okay transition; nothing crazy or out of whack.

Recruit training, unlike anywhere else in the fleet, is one area in which things can go south very quickly if the officers aren't involved. (b) (6) believed in equal, fair treatment. It was a failure when a hat got relieved. A lot of DIs are good, too good. If we didn't counsel the good ones they'll get out of line. It's the little things that matter like taking care of the DIs.

(b) (6) was very patient during the transition. The RTO was (b) (6) guiding principle to the battalions. Four of his five battalion commanders were transitioning. Some of the new battalion commanders were really good. My advice to the battalion commanders was to pass the bad news directly to the RTR CO, cc'ing me on emails. (b) (6) had an open door policy for his battalion commanders. I knew everything that was going on from a disciplinary perspective.

I didn't talk to (b) (6) much. I know (b) (6) battalion works harder than any other battalion. I had a great relationship with the prior 4th Battalion CO. (b) (6) just didn't want to talk to me. (b) (6) and I talked a lot. (b) (6) a good person; (b) (6) did a pretty good job at the battalion.

It was a bit strained relationship between (b) (6) and (b) (6). There was one particular incident when we got a call or hit on an inspection from the IG and asked why 4th Battalion was not using company duty officers. I called (b) (6) and (b) (6) told me that their OOD was covering CDQ requirements along with their OOD requirements, which is in violation of the RTO. I told (b) (6) to have (b) (6) (b) (6) discuss this issue with (b) (6). (b) (6) said (b) (6) (b) (6) would not change the policy due to (b) (6) manpower issues.

Enclosure (17)

Subj: Statement of Lieutenant (b) (6), (b) (6)  
(b) (6), Recruit Training Regiment

Another issue that strained their relationship was when (b) (6) started contacting RS Commanders to discuss issues with the caliber of incoming female recruits. It was frustrating for us. (b) (6) was going around the chain of command. (b) (6) should be handling these issues. We had some high rates of IST failures. I know (b) (6) was trying to make it better, but (b) (6) method was wrong. (b) (6) even continued contacting RS Commanders after we told to stop.

(b) (6) is very calm, straight and narrow. (b) (6) saw (b) (6) as a very effective leader but needed some rudder steer to address certain problems. I never heard any choice words between (b) (6) and (b) (6), but I know they had some closed door discussions after the RS Commander communications.

(b) (6) was the driving force in integrating females throughout the Regiment, especially in Support Battalion like at the pool and at Leatherneck Square. (b) (6) wanted to integrate females throughout the Depot in visible roles, such as instructors, MCWIS, rifle range, etc.

About November, (b) (6) was turning in her CMR. (b) (6) asked to talk to me and (b) (6) immediately started crying in my office. (b) (6) talked about the command climate and that the CO was berating (b) (6), (b) (6). (b) (6) told (b) (6) company commanders not to talk to (b) (6). (b) (6) was visibly upset. I had never seen (b) (6) cry before.

(b) (6) voiced (b) (6) concerns about manpower and staffing often, especially officers. They had just enough officers to get by and we put out a request for more. At one point they were short a SgtMaj and GySgts. (b) (6) manpower issues were worse than (b) (6) male counterparts. The manning issues were issues experienced toward the latter part of (b) (6) predecessor's time. We were talking to the G-1 to improve the manning piece. We tried to use males to fill certain billets. Female battalions do not have XOs.

(b) (6) was very upset with facilities. Air conditioning was always going out in the barracks. We never had an issue where a thermostat was out for 3-4 months though. (b) (6) mainly had issues with (b) (6) squad bays. There was once a leak in (b) (6) duty hut. I was constantly dealing with facilities issues.

I don't think the battalion commanders got along. I felt the old group was tight. (b) (6) and (b) (6) had a fallen out. They wouldn't talk to each other. Ninety percent of this job is getting along.

I don't see any aspects of gender bias, not at all. I never saw it. (b) (6) was so fair that (b) (6) made me feel bad about myself. (b) (6) unemotional.

Subj: Statement of (b) (6)  
(b) (6) Recruit Training Regiment

(b) (6)

The statement of (b) (6) represents an accurate, summarized narrative into the facts and circumstances of a hostile work environment at the Recruit Training Regiment, Marine Corps Recruit Depot, Parris Island in accordance with JAGINST 5800.7F (JAGMAN).

(b) (6)

5830  
9 Jun 15

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subj: Statement of (b) (6), 4th Recruit  
Training Battalion

I was on deck 30 days before (b) (6) assumed command. I bought into (b) (6) command philosophy; it was easy. (b) (6) (b) (6) is "definitely demanding as a CO, unrelenting to a fault." (b) (6) is moot to weakness; unrelenting on (b) (6) and others. (b) (6) runs a 300 PFT/CFT. I wouldn't characterize her as abusive. (b) (6) does not tolerate maltreatment. (b) (6) very hard on (b) (6) officers, unrelenting." I would like (b) (6) to listen to me more, but that's about it.

I had an odd first impression of the command XO. I'm still in my Alphas with a bag when the XO, (b) (6), approached me and wanted to persuade the CO not to NJP a Marine for violating the RTO five different times. The XO approached me in front of a company commander, so I took (b) (6) into an office and had a conversation alone. I felt like me and the XO were colluding against the CO. My initial impression was that the XO did not buy into CO's command philosophy.

The biggest issue for our battalion, an issue that still exists today, is manpower. "Manpower is the biggest sticking point. We haven't gotten the support." Our battalion has not received support from regiment until recently; we have been short-staffed on enlisted manpower since I've been here (last summer).

"We are internally bleeding." Headquarters does not see any T/O issues in 4th Battalion; however, they are not aware of our quota system, our pregnancy issues, our internal injuries, our TAD/ rotations, and certain support staff requirements for only females. It has gotten better in the past two weeks, primarily due the RTR SgtMaj and myself sitting down and scrutinizing our battalion's T/O. I think temporarily having male officers in 4th Battalion would help alleviate our problems.

Most male battalions have 5-hat teams; we generally have 3-hat teams, 4-hat teams is a luxury.

A challenge to our manpower issues is the Regiment's silence regarding a pregnancy policy. "Generally, no one wants to talk about it." It's a problem. We have presented the problem to the RTR staff many times, but have been met with silence. We initially brought up the issue initially in July/August 2014, similar to the MSG pregnancy policy. It's easy to process good-of-the-service packages for broken backs, but if we were to do that for pregnant females we would see request masts. We preferred a long-term medical policy vice a pregnancy policy.

Enclosure (18)

Subj: Statement of (b) (6) 4th Recruit  
Training Battalion

Revoking Special Duty Assignment pay for Marines in the battalion has created issues over the past year. The commander instituted a career progression program to prevent the retention of SDA pay for pregnant Marines or Marines with long-term medical/mental issues. One Staff Sergeant in particular went to the RTR twice griping about the issue. I got a call from the former RTR SgtMaj alleging that I threatened this Marine. I felt unsupported by my higher.

The CO has been pushing for Regiment policies since the beginning and has been making 4th Battalion go to the table on integrated training efforts. With integrated hikes, we used to act like a subordinate unit while allowing the main battalion(s) to do all the planning, control routes, march orders, etc. This doesn't happen as much anymore. We are now collaborating, taking a seat at the table, and pushing for standardized routes, uniforms, and equipment lists from the Regiment.

The diminished command climate was primarily due to the poor relationship between (b) (6) and (b) (6). The first problem between them arose during the relief of (b) (6). "It was something I've never experienced in the Marine Corps." (b) (6) command team was challenging. (b) (6) was the only company commander that would not seek my advice when gauging the CO's intent. It was hard to hear the CO and (b) (6) having conversations. I heard (b) (6) say that (b) (6) quit at least four times. (b) (6) ordered daily counselings, after leadership failures; and after it not working over a one-month period, (b) (6) relieved (b) (6) apparently against the recommendation of (b) (6) (b) (6).

Another poor relationship was between (b) (6) and (b) (6). The issues began on day one with one particular incident involving the use of a Master Brief Sheet to conduct career retention within the battalion. The XO believed what we were doing was illegal, so (b) (6) went to the RTR XO who told her that MBSSs should not be routed in the package to higher. I bumped heads with the XO a lot on this issue.

The biggest issue with the XO, however, occurred late summer last. I was told that the XO was going around the battalion requesting statements from company commanders about reports of abuse at the hands of the CO. I told the CO I couldn't trust the XO; I couldn't understand how another officer could go around a unit seeking statements incriminating the commanding officer. I recommended that the CO report the XO to higher. The XO wouldn't tell the CO who wrote statements or what Marines (b) (6) approached. It was a mind boggling conversation.

Months later, I had a conversation with the XO about how I felt that (b) (6) was undermining the CO's leadership while going around collecting statements. We had this conversation over a cup of coffee. The XO apologized and admitted that (b) (6) had a rough time with the CO. According to (b) (6), (b) (6) doesn't like the CO personally.



Subj: Statement of (b) (6), 4th Recruit Training Battalion

There is no love loss or concern for the CO on behalf of the XO. In February 2015 the CO lost her grandfather and grandmother and the XO didn't even say she was sorry; the XO seemed unconcerned.

Overall, the regiment does treat us differently as a battalion. As the (b) (6), I felt like there was something disruptive between the battalion and the regiment. Initially, the regimental S-3 (former MSgt who has since retired) was rude to my Marines. Whenever one of my Marines called him for support he would cuss at them. I had to eventually report him to the regimental SgtMaj. The regiment-battalion relationship seemed more than a personality conflict, but I couldn't say whether there was gender bias; just very strange relationships.

For example, it was a very strange relationship between (b) (6) and (b) (6). "The relationship has been so hostile." I think their strained relationship affected my relationship with the RTR SgtMaj. The strained relationship was noticed by the RTR staff, the battalion commanding officers and SgtsMaj, and certain 4th battalion entities. I think we've lacked support during the past year because of the strained relationship between (b) (6) and (b) (6).

Earlier this year, I recommended that (b) (6) ask for a mediator in future conversations because their conversations were just not going well. It started with issues surrounding the command climate survey. The survey normally invokes focus groups, and (b) (6) told (b) (6) to formulate a plan on the way ahead. (b) (6) recommended town hall meetings and small unit leadership, which (b) (6) didn't agree with. "(b) (6) didn't give (b) (6) what he asked for."

I told (b) (6) that (b) (6) should have a third party in a room during (b) (6) conversations with (b) (6). According to what (b) (6) told me, (b) (6) told (b) (6) "I would give you enough rope to hang yourself." I think the comment was made regarding fitness reports. There were a lot of outstanding fitness reports from (b) (6) since January.

We would invite the RTR staff to our selection boards, slating meetings, etc., and still to this day not one staff member has attended. One of my big frustrations is that even though we're the smallest battalion, we run twice the number of series' than the male battalions and yet my Marines are still being dragged away for staff secretary billets.

Other than manpower issues, the next biggest challenge our battalion has faced is integration/socialization with the other battalions. It has taken (b) (6) over eight months to issue any sort of policy on the Crucible hike. We have conducted integrated hikes in the past with mostly positive feedback from the male battalions. Third Battalion is the only exception. There are policy letters from (b) (6) that are against integration.

Subj: Statement of (b) (6) 4th Recruit  
Training Battalion

To improve socialization I think we should have female instructors conduct male PMEs and vice versa. For example, male DIs should provide SAPR PMEs to the female recruits and the female DIs should provide SAPR PMES to the male recruits. Also, some PMEs can be jointly presented with both male and female recruits in attendance. Many of the integration training efforts have been pushed by the SgtMaj of the Marine Corps.

I was heartbroken over the recent DEMOI survey results; it was very pointed towards the CO. The survey was taken by a small number of Marines, some of which were given an access code and submitted multiple surveys. I had Marines come to me saying they filled out the survey twice. The "DEOMI survey is such an unfortunate tool." We're basically being scrutinized due to relationship issues.

I believe rifle range results are a really big deal. The better we do initially the less we have to do on the back end. In many respects it gives us flexibility to allow recruits to participate in language skills, clearance requirements, medical needs, etc. Another observation of mine has been instances where male recruits would turn their backs whenever females were present. It happened to me once. I approached the male recruit and he said that he was instructed by his DI to turn his back when females are present.

