



Defense Department "Diversity" Push for Women in Land Combat

Center for Military Readiness Special Report

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George Orwell (1903 - 1950)

"The point is that we are all capable of believing things which we *know* to be untrue, and then, when we are finally proved wrong, impudently twisting the facts so as to show that we were right. Intellectually, it is possible to carry this process for an indefinite time: the only check on it is that sooner or later a false belief bumps up against solid reality, usually on a battlefield."

In Front of Your Nose, London Tribune (22 March 1946)

Statement of the Problem

In 2010 Congress directed the Secretary of Defense and the service secretaries to "*review laws, policies, and regulations that may restrict the service of female members.*" This was not a mandate to force women into the infantry in the name of "diversity," but starting in February 2012, the Defense Department has been proceeding as if it were.

In April 2012 the United States Marine Corps announced a multi-phased research effort to gather information on all relevant facts. Regardless of the Marines' intent and no matter what the facts show, advocates for women in land combat will try to seize the opportunity to impose an egalitarian agenda on the women and men of all branches and communities of the armed forces, including the combat arms. Gender-conscious discrimination and training compromises required to achieve "diversity metrics" would permanently weaken the culture of our military, and put national security at risk.

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– Table of Contents –

<u>Executive Summary</u>	1
<u>Background & Overview</u>	2
<i>"Diversity," Not Military Necessity</i>	2
<i>Amazon Warrior Myths</i>	3
<u>Assignment of Women in Ground Combat Units Research Plan</u>	4
<i>Memo for the Marines</i>	4
<i>Will Marine Corps Test Confirm Combat Realities or Promote Amazon Warrior Myths?</i>	5
A. Exception to Policy/Pilot Program	6
• Readiness	6
• Cohesion	7
• Effectiveness.....	7
• Costs	7
B. Force-Wide Survey	8
1) <i>Misleading Survey Questions</i>	8
2) <i>Advertising, Market Research, and Recruiting</i>	10
C. Quantitative Research Process: Laws, Rules and Ethics of Human Experimentation	11
1) <i>Navy Instruction Re: Human Experimentation</i>	12
2) <i>Marine Corps Order on Human Experimentation</i>	13
3) <i>Department of Defense Policy on Human Experimentation</i>	14

D. Marine Quantitative Research Elements	15
1) <i>Ground Combat Element Common Physical Performance Standards Testing</i>	15
2) <i>"Common Standards" Tests Modified Since 2011.....</i>	15
3) <i>Marine Infantry Officer Course, Quantico, VA</i>	17
a) <i>Pretending to Equalize Inequality</i>	18
b) <i>British Confirm: Gender-Free Training Does Not Work</i>	19
c) <i>Officer Candidate School (OCS).....</i>	20
d) <i>Male/Female Physiology</i>	21
e) <i>Combatives, Combat, and Violence Against Women</i>	22
f) <i>Gender-Specific Health Concerns</i>	23
4) <i>Closed Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) Analysis</i>	23
a) <i>Great Britain</i>	25
b) <i>Australia</i>	25
c) <i>Canada & Other Countries</i>	26
d) <i>Misconceptions and Reality.....</i>	27
<u>Conclusion</u>.....	28
Endnotes	30

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Defense Department "Diversity" Push for Women In Land Combat

Executive Summary

The ethos of the Warrior Culture of the Marine Corps, superiority in combat, is at risk. The Military Leadership Diversity Commission (MLDC), a mostly-civilian Pentagon advisory group with expertise in "diversity" and not combat, has recommended that women be assigned to infantry units at the battalion level, primarily to promote career opportunities and promotions for a few female officers to three- and four-star rank.

Since ground combat experience often (but not always) improves chances of promotion to general officer and senior enlisted ranks, the MLDC is recommending that female officers and enlisted personnel be ordered (not allowed) to serve in "tip of the spear" units involved in direct ground combat.