It's odd that we get picked for the CG's inspection one week after the DEOMI survey results were released.

Initially, the leadership teams within 4th Battalion were very disjointed. There was generally a lack of trust. But it has gotten much better. Today, the current XO is great; the current company commanders are on board with the CO's intent. Our battalion leadership is cohesive.

The statement of (b) (6) represents an accurate, summarized narrative into the facts and circumstances of a hostile work environment at the Recruit Training Regiment, Marine Corps Recruit Depot, Parris Island in accordance with JAGINST 5800.7F (JAGMAN).

(b) (6)

Enclosure (19)

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Enclosure (20)

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Enclosure (21)

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# Training Battalion Structure



**Bn CO**  
LtCol/SgtMaj

## Male Battalion

**Current personnel manning:**  
158 Marines  
▪ 18 Officers  
▪ 140 Enlisted

## Female Battalion

**Current personnel manning:**  
111 Marines  
▪ 14 Officers  
▪ 93 Enlisted

**Bn CO**  
LtCol/SgtMaj

**Co**  
Capt/1stSgt

**Recruit Avgs per:**  
Company: 383-552  
Series: 191-303  
Platoon: 64-92

**Recruit Avgs per:**  
Company: 228-264  
Series: 114-132  
Platoon: 57-74

**Co**  
Capt/1stSgt

**Ser Cmd**  
Capt/1stLt

**CDI**  
GySgt/SSgt

**CDI**  
GySgt/SSgt

**Ser Cmd**  
Capt/1stLt

**SDI**  
SSgt/Sgt

**SDI**  
SSgt/Sgt

**SDI**  
SSgt/Sgt

**SDI**  
SSgt/Sgt

Enclosure (2)

\*Co O has 3 Series

|                | Jun-14 | Jul-14 | Aug-14 | Sep-14 | Oct-14 | Nov-14 | Dec-14 | Jan-15 |
|----------------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|--------|
| 1st Bn On Hand | 128    | 124    | 123    | 118    | 118    | 128    | 119    | 117    |
| 1st Bn Eff/Non | 128/6  | 119/5  | 118/5  | 117/6  | 115/5  | 122/1  | 117/2  | 112/1  |
| Quota Filling  | 40     | 40     | 40     | 39     | 34     | 39     | 39     | 39     |
| 2d Bn On Hand  | 134    | 126    | 130    | 128    | 124    | 130    | 131    | 128    |
| 2d Bn Eff/Non  | 128/6  | 124/2  | 127/3  | 123/5  | 120/4  | 126/4  | 127/4  | 126/2  |
| Quota Filling  | 40     | 40     | 40     | 39     | 34     | 39     | 39     | 39     |
| 3d Bn On Hand  | 119    | 121    | 121    | 127    | 118    | 121    | 121    | 119    |
| 3d Bn Eff/Non  | 122/2  | 117/2  | 121/1  | 123/5  | 117/2  | 121/2  | 121/2  | 121/2  |
| Quota Filling  | 37     | 37     | 37     | 37     | 34     | 36     | 36     | 36     |
| 4th Bn On Hand | 77     | 70     | 68     | 66     | 72     | 71     | 71     | 71     |
| 4th Bn Eff/Non | 70/2   | 67/2   | 67/3   | 67/1   | 69/2   | 69/2   | 72/1   | 67/1   |
| Quota Filling  | 27     | 27     | 27     | 27     | 27     | 27     | 27     | 27     |
| RTR HQ On Hand | 18     | 18     | 18     | 19     | 17     | 17     | 16     | 17     |
| RTR HQ Eff/Non | 18/0   | 18/0   | 17/1   | 19/0   | 17/0   | 17/0   | 16/0   | 17/0   |

Feb-15    Mar-15    Apr-15    May-15    Jun-15

122    122    13    129    114  
15/7    116/5    10/7    117/1    105/5

126/1

135    136    132    131    132  
131/4    134/2    132/0    127/4    129/3  
39    39    34    35    35

115    115    115    115    115  
121/4    119/15    115/77    115/77    115/77

117/2/3    117/2/3    117/2/3    117/2/3

16    17    17    20    17  
16/0    17/0    17/0    20/0    17/0





Enclosure (25)

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Enclosure (26)

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(b) (6)

**From:** (b) (6)  
**Sent:** Thursday, October 16, 2014 7:09  
**To:** (b) (6)  
**Cc:** (b) (6)  
**Subject:** FW:(b) (6)  
**Signed By:** (b) (6)

Sir-

Further background on (b) (6) performance prior to her drop to support battallon.

V/R,

(b) (6)

-----Original Message-----

**From:** (b) (6) [mailto:(b) (6)]  
**Sent:** Wednesday, October 01, 2014 9:16 AM  
**To:** (b) (6)  
**Subject:** RE: (b) (6)

Ma'am,

Thank you for the email, I tried calling but was unable to reach you. I'm just returning from a funeral in SC, but have been in discussions with my SgtMaj and the SNCOIC about this issue while I was out of the office. A few thoughts:

1. This feedback is invaluable to me when I get it because it gives me a much better idea of what my root issues are and how to resolve them.
2. Based on her scores on the Initial IST, it sounds like she wasn't ready to ship in the first place. This is an issue that I've seen since taking over command this summer and that the SgtMaj and I are closely scrutinizing to resolve.
3. We've addressed the issue with the former recruiter/SNCOIC. A lack of ownership is disturbing and won't be tolerated. The recruiter has followed up with (b) (6) and will continue to do so until she is either successful or drops.
4. We've engaged the mother who is a key influencer to see if this can assist.

Thank you again for the info and feedback regarding our services as recruiters.

SF,

(b) (6)

(b) (6) USMC

(b) (6) Recruiting Station Albany, NY  
1 Buffington St, Watervliet, NY 12189-4000

W: (b) (6)  
BB: (b) (6)  
Fax: (b) (6)  
Email: (b) (6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b) (6)  
Sent: Tuesday, September 23, 2014 1:18 PM  
To: (b) (6)  
Cc: (b) (6)  
(b) (6)  
Subject: (b) (6)

Good morning, (b) (6) and (b) (6)

I wanted to give you a heads up that after 58 days on Island, (b) (6) (b) (6) is being dropped back to the Physical Conditioning Platoon at Support Battalion. This will be her last opportunity to demonstrate that she has what it takes to be a Marine before she is discharged. Her background is as follows:

(b) (6) was in the DEP for 10 months, but failed her first IST at Parris Island on 140801 with a run time of 15:01. She was assigned to PCP and picked up with O/4038 with an exit IST run time of 14:59 on 140812. She was light duty for TD1-TD5 and then again from TD7-TD8. She received missed training entries along with 8 red entries concerning lack of physical courage. During several PT events, to include the obstacle course and confidence course, she cried and refused to execute obstacles. She has also cried during normal PT sessions and was counseled for and behaving selfishly with her peers on various occasions. SNR was given EMI and assigned an essay on physical courage and bearing. She was not assigned to trial training due to her failure of multiple training events.

SNR failed the 2.5mi IE run and the 3.0mi IE with times of 28:16 and 34:33 (goals are 26 and 31) and also walked for part of the runs. In order to try to remotivate her, (b) (6) Senior Drill Instructor contacted her recruiter and was told that he was actually her second recruiter because the other one had given up on her. (b) (6) recruiter said that she was "the worst poolee ever" and was not surprised that she was performing poorly. He stated that they had already anticipated that she would get dropped so they already ensured she would not mess up their numbers.

I spoke to (b) (6) at length today about her attitude and failure to meet our standards and explained to her that this would be her last opportunity to try to demonstrate that she possesses the moral and physical courage required to be a Marine. If she takes the PCP opportunity seriously, she will be able to improve her physical condition and knowledge and be dropped back to training. To ensure she stays focused, it would be great if you could have one of your folks reach out to her to try to motivate her. She certainly has nothing better waiting for her at home.

Please let me know if there is anything we can do to assist you from here. (b) (6) and I look forward to working with you in the future.

Respectfully,

(b) (6) [REDACTED]

(b) (6) [REDACTED] 4th Recruit Training Battalion  
Marine Corps Recruit Depot Parris Island

O: (b) (6) [REDACTED]

BB: (b) (6) [REDACTED]



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# Request for Consideration: Company Duty Officer (CDO) Modification



# Personnel vs Requirements

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14/17 officer staffing ((b) (6) ██████████ PCSs 30 Sep)

- Company XO billets vacant
- 7 series commanders
  - No inbounds means no quotas or light at end of tunnel

Unique training schedule- on average:

- One series on outpost (1 series commander, 1 chief gone) compared to entire male company being off deck (supervision of series on deck still required)
- 2x month, series at the Crucible (1 series commander, 1 chief gone) compared to 1 x month for males (supervision for series on deck still required)
- BWT also at increased freq (supervision for series on deck still required)
- 31 days in month = 31 Bn OOD quotas
  - = 62 CDO quotas if >8 platoons on deck (2 per day x 31 days)
  - = 93 duty requirements per month
- Avg of only 16-20 eligible personnel at any given time to stand both CDO, Bn OOD based on rank requirements, training cycle, outpost, visit support





## Request for Consideration: CDO Modification

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Per the RgtO-


- “Battalion Commanders may expand upon duty requirements within the framework provided within this order.”
  - Calculated risk, not a reckless decision
    - Benefits outweigh risks
    - Neither order specifies that duties can’t be combined
    - Responsibilities virtually the same
- Benefits
  - Making the 4<sup>th</sup> Battalion OOD responsible for CDO requirements actually results in greater degree/level of supervision
    - Allows for less partial observation of activities required by Depot/Regimental Orders
      - Discrepancies reported to Battalion vs Company
    - Allows for more surprise (more random, more often)
      - CDO required to begin checks 15 min prior to lights, complete 15 min after- easy to predict when they will be off deck
      - Battalion OOD required to continue to walk the decks after lights for added supervision



## Request for Consideration: CDO Modification

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- Size, proximity of chow hall makes observing mealtimes for all series easy by one duty
- Allows for greater supervision by the Battalion staff
  - XO reviews Battalion OOD logbook daily for discrepancies
  - I review weekly
  - Would otherwise have to go to each company separately to review logbooks
- Company, Series, and Battalion staff continue to conduct checks throughout all training events, BDR, and chow times at times they feel most important
- Also results in much needed relief at the series commander/chief level- removes a rock from the rucksack without lessening degree of supervision
  - Helping me keep the faith with my personnel
  - Reduces the rate of burnout for the series staff



## Conclusion

### Depot Order- Recruit Training Order (RTO)

Does the change allow for Battalion OOD to:

- ✓ • Observe reveille and taps
- ✓ • Observe CV discussions, SDI time, mail call, hygiene inspections, devotions
- ✓ • Supervise meals

\*Note- WFTBn requirements N/A for 4<sup>th</sup> Bn due to billeting at Battalion

Does the change allow for:

- ✓ • Frequent and random early/late checks of evening and morning BDR

### Regimental Order- SOP for CDO

Does the change allow Battalion OOD to:

- ✓ • Take corrective action as warranted
- ✓ • Report all violations to the Company Commander
- ✓ • Monitor DI welfare
- ✓ • Check each platoon during morning/evening BDR
- ✓ • Attend morning, evening chow
- ✓ • Observe reveille and taps
- ✓ • Observe SDI time, mail call, hygiene inspections, devotions, free time, firewatch
- ✓ • Inspect for cleanliness

Endstate- We still meet the spirit and intent of the two orders without being in violation of them.

Enclosure (29)

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Enclosure (30)

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UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS  
RECRUIT TRAINING REGIMENT  
MARINE CORPS RECRUIT DEPOT/EASTERN RECRUITING REGION  
PO BOX 16001  
PARRIS ISLAND, SOUTH CAROLINA 29905-6001

IN REPLY REFER TO:  
1000  
22 Nov 14

From: (b) (6) Recruit Training Regiment Parris Island  
To: Office of the Vice of President

Subj: LETTER OF RECOMMENDATION IN THE CASE OF (b) (6)  
(b) (6) USMC

1. I enthusiastically recommend (b) (6) be selected to serve as a Vice Presidential Aide.
2. I have had the opportunity to observe (b) (6) in a professional capacity during (b) (6) tour as the Executive Officer of the 4<sup>th</sup> Recruit Training Battalion. During this time (b) (6) has demonstrated multiple qualities that would support (b) (6) selection and success.
3. (b) (6) breadth of personal experience in the Marine Corps is rare. In addition to (b) (6) experience at 4<sup>th</sup> Recruit Training Battalion, (b) (6) was a dependent as the (b) (6) of a Marine, has served as an enlisted Marine and as an officer, and has served in both the reserve and active duty components. (b) (6) has considerable operational experience, have served in Operation Iraqi Freedom and Operation Enduring Freedom, as well as in each element of the Marine Air Ground Task Force. This personal experience provides (b) (6) the first-hand knowledge that will make (b) (6) an exceptionally valuable representative of the Marine Corps.
4. Additionally, (b) (6) possesses several personal traits that support (b) (6) consideration. First, (b) (6) is diligent and mission oriented. As the Executive Officer of a Recruit Training Battalion, (b) (6) works long hours under sometimes difficult circumstances to support the goals of (b) (6) Battalion and the Regiment. More importantly, (b) (6) is resourceful and energetic in the execution of (b) (6) duties, and (b) (6) enthusiasm is infectious. (b) (6) actively seeks opportunities to learn and grow, seeking challenging assignments and tasks. (b) (6) is well-read, thoughtful and articulate. (b) (6) personal conduct is above reproach, and (b) (6) sense of ethics well developed.
5. Selecting the right officers to serve as Vice Presidential Aides is of the utmost importance. They support our elected leadership and simultaneously represent the Marine Corps. Such assignments allow service members to become intimately familiar with the operating of our government while at the same time ensuring our elected representatives truly understand what we do for the nation. We need to assign only our best and brightest to this program. (b) (6) is one of those officers - I enthusiastically recommend her selection.

(b) (6)

Enclosure (3)

Enclosure (32)

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Enclosure (33)

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Y

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)  
Sent: Tuesday, June 16, 2015 12:26  
To: (b) (6)  
Subject: FW: (b) (6)  
Signed By: (b) (6)

Ma'am-

This was the follow up email traffic regarding my relief of (b) (6). I was at a pick up brief when (b) (6) sent the first email and contacted (b) (6) immediately as soon as I was back in the office and saw (b) (6) email. I explained to you that I believed (b) (6)'s "alternate solution" comment during our meeting was specifically as relates to where (b) (6) would be assigned following (b) (6) relief. I don't know what alternate solution (b) (6) could have found for (b) (6) otherwise- particularly since I had laid out why (b) (6) was not effective. Following my receipt of (b) (6) initial email stating (b) (6) intent below, I immediately explained to (b) (6) that I had already relieved (b) (6) and was just sick about it. I attempted to contact (b) (6) by phone to explain the miscommunication to (b) (6) and (b) (6) was very angry and unwilling to discuss the issue. It was not until (b) (6) came to the IST on Friday that we spoke again. I hope this helps.

V/R,

(b) (6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b) (6)  
Sent: Thursday, December 18, 2014 4:30 PM  
To: (b) (6)  
Subject: RE: (b) (6)

(b) (6)

I was very clear - give me time to find an alternate solution. We can discuss later.

R'

(b) (6)

(b) (6)  
(b) (6) U.S. Marine Corps  
(b) (6)  
Recruit Training Regiment  
MCRD Parris Island, SC  
Comm: (b) (6)  
DSN: (b) (6)  
Cell: (b) (6)  
(b) (6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b) (6)  
Sent: Thursday, December 18, 2014 4:08 PM  
To: (b) (6)  
Subject: Re: (b) (6)

Sir-

I just got this after I had talked to (b) (6), (b) (6) is going on leave Tues. When you and I discussed the issue I did not leave with the impression that you did not concur with the relief but that you wanted to hold off on the new billet.

V/R,

(b) (6)

— Original Message —

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Thursday, December 18, 2014 03:20 PM

To: (b) (6)

Subject: (b) (6)

(b) (6)

I wanted to be sure I was clear when we discussed. Please do not remove (b) (6) from command until I have an opportunity to research options as I discussed.

R<sup>1</sup>

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6) U.S. Marine Corps

(b) (6)

Recruit Training Regiment

MCRD Parris Island, SC

Comm: (b) (6)

DSN: (b) (6)

Cell: (b) (6)

(b) (6)



Main FITREP MROW [Navigation icons]

Welcome to A-PES, (b) (6)

Thursday, May 21, 2015

FITREP Status

Create In Progress Completed My Personal Batch Process Trusted Assistant




In Progress Fitness Reports

View only FITREPs for action

Print List

RECORD ID GRADE LAST NAME RS GRADE RS LAST NAME UIC RPT ID RPT DATE RPT STATUS DUE DATE UIC UIC DATE UIC DONE



Enclosure (3)



**4<sup>TH</sup> RECRUIT TRAINING BATTALION**  
**MERITORIOUS PROMOTION, SDI/DI OF THE QUARTER & BILLET PROGRESSION BOARD SCHEDULE 2015**

Updated: 150126

| EVENT  | PACKAGE DUE   | BOARD DATE   | HHQ   | QUALIFICATIONS   |
|--|---|--|---|--|
| <b>CDI<br/>BILLET<br/>PROGRESSION</b>              | <b>1<sup>ST</sup> QUARTER</b><br>1 OCT 15<br>1 DEC 15 | <b>1<sup>ST</sup> QUARTER</b><br>15 OCT 15<br>15 DEC 15  | <b>FY-16</b>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• SSgt or Above</li> <li>• No NJP within the last 24 months*</li> <li>• No 6105's in the last 12 months*</li> <li>• 1<sup>st</sup> class PFT/CFT score</li> <li>• CDI Course (as available)</li> <li>• PTI Course (as available)</li> <li>• SDI Course</li> <li>• At least (1) SDI Cycle</li> <li>• At least (1) EDI Cycle*</li> <li>• At least (1) DI Cycle</li> <li>• Passed Initial &amp; Final Drill</li> <li>• Passed RTO</li> <li>• RS visit/Ed Wkshp or leadership panel (preferred – not required)*</li> <li>• Board Interview</li> </ul> |
|  | <b>2<sup>ND</sup> QUARTER</b><br>1 FEB 15             | <b>2<sup>ND</sup> QUARTER</b><br>15 FEB 15               | <b>FY-15</b>  |  |
|  | <b>3<sup>RD</sup> QUARTER</b><br>1 APR 15<br>1 JUN 15 | <b>3<sup>RD</sup> QUARTER</b><br>15 APR 15<br>15 JUN 15  |   |  |
|  | <b>4<sup>TH</sup> QUARTER</b><br>1 AUG 15             | <b>4<sup>TH</sup> QUARTER</b><br>15 AUG 15               |   |  |
| <b>SDI<br/>BILLET<br/>PROGRESSION</b>              | <b>1<sup>ST</sup> QUARTER</b><br>1 OCT 15<br>1 DEC 15 | <b>1<sup>ST</sup> QUARTER</b><br>15 OCT 15<br>15 DEC 15  | <b>FY-16</b>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Sgt or Above</li> <li>• No NJP/6105's in the last 12 months*</li> <li>• 1<sup>st</sup> class PFT/CFT score</li> <li>• SDI Course (as available)</li> <li>• At least (1) EDI Cycle</li> <li>• At least (1) DI Cycle</li> <li>• Passed Initial Drill</li> <li>• Passed RTO</li> <li>• RS visit/Ed Wkshp or leadership panel (preferred – not required)*</li> <li>• Board Interview</li> </ul>   |
|  | <b>2<sup>ND</sup> QUARTER</b><br>1 FEB 15             | <b>2<sup>ND</sup> QUARTER</b><br>15 FEB 15               | <b>BN CDR<br/>&amp;<br/>RTR CDR<br/>INTERVIEW<br/>SGT PACKAGES<br/>ONLY</b> |  |
|  | <b>3<sup>RD</sup> QUARTER</b><br>1 APR 15<br>1 JUN 15 | <b>3<sup>RD</sup> QUARTER</b><br>15 APR 15<br>15 JUN 15  |   |  |
|  | <b>4<sup>TH</sup> QUARTER</b><br>1 AUG 15             | <b>4<sup>TH</sup> QUARTER</b><br>15 AUG 15               |   |  |
| <b>DIOQ<br/>&amp;<br/>SDIOQ</b>                    | <b>1<sup>ST</sup> QUARTER</b><br>15 DEC 14            | <b>BATTALION</b><br>17 DEC 14                            | <b>RTR<br/>N/A</b>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• No NJP within the last 12 months</li> <li>• No 6105's in the last 12 months</li> <li>• NCOs Enrolled or completed the 8010 series MCI</li> <li>• Book report from CMC Reading List</li> <li>• 1<sup>st</sup> class PFT/CFT score</li> <li>• Excellent to Outstanding performance during the current quarter</li> <li>• DI of the Month (preferred) – not required</li> <li>• Board Interview</li> </ul>   |
|  | <b>2<sup>ND</sup> QUARTER</b><br>16 MAR 15            | 18 MAR 15  |   |  |
|  | <b>3<sup>RD</sup> QUARTER</b><br>15 JUN 15            | 17 JUN 15  |   |  |
|  | <b>4<sup>TH</sup> QUARTER</b><br>14 SEP 15            | 17 SEP 15  |   |  |
| <b>DIOY<br/>&amp;<br/>SDIOY</b>                    | 1 OCT 15  | <b>BATTALION</b><br>1 OCT 15<br><b>RTR</b><br><b>UNK</b> | <b>DEPOT<br/>UNK</b>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• Winner SDIOQ or DIOQ current FY</li> <li>• Attached to current command</li> <li>• Board Interview</li> </ul>  |
| <b>DRILL<br/>MASTER</b>                            | AS REQUIRED   | <b>BATTALION</b><br><b>ANNUAL</b>                        | <b>RTR<br/>N/A</b>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• All Inclusive CDI, SDI and SDIOQ Requirements</li> <li>• Further requirements published at the time of the board</li> <li>• Board Interview &amp; Commanding Officer Interview</li> </ul>   |
| <b>DRILL<br/>INSTRUCTOR<br/>SCHOOL</b>             | AS REQUIRED   | <b>BATTALION</b><br><b>ANNUAL</b>                        | <b>RTR<br/>UNK</b>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• All Inclusive CDI, SDI and SDIOQ Requirements</li> <li>• Further requirements published at the time of the board</li> <li>• Board Interview &amp; Commanding Officer Interview</li> </ul>   |
| <b>MERITORIOUS<br/>SSGT<br/>&amp;<br/>GYSGT</b>    | 15 MAR 15   | <b>BATTALION</b><br>18 MAR 15<br><b>RTR</b><br>APR 2015  | <b>DOR</b><br>2 MAY 15  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 12 Months Observed Performance</li> <li>• SSgt (6 yrs TIS) Sgt (4 yrs TIS)</li> <li>• Rank Required: PME (DEP)</li> <li>• No Punitive action in last 12 months</li> <li>• Current Annual Training</li> <li>• Excellent to Outstanding performance during current tour</li> <li>• Board Interview</li> </ul>   |
| <b>MERITORIOUS<br/>SGT,<br/>CPL &amp;<br/>LCPL</b> | <b>1<sup>ST</sup> QUARTER</b><br>N/A                  | <b>BATTALION</b><br>N/A                                  | <b>RTR &amp; DEPOT</b><br>20 JAN 15   | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• 12 Months Observed Performance</li> <li>• Sgt (18 Mos TIS) Cpl (6 Mos TIS)</li> <li>• Rank Required PME (DEP)</li> <li>• No Punitive action in last 12 months</li> <li>• Current Annual Training</li> <li>• Excellent to Outstanding performance during current tour</li> <li>• Company Commander Nomination</li> </ul>   |
|  | <b>2<sup>ND</sup> QUARTER</b><br>1 APR 15             | 8 APR 15   | 14 APR 15   |  |
|  | <b>3<sup>RD</sup> QUARTER</b><br>1 JUL 15             | 8 JUL 15   | 14 JUL 15   |  |
|  | <b>4<sup>TH</sup> QUARTER</b><br>1 OCT 15             | 7 OCT 15   | 13 OCT 15   |  |

\*Indicates ability to waive. Provided are the general requirements for nomination to the specific board. Further details and explanations are provided in the specific unit orders.

✓  
(b) (6)

**From:** (b) (6)  
**Sent:** Thursday, December 04, 2014 11:28  
**To:** (b) (6)  
**Cc:** (b) (6)  
**Subject:** RE: Integration of Crucible Hike  
**Signed By:** (b) (6)

(b) (6)

I have no concerns, the institution has my support, and hope you understand I am a big proponent of integration. I was here in the late 90s and remember the integrated hikes with (b) (6) and (b) (6). When I worked Navy OCS, we are fully integrated. I'll call you later this afternoon to understand your vision relative to actual execution so we are not to be surprised Sat morning.

r, (b) (6)

-----Original Message-----

**From:** (b) (6)  
**Sent:** Thursday, December 04, 2014 11:05 AM  
**To:** (b) (6)  
**Cc:** (b) (6)  
**Subject:** Integration of Crucible Hike

(b) (6)

You weren't at the last RTR staff meeting, but I wanted to ensure you were aware that the Regiment has approved the integration of the female series and the male company for the Crucible hikes. Both (b) (6) and (b) (6) are fully on board with this reversion back to the way we used to conduct training and (b) (6) has approved the change. As you may be aware, this battalion is working extremely hard to improve our stats, from our initial qual rates on the range to what we achieve on the prac app tests and written exams. We are also focused on improving the fitness levels of our recruits, rather than accepting the bare minimum as we have done in the past decade. In doing so, we know we will be improving the caliber of Marine we send to the operating forces.

In terms of the hikes and hopefully some select PT events in the future like the PFT, the integration of the female series with their male counterparts during training will be critical to setting both cohorts up for success before they go to either MCT or ITB. Believe it or not, this is exactly how we used to train and no one can figure out when and why the process changed (I asked (b) (6) to do research on this issue). Rest assured that my female recruits are being held to high standards for performance and conduct and this is mainly to ensure they can compete with their male counterparts when they leave here. Whether we agree with it or not, the Institution is moving towards the integration of combat arms MOSs, and with the way we have been conducting training up to now, we are not giving them a realistic view of how either group can and should conduct themselves around the opposite sex. In fact, we have created a climate of fear due to the way we as an Institution have focused on sexual assaults over the past two years. We can only change this if we create an atmosphere of respect for and credibility of both sexes early on in the training cycle. Regardless of your personal feelings about the utility of such a change, I am asking for your support. While initially it will require some additional coordination by the companies and supporting agencies like medical, the logistical maneuvering should be something we can do over the next week to get ready for next week's Crucible hike back.

As I mentioned, I have discussed this issue several times with (b) (6) and I didn't want your Battalion to be the only one not on board. If you want to discuss further, let me know. Otherwise, I have directed my company commander to coordinate directly with her counterpart at 3rd to get the hike organized.

Respectfully,

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

4th Recruit Training Battalion

Marine Corps Recruit Depot Parris Island

O: (b) (6)

BB: (b) (6)

Enclosure (38)

This page is being withheld in its entirety pursuant to FOIA exemption (5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5) and (b)(6)), which protects inter-agency and intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with this agency and which protects personnel, medical, and similar files that would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.





UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS  
(b) (6)  
RECRUIT TRAINING REGIMENT  
MARINE CORPS RECRUIT DEPOT  
PO BOX 15001  
PARRIS ISLAND, SOUTH CAROLINA 29905-5001

1000  
(b) (6)  
23MAY15

From: (b) (6)  
To: (b) (6), MCRD Parris Island  
Subj: VOLUNTARY STATEMENT (b) (6)  
(b) (6)

Encl: Marine Corps Order No. 29, Major General John A. Lejeune

1. The following statement is provided voluntarily.
2. In response to the question regarding have I experienced any gender bias; perception of gender bias; or other equal opportunity violation(s) from (b) (6) (b) (6) (b) (6), or (b) (6) I respond absolutely not.
3. As a captain, I served with (b) (6) at HQMC, M&RA, MMEA for one year and experienced no gender bias during this time in any way, shape, or form from (b) (6). At no time did any of the three female officers assigned to MMEA make any comment to me of any gender bias from (b) (6). (b) (6) was an military faculty advisor with Marine Corps University, Command and Staff College while I was a student and a major, and I experienced no gender bias during this time in any way, shape, or form from (b) (6). In the two years (b) (6) has been my (b) (6) (b) (6) has held me accountable for my actions, counseled me, and mentored me in a professional manner commensurate with Major General Lejeune's Marine Corps Order No.29 (see enclosure).
4. In approximately 10 months I served with (b) (6) (b) (6) in Recruit Training Regiment, in (b) (6) billets as the (b) (6) or the (b) (6) (b) (6). I never once experienced or witnessed (b) (6) execute or leave perception of gender bias in any way, shape, or form. (b) (6) (b) (6) interaction with Marines of all ranks is in professional manner commensurate with Major General Lejeune's Marine Corps Order No.29 (see enclosure).
5. In approximately 18 months I served with (b) (6) (b) (6) in Recruit Training Regiment, in (b) (6) billets as the (b) (6)

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Enclosure (3)

Subj: VOLUNTARY STATEMENT (b) (6)  
(b) (6)

(b) (6) or the (b) (6)  
(b) (6) I never once experienced or witnessed (b) (6) execute or leave  
perception of gender bias in any way, shape, or form. (b) (6)  
(b) (6) interaction with Marines of all ranks is in professional  
manner commensurate with Major General Lejeune's Marine Corps Order  
No.29 (see enclosure).

6. In response to the question of my assessment of a (b) (6)  
(b) (6), (b) (6), I provide the following  
response. My single experience with recruit training is with Support  
Battalion, MCRD Parris Island. In the past 20 months I have worked  
with eight peers in their roles and responsibilities as (b) (6)  
(b) (6). I maintain a professional correspondence with  
all eight. I choose to seek counsel, identify problems to work toward  
resolutions with a few of these peers. I do not seek (b) (6)  
counsel. It is inappropriate to evaluate (b) (6) performance. I  
acknowledge the statistical improvements in rifle scores and other  
areas of recruit training. However, I also see the positive and  
negative of four training battalion command climates as Marines and  
Recruits process through (b) (6). I do not believe  
(b) (6) is leading Recruits, Marines,  
Sailors, and civilian according to Marine Corps Order No. 29.

(b) (6)



United States Marine Corps  
Lejeune Leadership Institute



## LtGen John A. Lejeune: Relations between Officers and Men

**Title:** Relations between Officers and Men  
**Category:** Marine Corps Order No. 29  
**Author/Presenter:** Major General John A. Lejeune, USMC  
Commandant of the Marine Corps  
**Date:** 14 August 1920

Young Marines respond quickly and readily to the exhibition of qualities of leadership on the part of their officers. Each officer must endeavor by all means in his power to develop within himself those qualities of leadership, including industry, justice, self-control, unselfishness, honor, and courage, which will fit him to be a real leader of men and which will aid in establishing the relationship described below.

The spirit of comradeship and brotherhood in arms which has traditionally existed throughout the ranks of the Marine Corps is a vital characteristic of the Corps. It must be fostered and kept alive and made the moving force in all Marine Corps organizations.

The relation between officers and enlisted men should in no sense be that of superior and inferior nor that of master and servant, but rather that of teacher and scholar. In fact, it should partake of the nature of the relation between father and son, to the extent that officers, especially commanders, are responsible for the physical, mental, and moral welfare, as well as the discipline and military training of the men under their command who are serving the Nation in the Marine Corps.

The recognition of this responsibility on the part of officers is vital to the well-being of the Marine Corps. It is especially so for the reason that so large a proportion of the men enlisting are under 21 years of age. These men are in the formative period of their lives and officers owe it to them, to their parents, and to the Nation, that when discharged from the service they should be far better men physically, mentally, and morally than they were when they enlisted. To accomplish this task successfully a constant effort must be made by all officers to fill each day with useful and interesting instructions and wholesome recreation for the men. This effort must be intelligent and not perfunctory, the object being not only to eliminate idleness, but to train and cultivate the bodies, the minds, and the spirit of our men.

It will be necessary for officers not only to devote their close attention to the many questions affecting the comfort, health, morals, religious guidance, military training, and discipline of the men under their command, but also to actively enlist the interest of their men in building up and maintaining their bodies in the finest physical condition; to encourage them to improve their professional knowledge and to make every effort by means of historical, educational, and patriotic addresses to cultivate in their hearts a deep abiding love of the Corps and Country. The provisions of the above apply generally to the relationships of non-commissioned officers with their subordinates and apply specifically to non-commissioned officers who may be exercising command authority.





UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS  
(b) (6)  
RECRUIT TRAINING REGIMENT  
MARINE CORPS RECRUIT DEPOT  
PO BOX 15001  
FARRIS ISLAND, SOUTH CAROLINA 29905-5001

1000  
(b) (6)  
20MAY15

From: (b) (6)  
To: (b) (6), MCRD Parris Island  
Subj: VOLUNTARY STATEMENT (b) (6)  
(b) (6)

- Encl: (1) Electronic mail correspondence 08:48 31JUL14 to adjacent commanders regarding Force Preservation Council documentation and Crucible Hikes  
(2) Electronic mail correspondence 06:56 28AUG14 regarding 4th Recruit Training Battalion Quota Meeting  
(3) Electronic mail correspondence 09:01 4SEP14 and 09:39 12SEP14 regarding 4th Recruit Training Battalion Crucible Hikes  
(4) Recruit Evaluation Card in case of (b) (6)

1. The following statement is provided voluntarily and enclosures are provided as substantiating material.

2. On or about 28 August 2014, (b) (6) (b) (6) asked me to join a 4th Recruit Training Battalion Quota Meeting [Enclosure (1)]. During the meeting, (b) (6) announced to the room which included the (b) (6), (b) (6), (b) (6) and (b) (6) the (b) (6) and approximately three to four Drill Instructors ranging in rank from (b) (6) to (b) (6). "See, you don't get what you want from higher. You go around them!" (b) (6) smiled while making this comment. After departed the meeting, I informed the acting (b) (6) (b) (6), (b) (6) we will not return for any additional meetings. I did not concur with (b) (6) (b) (6) comment and would not appear to support these comments by attending further meetings. I have not attended another meeting at 4th Recruit Training Battalion to date.

3. During the first year of my assignment at (b) (6) I completed three crucible hikes with 1st, 2nd, and 3rd Recruit Training Battalions [Enclosure (2)]. For all three of these hikes, I joined the (b) (6) at the head of the formation for the duration of the hike.

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Enclosure (4)

Y  
Subj: VOLUNTARY STATEMENT (b) (6)  
(b) (6)

- a. On or about 02:30 13 September 2014, I joined (b) (6) at the head of the Oscar Series Crucible Hike. We discussed hike routes and other topics regarding recruit training. At a point during the hike (b) (6) stated (b) (6) would like to go to the rear of the formation in order to gain a different perspective of the hike. I followed to rear of formation; I cannot remember if I made a verbal comment regarding battalion commander at the rear of a formation being unusual. I do clearly recall thinking it was unusual; however, I fully acknowledge commander's prerogative and the choice was not safety violation.
- b. Upon joining the rear of the (b) (6) Crucible Hike (b) (6) (b) (6) focused on the series honor grad who was struggling to complete the hike. Said Name Recruit (SNR) appeared to be under 5'0" and struggling with the pack and rifle. (b) (6) (b) (6) pointed out SNR to all fellow recruits words to the effect of 'how could this recruit be the (b) (6) as no (b) (6) should be at the rear of the formation'; further, (b) (6) continued negative verbal counseling regarding SNR not worthy of being the (b) (6) when at the rear of the formation.
- c. As this continued, I started pointing out positive actions of recruits, 'there you go', 'dig in', 'you've got this', etc... I do recall making a comment to (b) (6) loud enough for the recruits and Drill Instructors to hear, about teamwork being the key to success in the Marine Corps.
- d. During the Crucible Hike, I pointed out (b) (6) (b) (6) who was assigned to (b) (6) (b) (6) during my first few weeks with (b) (6). I commented to (b) (6) did a great job as the (b) (6). (b) (6) (b) (6) stated loud enough for the recruits, (b) (6) (b) (6) (b) (6) (b) (6) (b) (6) to hear, "(b) (6) is the worst (b) (6) I have." I attempted to change topic to distract from negative comments regarding a (b) (6) made within one to three feet of recruits.
- e. (b) (6) continued to provide negative verbal counseling to recruits falling behind in formation. (b) (6) comments, while negative, did not violate Equal Opportunity and were not a threat to safety of the recruits. I chose to continue to focus on positive comments regarding team work and encouraging recruits they were almost to the objective. As I continued, (b) (6) transitioned to positive comments as well for a period of time.

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Enclosure (40)

Subj: VOLUNTARY STATEMENT (b) (6)  
(b) (6)

f. At the final break prior to completing the hike, (b) (6) moved to the head of the formation. I chose to stay in the rear of the formation. I continued to make positive comments towards the recruits and discussed with the (b) (6) (b) (6) (b) (6) how I was motivated by her example. (b) (6) (b) (6) was exhausted due to finishing the Crucible diagnosed with the flu.

4. On or about 6 March 2015, during the Initial Strength Test for (b) (6) Series I observed (b) (6) yelling at (b) (6) (b) (6) (b) (6) observed SNR spit on the top of a pile of 'glow belts'. TSNR did not immediately respond to (b) (6) (b) (6) asking SNR questions. (b) (6) standing within one foot of the recruit, was yelling at the recruit. (b) (6) volume increased and I noticed (b) (6) yelling at SNR. I walked over to (b) (6) and stated, "(b) (6) may I please speak with you." After (b) (6) and I moved a few feet away from the recruit, I stated, "(b) (6) you are obviously upset. Please relay to me what occurred and I will make certain appropriate action is taken regarding the recruit." (b) (6) stated the recruit spat on the glow belts and was disrespectful. (Note: SNR was facing forward in line and (b) (6) in authorized Physical Training (PT) uniform, was facing SNR's left side when yelling. SNR could not see rank, nor could SNR see billet listed on the back of (b) (6) (b) (6) PT uniform.) I thanked (b) (6) for the information and stated again, the recruit was assigned to (b) (6) and appropriate action would be taken. SNR was issued a Written Notification of Deficiencies and a copy was sent by me to (b) (6) (b) (6) to confirm action completed [Enclosure (4)].

(b) (6)

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Enclosure (4)

| Work Order | Description   | Location | Reported Date | Work Group | Priority | Status | Customer | Work Type | Supervisor | She | Assigned To |
|------------|---|----------|---------------|------------|----------|--------|----------|-----------|------------|-----|-------------|
| 1321971    | CHK/RPR HIGH HUMIDITY IN RM 133 BLDG 929  | 929      | 19-Aug-14     | 53         | 2        | COMP   | 23       | CM        |            |     | PI          |
| 1360183    | check heat in rooms 219, 220, 221, 222, 223 (HOLD PER DAN KUELKER)                                      | 931      | 20-Feb-15     | 53         | 0        | WMATL  | 23       | CM        | (b) (6)    |     | (b) (6)     |
| 1360184    | check heat in rooms 224, 313, 314, 315, 316 (HOLD PER DAN KUELKER)                                      | 931      | 20-Feb-15     | 53         | 0        | WMATL  | 23       | CM        |            |     | PI          |
| 1360199    | BLDG 929 ROOMS DO NOT HAVE THERMOSTATS ROOMS: 730, 233, 234, 235, 325                                   | 929      | 23-Feb-15     | 53         | 0        | WMATL  | 23       | CM        |            |     | PI          |
| 1360198    | BLDG 929 ROOMS DO NOT HAVE THERMOSTATS ROOMS: 326, 327, 328, 329, 330, 931                              | 929      | 23-Feb-15     | 53         | 0        | WMATL  | 23       | CM        |            |     | PI          |
| 1360196    | BLDG 929 ROOM DOES NOT HAVE THERMOSTAT ROOM 932   | 929      | 23-Feb-15     | 53         | 0        | WMATL  | 23       | CM        |            |     | PI          |
| 1360195    | BLDG 930 ROOMS DO NOT HAVE THERMOSTATS ROOMS: 203, 204, 303, 304, 311, 312                              | 930      | 23-Feb-15     | 53         | 0        | WMATL  | 23       | CM        |            |     | PI          |
| 1360194    | BLDG 931 ROOMS DO NOT HAVE THERMOSTATS ROOMS: 213, 214, 215, 216, 217                                   | 931      | 23-Feb-15     | 53         | 0        | WMATL  | 23       | CM        |            |     | PI          |
| 1360193    | BLDG 931 ROOMS DO NOT HAVE THERMOSTATS ROOMS: 219, 220, 221, 222, 223                                   | 931      | 23-Feb-15     | 53         | 0        | WMATL  | 23       | CM        |            |     | PI          |
| 1360192    | BLDG 931 ROOMS DO NOT HAVE THERMOSTATS ROOMS: 224, 314, 315, 320, 321, 322, 323                         | 931      | 23-Feb-15     | 53         | 0        | WMATL  | 23       | CM        |            |     | PI          |
| 1364137    | PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE FOR PUMP/HEAT CIRCULATE  | 990      | 26-Feb-15     | 53         | 1        | COMP   | 23       | PM        |            |     | PI          |
| 1373466    | PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE FOR FAN COIL UNIT  | 990      | 9-Apr-15      | 53         | 1        | COMP   | 23       | PM        |            |     | PI          |
| 1379329    | PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE FOR HEAT PUMP  | 929      | 24-Apr-15     | 53         | 1        | COMP   | 23       | PM        |            |     | PI          |
| 1379358    | PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE FOR PUMP/HEAT CIRCULATE  | 930      | 24-Apr-15     | 53         | 1        | COMP   | 23       | PM        |            |     | PI          |
| 1379349    | PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE FOR AIR HANDLING UNIT  | 930      | 24-Apr-15     | 53         | 1        | COMP   | 23       | PM        |            |     | PI          |
| 1379367    | PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE FOR HEAT PUMP  | 931      | 24-Apr-15     | 53         | 1        | COMP   | 23       | PM        |            |     | PI          |
| 1381660    | PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE FOR FAN COIL UNIT  | 929      | 5-May-15      | 53         | 1        | COMP   | 23       | PM        | AREA3      |     | PI          |
| 1381681    | PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE FOR FAN COIL UNIT  | 931      | 5-May-15      | 53         | 1        | COMP   | 23       | PM        | AREA3      |     | PI          |
| 1382387    | chk rpr ac for the whole building 931   | 931      | 11-May-15     | 53         | 0        | COMP   | 23       | UM        | (b) (6)    |     | PI          |
| 1382494    | ODR, 53/53 MOTOR NOT WORKING (CHWP) ASSET 7491. RECOMMEND TO REPLACE MOTOR.                             | 931      | 12-May-15     | 53         | 0        | COMP   | 23       | CM        | (b) (6)    |     | PI          |
| 1382508    | chk rpr leaking a/c unit in room 131 bldg 929   | 929      | 13-May-15     | 53         | 0        | COMP   | 23       | CM        |            |     | PI          |
| 1383259    | PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE PUMP CHILLED WATER SEMI-ANNUAL   | 930      | 13-May-15     | 53         | 1        | INPRG  | 23       | PM        | AREA5      |     | PI          |
| 1383418    | CHK/RPR AC PUMPING WATER CARPET 64 sq HOUR  | 929      | 14-May-15     | 53         | 0        | COMP   | 23       | UM        | (b) (6)    |     | PI          |
| 1384315    | ODR, 53/53 DRAIN LINE LEAKING IN ROOM 122   | 931      | 19-May-15     | 53         | 0        | COMP   | 23       | CM        | (b) (6)    |     | PI          |
| 1388186    | PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE FOR HEAT PUMP  | 929      | 26-May-15     | 53         | 1        | INPRG  | 23       | PM        | AREA1      |     | PI          |
| 1388206    | PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE FOR AIR HANDLING UNIT  | 930      | 26-May-15     | 53         | 1        | COMP   | 23       | PM        | AREA5      |     | PI          |
| 1388217    | PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE FOR PUMP/HEAT CIRCULATE  | 930      | 26-May-15     | 53         | 1        | INPRG  | 23       | PM        | AREA5      |     | PI          |
| 1388226    | PREVENTIVE MAINTENANCE FOR HEAT PUMP  | 931      | 26-May-15     | 53         | 1        | INPRG  | 23       | PM        | AREA1      |     | PI          |
| 1388546    | ODR, 53/53 SQUARE CAGE BEARING GOING OUT ON 5RD FLOOR ERU UNIT. ASSET 5210. RECOMMEND QUAN TO EVALUATE. | 931      | 27-May-15     | 53         | 0        | INPRG  | 23       | CM        | (b) (6)    |     | PI          |
| 1389175    | chk/ rpr a/c in building 931  | 931      | 1-Jun-15      | 53         | 0        | INPRG  | 23       | UM        | (b) (6)    |     | PI          |
| 1390923    | check and repair a/c in rm 332 bldg 929   | 929      | 5-Jun-15      | 53         | 0        | INPRG  | 23       | CM        |            |     | PI          |

Enclosure (4)

Y

(b) (6)

From: (b) (6)  
Sent: Wednesday, March 18, 2015 9:41  
To: (b) (6)  
Subject: RE: Help  
Signed By: (b) (6)

Good morning ma'am,

Thank you for sharing this with me. I want to help.

I'll find you today and share some interesting, but more importantly, helpful news for your end state.

If you read just one thing from this message, please know that YOU are not alone in this fight. Hang in there.

Semper Fidells,

(b) (6)  
(b) (6)

Marine Corps Recruit Depot-Eastern Recruiting Region  
Bldg 154  
Parris Island, SC 29905  
Office: (b) (6)  
BB: (b) (6)  
Personal Cell: (b) (6)  
Email: (b) (6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b) (6)  
Sent: Wednesday, March 18, 2015 9:15 AM  
To: (b) (6)  
Subject: Help

(b) (6)

I apologize up front for the long email- I know you are extremely busy and are probably on travel this week based on our brief discussion on Friday, but I really need some help and am not sure where I can turn. I am having significant issues with (b) (6) that are affecting the welfare of (b) (6) particularly pertaining to officer staffing and (b) (6) assessment of my leadership. I am absolutely convinced that they are grounded in gender bias. I have been trying for literally months to get (b) (6) to take action on issues that affect my Marines and recruits and get no support and the general apathy at the Regimental level is staggering. It's almost like they roll their eyes when 4th Battalion says there is a problem because we are just being emotional. Facility Maintenance issues go unresolved for months and months with no action or intervention by (b) (6) or (b) (6) staff (ex: four of my Marines' barracks rooms without heat for three months due to an alleged thermostat issue). We are severely short staffed for officers and have never had company level XO's which means that other than 2 weeks of outpost there is zero break for my company or series commanders when they need it (ie: for duty requirements). (b) (6) goes on terminal 24 April and we still don't have a replacement identified and since (b) (6) has no XO, we are going to struggle when (b) (6) leaves. I got counseled by (b) (6) for contacting MMOA myself to discuss the slate and coordinate solutions, but since then (over 6 months ago) no



action has been taken to identify replacements for the Battalion or get us up to 95% officer staffing. (b) (6) got mad at me again in Dec. because I kept pushing the issue and basically made it sound like I was being a nuisance, but we still have no solutions in place.

Despite all of the actions I have taken with (b) (6) to improve the command climate in the Battalion over the past 10 months, (b) (6) called me up to (b) (6) office Saturday out of the blue to tell me that I needed to be aware that (b) (6) had concerns about our command climate and my approachability. (b) (6) would not provide any additional information so that I could defend myself or Battalion (not helpful), and because I don't even know how (b) (6) defines the command climate or approachability, I feel like I am in a hopeless situation. This coming from (b) (6) who has never once (not ever) visited (b) (6) or attended a single training event other than the IST or pick up to talk to my Marines or observe my interactions with them to see how good things are. We basically have no (b) (6) relationship. Everything (b) (6) hears is second hand or hearsay. I have been called up to (b) (6) office a total of 4 or 5 times in 10 months, all of which have been in response to what negative issues. Meanwhile, I see and talk to my company commanders and Marines every single day.

It is no coincidence that on Monday I got a call from one of my peers to tell me that (b) (6) had heard through the grapevine that a few of my Marines were going to make anonymous IG complaints against me. It is interesting that I was counseled by (b) (6) on my command climate and approachability two days prior to that call. The bottom line is that no one has their finger on the pulse of my Battalion more than myself or (b) (6) it is something we discuss literally every day. I am tired of feeling like every time someone complains (b) (6) accepts the complaint for the gospel and I am also tired of feeling like (b) (6) discusses me with my peers and (b) (6) staff in a negative way. I don't care about the IG complaints or request masts- our Marines have the right to use these tools and even if everyone thought I was the nicest person on earth, we would still have complaints. I am confident the processes are fairly conducted and that when all of the investigation is complete, the complaints will be unsubstantiated. However, in the mind of (b) (6) (and (b) (6) staff and my peers), I have clearly already been found guilty.

While (b) (6) and I acknowledge that we still have work to do on the climate here, we also know that every Battalion has issues at any given time. I know for a fact that I have been extremely proactive with (b) (6) throughout the past 10 months to make (b) (6) aware of the issues and what we are doing to fix them. I also know that the vast majority of my Marines are more satisfied now with the Battalion than they have been in years- we aren't perfect and we have issues, but we have been super proactive in identifying issues and putting solutions in place. I have also been active in making (b) (6) aware of all of the problem areas in (b) (6) and what I am doing to fix them, but the change is literally something you can feel. I believe 100% in transparency and have done everything possible to engage (b) (6). Based on what I have reported to (b) (6) over the past 10 months AND the many problems that existed prior to June of last year, I find it ironic that out of the blue (b) (6) felt the need to counsel me Saturday on my command climate and my approachability.

As far as my approachability goes, I have been very honest with (b) (6) about the fact that I feel like there is gender bias in how I am perceived by (b) (6) and (b) (6) staff. Several months ago (b) (6) counseled me for reaching out to the (b) (6) to inform them of problem recruits and trends. To me, this was a way to foster teamwork with our recruiting brothers and sisters. (b) (6) told me I was too aggressive in my approach and that I was being perceived "by others" as a problem. My question back to (b) (6) was that wouldn't (b) (6) see his male commanders in a positive way if they demonstrated the same characteristics? I have always been an aggressive problem solver and for the past few years have been constantly told that I need to be nicer. I am so very tired of having to defend myself when I know if my heart I am doing the right things and I have worked so hard to do things differently than I did when I was an RS CO and everything was a nail and I was the hammer. I don't suffer fools lightly and recognize I could be more gentle in my approach to them and I tell my Marines every day that I screw stuff up. I am super hard on myself. If I make a mistake, I take ownership of it and am accountable for my actions. I teach my Marines to do the same and it is part of our command philosophy. There are just certain times where if someone continues to make the same mistake, a different approach to changing their behavior is necessary. If it is the sixth time they have done the same thing, I am not going to treat them the same way I did when I corrected them the first five times. This does not make me unapproachable, it makes me accountable. If one of my peers had the same qualities, they would be lauded for being strong and aggressive, but I am seen as being "mean" even though (b) (6) has no idea what the context might be.

Unfortunately, if one of my Marines complains that I am not approachable (like (b) (6) anonymously or not, (b) (6) (b) (6) assumes right off the bat that what they have said is absolutely true without considering the other side of the story. (b) (6) also does things to undermine my credibility both with my peers and my Marines like writing a letter of

recommendation for (b) (6) to be the VP aide without me knowing during the exact same time I had informed (b) (6) I was having problems with (b) (6). As a result, he has encouraged people like (b) (6) to feel that they are right and that I am wrong. (b) (6) (b) (6) publicly stated to others that "I don't have playground skills" and I am completely offended by that assessment. This business isn't about getting along, it is about taking care of Marines and being accountable for our actions.

I knew coming to 4th Battalion would be challenging but I had no idea that the biggest struggle I would have would be in being considered credible and capable by (b) (6). I could go on and on about the problems I have with the Regiment but I don't want to belabor the point. If it isn't a conflict of interest for you, I would greatly appreciate your advice on what I can do. Issues like my officer manning levels are getting ready to cause (b) (6) to go into catastrophic failure and we need solutions, not more discussion with me about my personality. If it is a conflict for you, I understand and apologize for putting you in an awkward solution. I appreciate your time and apologize up front for being a burden- I am embarrassed that I need help but don't know what else I can do.

Respectfully,

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

4th Recruit Training Battalion

Marine Corps Recruit Depot Parris Island

O: (b) (6)

BB: (b) (6)

(b) (6)

**From:** (b) (6)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, June 16, 2015 12:24  
**To:** (b) (6)  
**Subject:** FW: Action Plan  
**Attachments:** Action Plan.pptx  
**Signed By:** (b) (6)

Ma'am-

Attached is the action plan I provided to (b) (6) regarding the 2015 DEOMI survey. The guidance he provided me when we first met to discuss the results was to explain to him how I planned to address the concerns raised in the survey. He did not provide any other specifics (as laid out below only after I sent him the proposed plan). Please see the attached slides I provided him for an explanation on how we planned to resolve the issues.

Of note, I provided (b) (6) with the DEOMI survey from last July when I first took command, as well as the PME slides we used to present the information and corrective actions to all hands. It is interesting to me that no one asked me to brief the Regiment on the survey from the summer of 2014. Out of professional courtesy, I did provide (b) (6) with a summary of the issues raised in that survey as well as the plan we implemented to reduce concerns in the "red flag" areas. Almost every issue related back to trust in that survey. (b) (6) expressed no interest in having me develop an action plan, nor in having me brief him. While the percentages in the categories from this year's survey dropped, the percentages of satisfaction from last year's survey weren't great either, which to me, indicates that there were systemic issues with trust prior to me getting here. Additionally, I don't believe that this year's survey is valid for reasons laid out in my statement. For whatever reason, there is much more of a heightened degree of scrutiny on this year's results.

Please let me know if you need more information.

V/R,

(b) (6)

-----Original Message-----

**From:** (b) (6)  
**Sent:** Thursday, May 14, 2015 9:36 PM  
**To:** (b) (6)  
**Subject:** RE: Action Plan

(b) (6)

Thanks. I reviewed the slides, and we have some things we need to discuss. This does not meet the guidance I provided you.

Here is what you need to do tomorrow -

- Review the DEOMI Survey. Note the areas your Bn has been identified as below average (Sect IV and VI provide the overview. Use other sections for diagnostics/amplifying information).
- Once you have identified the areas identified as below average, develop a plan of action to address them specifically.
- The date for reassessment I provided you was 30 June, not +90 days. Please adjust.

I am prepared to discuss in greater detail tomorrow.

R'

(b) (6)

(b) (6)

(b) (6) J.S. Marine Corps

(b) (6)

Recruit Training Regiment

MCRD Parris Island, SC

Comm: (b) (6)

DSN: (b) (6)

Cell: (b) (6)

(b) (6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b) (6)

Sent: Thursday, May 14, 2015 4:17 PM

To: (b) (6)

Subject: Action Plan

Sir-

Per your direction, the proposed action plan is attached.

Respectfully,



(b) (6)

(b) (6) 4th Recruit Training Battalion

Marine Corps Recruit Depot Parris Island

O: (b) (6)

BB: (b) (6)



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# 4<sup>th</sup> Battalion Post DEOMI Action Plan

Enclosure (3)

6/16/2015



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## Two key areas of focus:

- Conflict resolution at the small unit leader level
- Enforcing the roles of the series commander and company commander in changing the culture, achieving high standards

Enclosure (A3)

6/16/2015



# Conflict Resolution

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- Purpose: Many of the issues addressed in the survey are related to disciplinary or personnel issues that should not have made it all the way to the Battalion level as problems to solve. Focusing on conflict resolution at the lowest echelons of the command will reduce friction and reinforce small unit leadership skills.
- Message: We have to practice what we teach to our recruits.
  - The “preferred method” to problem solving.
  - “Emphasizes personal responsibility to act as a role model of personal behavior and take action to confront inappropriate behavior.”
  - Emphasizes facts based vs emotions based decisions.
  - Requires direct (confronting individual) or indirect approach (mediation via chain of command).



# Conflict Resolution

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- According to our curriculum, “an effective chain of command:
- Acts as a cohesive, harmonized team
- Communicates clear messages
- Upholds and models our Core Values
- Creates strong bonds of trust, confidence, respect, and understanding”
- No different than what is expected anywhere else in the Marine Corps

Enclosure (3)

6/16/2015





# Conflict Resolution

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- Process driven by senior drill instructors, chief drill instructors, and series commanders
  - Series commanders must own the process and the results
  - Enforced by the company commander
- Will require constant communication and involvement by the entire chain of command

Enclosure (13)

6/16/2015



# Method

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- We will discuss small unit leadership and informal resolution at the previously scheduled All Hands 19 May
- Series/company commanders will be briefed on the immediate expectation for informal resolution skill employment
  - Will be expected to provide training to their Marines no later than 31 July
- Candidates for senior and chief drill instructor will be evaluated on their small unit leadership and informal resolution skills as part of the career progression board process
- We will reevaluate in a follow on survey in another 90 days

Enclosure (1)

6/16/2015



# Series/Company Commander Roles

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- Purpose: Many of the concerns and complaints in the survey are related to how officers perceive themselves to be mistreated, which indicates a lack of understanding of their roles and the importance of resiliency
- Message: Accountability and ownership of series/company will increase morale, improve transparency, and improve each team's chances of success due to clarity in the message and speedy conflict resolution. Command climate starts with them.
  - Tied directly to informal resolution process (swift resolution to problems rather than lingering grudges)
  - No different than what is expected of officers anywhere else



# Method

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- We will continue to use seminars, planning briefs for the pick up, rifle range, and Crucible to educate the officers on their leadership roles
- We will continue to stress that series and company commanders have real responsibilities and obligations to their Marines and recruits
  - Results matter (both tangible and intangible)
  - Not simply figure heads or safety officers
  - Facts are required, not emotions
- Requires pre-planning with clearly defined endstate and metrics established to achieve success
  - Supervision throughout
- Requires knowing Marines inside and out (engaged leadership)
  - Employment of resources early
- Requires strong officers who consult with their senior enlisted but are not willing to accept the mindset that there is an officer chain of command and an enlisted chain of command
- We will reevaluate in a follow on survey in another 90 days

Enclosure (B)

6/16/2015



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS  
MARINE CORPS RECRUIT DEPOT/EASTERN RECRUITING REGION  
PO BOX 19580  
PARRIS ISLAND, SC 29905-9580

IN REPLY REFER TO:  
1000  
CI/(b) (6)  
23 Apr 15

From: Commanding General  
To: (b) (6), 4th Recruit Training Battalion  
Subj: NOTIFICATION OF A COMMANDING GENERAL'S INSPECTION (CGI) 28-30  
APRIL 2015  
Ref: (a) MCO 5040.6H Marine Corps Readiness Inspection and  
Assessments  
(b) DepO 5041.3S Commanding General's Inspection Program  
(CGIP)  
Encl: (1) CGIP Synchronization Matrix

1. BACKGROUND: The Commanding General of Marine Corps Recruit Depot/Eastern Recruiting Region (MCRD/ERR) has directed the Command Inspector to inspect 4th Recruit Training Battalion to assess the command's ability to perform its assigned mission. Per the references, the Command Inspection Team will conduct the CGI at your command from 28-30 April 2015. This inspection is designed to enhance and develop policies, processes, and procedures to ensure mission readiness.
2. PURPOSE: Provide the commander with an unbiased and objective assessment of the unit's mission readiness and evaluate its organizational strengths and weaknesses.
3. OBJECTIVES: This inspection should provide a clear benefit to the units overall mission readiness while promoting the following:
  - a. Compliance with established orders and directives.
  - b. Identification of positive and negative trends.
  - c. Enhancement of Marine Corps ethos.
  - d. The morale and welfare of Marines and Sailors.
4. INTENT: The Command Inspector will use a systematic inspection methodology to evaluate all relevant functional areas listed in the Inspector General of the Marine Corps Functional Area Checklists. The CGI covers both technical and officer/enlisted uniform inspections that will be conducted with minimal disruption to ongoing training and operations.
5. OVERVIEW: The CGI is a three day focused event that will start with a formal in-brief and conclude with a formal out-brief. The results of this CGI will be contained in a written inspection report distributed to the Commanding Officer following the Commanding General's review of the results. A detailed inspection plan for the CGI will be published by the Command Inspector following the commands completion of enclosure (1). This separate correspondence will outline the relevant functional areas and assign tasking to ensure smooth execution during the inspection.

Enclosure (4)

Subj: NOTIFICATION OF A COMMANDING GENERAL'S INSPECTION (CGI) 28-30  
APRIL 2015

6. TASK: Upon receipt of this notification, complete the following:

a. Complete and submit the enclosed Synchronization Matrix to the Command Inspector no later than 1600, 24 April 2015. If there are questions/concerns with areas identified to be inspected, notify this office as soon as possible.

b. Ensure all relevant functional area Program Managers within the command are notified and prepared for the CGI.

7. Point of contact is the Command Inspector, (b) (6) or  
(b) (6) at (b) (6)

(b) (6)

By direction



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS  
MARINE CORPS RECRUIT DEPOT/EASTERN RECRUITING REGION  
PO BOX 19580  
PARRIS ISLAND, SC 29905-9580

IN REPLY REF  
5040  
CI/(b) (6)  
24 Apr 15

From: Commanding General  
To: (b) (6) 4th Recruit Training Battalion  
Subj: DETAILED INSPECTION PLAN FOR 4TH RECRUIT TRAINING BATTALION (4RTBN)  
COMMANDING GENERAL'S INSPECTION FROM 28-30 APRIL 2015  
Ref: (a) MCO 5040.6H, Marine Corps Readiness Inspections and Assessments  
(b) MCO 1700.23F, Request Mast  
(c) MCO 5041.1, Military Whistleblower Protection  
(d) DepO 5041.3S, Commanding General's Inspection Program (CGIP)  
Encl: (1) CGI 4RTBN Synchronization Matrix

1. Situation. The (b) (6) will conduct a Commanding General's Inspection (CGI) in accordance with the references from 28-30 April 2015. CGI's are conducted to ensure mission effectiveness by assessing training and operational readiness of all organizations and activities inspected. The Functional Area Inspectors (FAI) listed in enclosure (1), will utilize the (b) (6) Functional Areas Checklists (FAC) to ascertain compliance with applicable orders and directives.

2. Mission. The CGI will be conducted in order to determine the unit's efficiency, economy, mission readiness, and to provide subordinate commanders with a tool to assess their organizational strengths and weaknesses.

3. Execution

a. Commander's Intent and Concept of Operations

(1) Commander's Intent. CGI's reinforce the importance of mission readiness; evaluate the critical areas essential for mission accomplishment, and serve as a tool for commanders to assess their units. They also promote readiness, economy of management, and morale within the command. Accordingly, the FAI will assess and enhance the ability of this command and subordinate organizations to perform their assigned missions. The FAI will also identify any occurrence or potential vulnerability for fraud, waste, mismanagement, discrimination, sexual harassment, hazing, environmental non-compliance, and safety.

(2) Concept of Operations. The CGI is a formal inspection conducted biennially to assess, prepare, and enhance the unit's assigned missions. The (b) (6) will coordinate this visit and organize an inspection team comprised of FAIs who are recognized as subject matter experts (SME) within their functional areas.

b. Tasks

(1) (b) (6) 4th Recruit Training Battalion

(a) Ensure the primary or alternate program managers are available to receive the inspection team for review of their respective functional areas.

Enclosure (45)

Subj: DETAILED INSPECTION PLAN FOR 4TH RECRUIT TRAINING BATTALION (4RTBN)  
COMMANDING GENERAL'S INSPECTION FROM 28-30 APRIL 2015

(b) Coordinate events, as required, to ensure that each functional area is ready to be inspected per the references.

(c) Provide the (b) (6) with a work space to accommodate his administrative support team.

(d) Provide a venue for the (b) (6) to conduct a Request Mast brief for all available personnel, primarily SNCO's and Officers.

(e) Provide the (b) (6) with after action comments for the CGI.

(2) (b) (6)

(a) Provide an in-brief to 4RTBN at the start of the inspection and an out-brief upon conclusion of the inspection.

(b) Ensure that all FAIs have been assigned in writing.

(c) Provide training to all FAIs and Command Inspector personnel as required prior to the inspection.

(d) Coordinate the itinerary for the inspection with 4RTBN prior to the commencement date.

(e) Ensure feedback is provided to (b) (6) in the form of a Unit Inspection Report (UIR).

(f) Compile lessons learned for internal utilization as required.

(g) Collect after action comments from 4RTBN for internal utilization as required.

(h) Compile FAI evaluations as required.

(i) Prepare FAI and Command Inspector personnel for follow on CGIP requirements.

(j) Coordinate all aspects of this inspection with 4RTBN as required.

(k) Provide previous CGIP results to each FAI as needed.

(l) Be prepared to provide follow-up inspections as may be requested.

(3) Functional Area Inspectors

(a) Conduct evaluations as scheduled and in accordance with all applicable directives.

(b) Be thoroughly familiar with all applicable directives, regulations and policies for the functional area(s) assigned.

(c) Utilize appropriate FACs when conducting inspections. Provide recommended changes to FACs as may be required to the (b) (6) (b) (6)



Subj: DETAILED INSPECTION PLAN FOR 4TH RECRUIT TRAINING BATTALION (4RTBN)  
COMMANDING GENERAL'S INSPECTION FROM 28-30 APRIL 2015

(d) Conduct all inspections in a positive and constructive manner. Be courteous and make every effort to effect improvements within the evaluated unit. Remain mindful of each command's unique mission, resources, and operating environment.

(e) Identify the root cause of problems and not just the symptoms. Identify problems that may be beyond the command's ability to resolve.

(f) Foster a climate of trust and confidence by ensuring a positive and productive learning experience.

(g) Always respect and reinforce the (b) (6) authority.

(h) Identify and recognize excellence in personnel and programs where found. Ensure that recognition is made a part of the functional area grade sheet.

(i) Provide written and verbal reports as required.

(j) Be thoroughly familiar with grading criteria and grading formats as required by the (b) (6).

(k) Prepare and submit inspection reports as required to the (b) (6) via the InfoPath Gradesheet.

c. Coordinating Instructions

(1) Uniform

(a) Military Personnel: Desert Marine Pattern (MARPAT).

(b) Civilian Personnel: Business Casual.

(c) Officer and Enlisted uniform inspections: As directed.

(2) Evaluations

(a) (b) (6) 4RTBN will complete a survey form on the conduct of the inspection team, and provide it to (b) (6).

(b) The UIR will be prepared for review by the Commanding General and provided to the (b) (6) within 14 days of the inspection.

4. Administration and Logistics

a. Administration

(1) All administrative reports will be provided and compiled in accordance with references by the administrative section of the Command Inspector's office.

(2) (b) (6) will need access to a computer and projector for a PowerPoint in-brief.

(3) A list of all Functional Areas to be inspected is listed in enclosure (1).

Subj: DETAILED INSPECTION PLAN FOR 4TH RECRUIT TRAINING BATTALION (4RTBN)  
COMMANDING GENERAL'S INSPECTION FROM 28-30 APRIL 2015

(4) Comments and recommendations concerning this inspection and instructions are invited and encouraged. Comments and recommendations may be addressed to (b) (6) via email, phone, or correspondence.

b. Logistics The tentative schedule for the inspection is as follows:

28 April 2015

0800 - 0830 In-Brief (b) (6), staff, and FAI's  
0830 - 1200 Begin assessment of unit  
0900 - 1100 Enlisted uniform inspections (25% of available enlisted personnel for each grade)  
1200 - 1300 Chow  
1500 - 1600 Request Mast Brief  
1300 - 1630 Continue assessment of unit

29 April 2015

0800 - 1200 Continue assessment of unit  
0930 - 1030 Officer uniform inspection (25% of available Officers)  
1000 - 1100 PFT (25% of available personnel for each grade)  
1200 - 1300 Chow  
1300 - 1500 Continue assessment of unit  
1500 - 1600 Consolidate assessment results

30 April 2015

0900 - 1000 Out-brief with (b) (6)

6. Command and Signal

a. Command Points of contact are (b) (6) (b) (6)  
(b) (6) or (b) (6) at (b) (6)

b. Signal This plan is effective the date signed

(b) (6)

by direction

DISTRIBUTION: A.

| CGIP Synch Matrix - 4th Recruit Training Battalion |   |         |      |         |           |
|--|---|---------|------|---------|-----------|
| <b>AC/S, G-1</b>                                   |   |         |      |         |           |
| 060  | Publ Management & Directives Control              | (b) (6) | 2488 | (b) (6) | 3323      |
| 061  | Record Management Program                         | (b) (6) | 2488 | (b) (6) | 3323      |
| 068  | Marine Corps Publication Management Program       | (b) (6) | 2488 | (b) (6) | 3323      |
| 071  | Military Awards                                   | (b) (6) | 2488 | (b) (6) | 3323      |
| 120  | Casualty Affairs                                  | (b) (6) | 4519 | (b) (6) | 3323      |
| 210  | Voter Registration Program                        | (b) (6) | 4519 | (b) (6) | 3323      |
| 062  | General Administration                            | (b) (6) | 3223 | (b) (6) | 3323      |
| 063  | Performance Evaluation System (PES)               | (b) (6) | 3223 | (b) (6) | 3323      |
| 065  | Promotion   | (b) (6) | 3223 | (b) (6) | 3323      |
| 070  | Personnel Administration                          | (b) (6) | 3223 | (b) (6) | 3323      |
| 080  | MC Total Force System (MCTFS)                     | (b) (6) | 3223 | (b) (6) | 3323      |
| 121  | Separation and Retirement                         | (b) (6) | 3223 | (b) (6) | 3323      |
| 123  | Limited Duty                                      | (b) (6) | 3223 | (b) (6) | 3323      |
| 065  | Privacy Act                                       | (b) (6) | 4762 | (b) (6) | 3323      |
| 090  | Legal Administration                              | (b) (6) | 4762 | (b) (6) | 3323      |
| 092  | Victim and Witness Assistance Program (VWAP)      | (b) (6) | 4762 | (b) (6) | 3323      |
| 100  | Postal Affairs                                    | (b) (6) | 2906 | (b) (6) | 3323      |
| <b>AC/S, G-3</b>                                   |   |         |      |         |           |
| 340  | Physical Fitness Program                          | (b) (6) | 2165 | (b) (6) | 4018      |
| 350  | Body Composition & Military Appearance Program    | (b) (6) | 2165 | (b) (6) | 4018      |
| 360  | Combat Marksmanship Program                       | (b) (6) | 2165 | (b) (6) | 4018      |
| 370  | Marine Corps Martial Arts Program (MCMAP)         | (b) (6) | 2165 | (b) (6) | 4018      |
| 380  | Unit Training Management                          | (b) (6) | 2165 | (b) (6) | 4018      |
| 381  | Water Safety/Survival Program                     | (b) (6) | 2165 | (b) (6) | 4018      |
| 385  | Distance Professional Military Education (DPME)   | (b) (6) | 4085 | (b) (6) | 4018      |
| 410  | LifeLong Learning (LL)                            | (b) (6) | 4085 | (b) (6) | 4018      |
| 270  | Information & Personnel Security                  | (b) (6) | 4091 | (b) (6) | 4018      |
| 470  | Physical Security                                 | (b) (6) | 6335 | (b) (6) | 4018      |
| 480  | Anti-Terrorism                                    | (b) (6) | 4785 | (b) (6) | 4018      |
| 481  | Operational Security                              | (b) (6) | 4091 | (b) (6) | 4018      |
| <b>AC/S, G-4</b>                                   |   |         |      |         |           |
| 753  | Ground Supply                                     | (b) (6) | 3165 | (b) (6) | 3059      |
| <b>AC/S, QM</b>                                    |   |         |      |         |           |
| 020  | Request Mast                                      | (b) (6) | 3307 | (b) (6) | 3003      |
| 290  | Officer Uniform Inspection                        | (b) (6) | 3307 | (b) (6) | 2104      |
| 460  | Historical Programs                               | (b) (6) | 4425 | (b) (6) | 4018      |
| 030  | Hazing and Prevention Response                    | (b) (6) | 3567 | (b) (6) | 2549      |
| 190  | Equal Opportunity Program                         | (b) (6) | 3567 | (b) (6) | 2549      |
| 300  | SNCO Uniform Inspection                           | (b) (6) | 2409 | (b) (6) | 3479/3528 |
| 310  | Personnel Inspection                              | (b) (6) | 2409 | (b) (6) | 2268      |
| 325  | Sword Manual                                      | (b) (6) | 2409 | (b) (6) | 2460      |
| 420  | Color Guard                                       | (b) (6) | 2409 | (b) (6) | 2460/2916 |
| <b>MCCS</b>  |   |         |      |         |           |
| 200  | Substance Abuse Program                           | (b) (6) | 2465 | (b) (6) | 3323      |
| 966  | Marine Corps Family Team Building (MCFTB) Program | (b) (6) | 1505 | (b) (6) | 2104      |
| 968  | Unit Personal and Family Readiness Program        | (b) (6) | 2944 | (b) (6) | 2104      |
| 967  | Single Marine Program                             | (b) (6) | 1541 | (b) (6) | 2915      |
| 963  | Sexual Assault Prevention and Response Program    | (b) (6) | 3744 | (b) (6) | 2460      |
| <b>FORCE PRES</b>                                  |   |         |      |         |           |
| 190  | Safety (Non-Aviation)                             | (b) (6) | 2704 | (b) (6) | 3059      |
| 994  | Suicide Prevention Program                        | (b) (6) | 2704 | (b) (6) | 2868      |
| <b>AC/S, Compl</b>                                 |   |         |      |         |           |
| 075  | Defense Travel System                             | (b) (6) | 4928 | (b) (6) | 3323      |
| 992  | Government Travel Charge Card Program (GTCCP)     | (b) (6) | 4928 | (b) (6) | 3323      |
| <b>AC/S, Chaplain</b>                              |   |         |      |         |           |
| 520  | Religious Ministries                              | (b) (6) | 4514 | (b) (6) | 2868      |
| <b>Medical/Dental</b>                              |   |         |      |         |           |
| 500  | Health Service Management                         | HM2 Box | 2864 | (b) (6) | 2104      |
| 510  | Dental  | HM2 Box | 2864 | (b) (6) | 2104      |

IGMC CORE FUNCTIONAL AREAS

ENCLOSURE (1)

Enclosure (5)

Enclosure (46)

This page is being withheld in its entirety pursuant to FOIA exemption (5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5), (b)(6), and (b)(7)(C)), which protects inter-agency and intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with this agency and which protects personnel, medical, and similar files that would constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.

5830  
11 Jun 15

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subj: Statement of (b) (6) (b) (6)  
Marine Corps Recruit Depot, Parris Island

During the recent CMC IG Inspection our office was told that our battalions needed to be inspected. We were given a choice: either our office inspects the battalions or the CMC IG's office inspects the battalions. We chose the former course of action.

We chose to inspect 4th Battalion in April of this year because of a recent IG complaint on command climate that came from personnel in the 4th Battalion. It was the "perfect opportunity" to start the battalion-level inspections. Fourth Battalion received a 93% marking; however, since they were the first to be inspected we are unable to compare it to any other standard.

We interviewed a few Marines in the battalion. I cannot comment on whether it was a random sampling or targeting of individuals or audience. However, we used a standard series of questions, some partially based off of prior DEOMI survey questions, i.e., do you feel the command has effective communication; do you feel the command works well together; do you feel morale is high; what improvements would you recommend; and do you feel the battalion is doing well? I can't comment on the questioned Marines' responses.

Over the next year our office will interview the other Recruit Training Battalions.

The statement of (b) (6) represents an accurate, summarized narrative into the facts and circumstances of a hostile work environment at the Recruit Training Regiment, Marine Corps Recruit Depot, Parris Island in accordance with JAGINST 5800.7F (JAGMAN).

(b) (6)

Enclosure (47)

Enclosure (48)

This page is being withheld in its entirety pursuant to FOIA exemption (5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5)), which protects inter-agency and intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with this agency.

Enclosure (49)

This page is being withheld in its entirety pursuant to FOIA exemption (5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(5)), which protects inter-agency and intra-agency memorandums or letters which would not be available by law to a party other than an agency in litigation with this agency.

5830  
11 Jun 15

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subj: Statement of (b) (6) (b) (6) Recruit Training Regiment

I checked in September 2013 to the Regiment. I came from Miramar. I'm (b) (6) filling (b) (6). I'm getting out in less than a year. I always planned on getting out. I've passed the South Carolina bar and I'll be able to practice in this state. I have three little boys, the oldest is four.

I never saw any gender bias at the Regiment. I haven't seen anything directly. I don't think (b) (6) has a favorable opinion of (b) (6) (b) (6), probably due to the recent DEOMI survey results. I wouldn't say (b) (6) and (b) (6) don't get along. (b) (6) doesn't agree with (b) (6) on things, e.g., multiple request masts from 4th Battalion that were going to be sent to the CG, DEMOI survey results, etc.

I have seen (b) (6) openly question [or what I would perceive as being disrespectful of (b) (6)] in front of officers and SNCOs. It's hard to gauge (b) (6). I'm not sure if (b) (6) in a good mood or a bad mood.

For awhile, (b) (6) has been quiet during staff meetings. (b) (6) has been saying, "I have nothing to pass." It started a few months ago.

(b) (6) has been the best leader I've ever had the opportunity to work for." I don't feel there's a hostile work environment at all.

There aren't many socials. I do remember a Super Bowl party put on by (b) (6), but (b) (6) was one of the only leaders not there. I haven't seen much interaction between (b) (6) and any of (b) (6).

I have not really dealt with (b) (6). I mostly deal with (b) (6) (b) (6). I sensed frustration between (b) (6) and (b) (6) but (b) (6) never said what it was about. There appeared to be some lack of communication. I don't think any Regimental staff members interact much with (b) (6) or the other (b) (6).

The statement of (b) (6) represents an accurate, summarized narrative into the facts and circumstances of a hostile work environment at the Recruit Training Regiment, Marine Corps Recruit Depot, Parris Island in accordance with JAGINST 5800.7F (JAGMAN).

(b) (6)

Enclosure (5)



**RECRUIT TRAINING REGIMENT  
COMMANDING OFFICER'S  
POLICY STATEMENT ON  
EQUAL OPPORTUNITY AND SEXUAL HARASSMENT**

Discrimination and sexual harassment divides Marines, destroys unit cohesion, and is contrary to our Core Values. Establishing and maintaining equal opportunity and eliminating sexual harassment at all levels are fundamental leadership issues, and essential to a functioning command and healthy command climate.

(b) (6)

Recognizing this, I require all members of this command to foster a climate of equal and fair treatment of all military and civilian personnel regardless of age, color, gender, race/ethnicity, religion, national origin or sexual orientation. I require all personnel to promote and maintain teamwork and unit cohesion in all places, at all times. We will build and maintain a cohesive command, where our personnel focus on accomplishing our mission of "Making Marines" without fear of being discriminated against or sexually harassed.

Each member of this Regiment will be treated with dignity and evaluated solely on professional merit, fitness, and ability. Degrading language, or language that could reasonably be perceived as degrading, will not be used by any Marine, Sailor, civilian or recruit – especially when referring to any other member of this Regiment.

I expect leaders to enforce these standards, to set an example beyond reproach and to respond swiftly in response to allegations of discrimination or sexual harassment. Commanders will actively monitor the climate in their units and investigate all complaints in an impartial manner, without tolerating any threat of reprisal, intimidation or retaliation. At the same time, ensure any false allegations are subject to appropriate disciplinary action. Commanders will ensure personnel understand the Informal Resolution System (IRS) and seek to resolve related issues at the lowest level possible. If the IRS fails to resolve the issue, the preferred method to file a formal complaint is Request Mast.

Every member of this command plays a vital role in accomplishing our mission. It is my duty, and the duty of every member of this command, to create an environment that maximizes each member's ability to contribute. Discrimination and sexual harassment are not part of that environment.

If you believe you have been the victim of discrimination, sexual harassment or reprisal, notify your chain of command or your Equal Opportunity Representative immediately. Assistance is available through command Equal Opportunity Representatives or the MCRD Equal Opportunity Advisor at (843) 228-3567.

(b) (6)

(b) (6) U. S. Marine Corps  
(b) (6)

Enclosure (5)



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS

Training and Education Command  
1019 Elliot Road  
QUANTICO, VIRGINIA 22134

IN REPLY REFER TO:

5830

(b) (6)

5 Jun 15

From: Investigating Officer, Training and Education Command  
To: Commanding General, Training and Education Command

SUBJ: EQUAL OPPORTUNITY COMPLAINT AND NOTIFICATION OF INQUIRY  
IN THE CASE OF (b) (6) ON THE BASIS OF GENDER

Ref: (a) MCO 5354.1D w/ch 1

1. Per reference (a), this written report containing a detailed description of the allegation of an equal opportunity complaint is submitted.

2. On 18 May 2015 (b) (6) submitted a formal equal opportunity complaint in the form of a request mast.

3. The Commanding General, Training and Education Command appointed me in writing on 3 June 2015.

4. On 4 June 2015 at 1229, (b) (6) was notified via telephone by the investigating officer of an inquiry into her allegations of a hostile work environment and gender discrimination by (b) (6) and (b) (6) staff.

5. I, the investigating officer, (b) (6) have been appointed to conduct the inquiry and he can be reached at (b) (6) (b) (6)

(b) (6)

Copy to:  
CG MCRD Files  
TECOM SJA Files  
MCRD SJA Files  
MCRD EOA FILE

Enclosure (2)



UNITED STATES MARINE CORPS  
Training and Education Command  
1019 Elliot Road  
QUANTICO, VIRGINIA 22134

IN REPLY REFER TO:  
5830  
(b) (6)  
15 Jun 15

From: (b) (6)  
To: Commanding General, Training and Education Command

SUBJ: REQUEST FOR EXTENSION IN THE CASE OF COMMAND INVESTIGATION INTO THE FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES SURROUNDING ALLEGATIONS OF A HOSTILE WORK ENVIRONMENT AT THE RECRUIT TRAINING REGIMENT, MARINE CORPS RECRUIT DEPOT, PARRIS ISLAND, SOUTH CAROLINA

Ref: (a) MCO P5354.1D w/ch 1 (Equal Opportunity Manual)

1. Pursuant to the reference, I am requesting an additional 14-day extension, due on 3 July 2015, for the command investigation involving (b) (6) (b) (6) equal opportunity complaint on the basis of gender. This command investigation cannot be conducted thoroughly and completely with the required reviews within the 14-day time limit. I am requesting an extension to allow adequate time for the required sufficiency reviews from the Staff Judge Advocate and Equal Opportunity Advisor as required per the reference.

2. The point of contact concerning this matter is (b) (6) (b) (6) at (b) (6) or (b) (6) or (b) (6) (b) (6) at (b) (6) or (b) (6)

(b) (6)

By direction

Copy to:  
CG MCRDPI Files  
TECOM SJA Files  
TECOM EOA Files  
MCRDPI SJA Files  
MCRDPI EOA Files

Enclosure (5)