Marine Commandant General James Amos is conducting a multi-phased research effort to test the consequences of assigning women to ground combat element (GCE) units. The project is designed to (a) Monitor and analyze the results of certain exceptions to current policies; (b) Survey the opinions of Marines on current policies regarding women in combat; (c) Compare the physical capabilities of men and women performing common tasks; (d) Test female volunteers on the Infantry Officer Course (IOC) at Quantico, VA; and (e) Review the requirements of closed military occupational specialties (MOSs).

The research tests are well-intended, but objective results could be disregarded or misinterpreted. The survey of Marines seeks opinions on a "volunteer" option for women in combat that does not exist. Some of the common task tests measuring physical strength and endurance already have been scaled back and adjusted to reduce physical demands and improve women's achievement scores. Tests of female volunteers on the IOC could be in conflict with laws and regulations mandating ethical procedures for human experimentation.

The administration's pressure for more "career opportunities" for women in close combat units, motivated by MLDC demands for gender-based "diversity metrics," assigns highest priority not to military readiness, but rather to social/political goals associated with an unprecedented, radical concept—what former Joint Chiefs Chairman Adm. Mike Mullen has called "diversity as a strategic imperative."

Liberal media and feminists are trying to use the military as a laboratory for the testing of a controversial twentieth-century social science theory—that men and women are interchangeable in all roles, and any differences that do exist are primarily, if not exclusively, due to socialization. We are watching Pentagon-based ideologues using "perception management" (PM) techniques to achieve pre-determined results; i.e., implementation of the MLDC agenda and affirmation of beliefs that should be called Amazon Warrior Myths.

To shed light on the situation and to deter these consequences, the Center for Military Readiness has prepared the following analysis. It explains why each of the research plan components, and the underlying drive for gender-based "diversity" taken to extremes, must be evaluated objectively and without pre-conceived conclusions.

Background & Overview

On 9 February 2012, the **Obama Administration** began accelerating a determined drive to force gender-based "diversity" on the military, which would force military women into infantry battalions. During a Pentagon Briefing, Department of Defense (DoD) Military Personnel Policy officials **Vee Penrod** and Army **MG Gary Patton** officially announced a report to Congress on rule changes affecting women in combat. ¹

The report officially repealed the Defense Department's "collocation rule," which had been in place since 1994. Established by then-Defense Secretary **Les Aspin**, together with regulations exempting women from assignments in **direct ground combat (DGC)** units, the collocation rule exempted female personnel from assignments in support units that were embedded or constantly collocated with DGC units such as infantry battalions.

The Pentagon's February announcement and report revoking the collocation rule essentially legalized what the Army had been doing since 2004: circumventing and redefining the Defense Department regulation without authorization. ² As a result, approximately 14,000 positions were officially opened to women, but that was not enough for civilian feminists and the Pentagon's **Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS)**.

The DoD officials described their incremental step as "*only the beginning, not the end*" in the campaign to order (not allow) women into land combat units. ³ The determined effort to repeal women's exemptions (called exclusions) from direct ground combat battalions was indirectly sparked (but not authorized) by passage of the **2011 National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA)**. ⁴

"Diversity," Not Military Necessity

The 9 February Pentagon briefing specifically referenced recommendations made by the **Military Leadership Diversity Commission, (MLDC)**, a congressionally-established committee

that is largely composed of civilian and a few military "equal opportunity" experts. In March 2011 the MLDC published a 140-page report titled ***From Representation to Inclusion: Diversity Leadership for the 21st Century.***⁵ The report and related papers promote the ideology of "diversity," dressed up in military terms, and effectively redefine the meaning of equality and civil rights.

"Diversity" is a positive word – usually thought to mean the happy result of non-discrimination and recognition of individual merit. But the MLDC admits that the new concept of diversity they are advocating may be a "difficult concept to grasp" because it is not the same as the "EO-inspired mandate to be both color and gender blind." The redefined concept would replace non-discrimination with gender-conscious "diversity metrics," even without any evidence of discrimination against women.

Non-remedial gender-consciousness threatens to become a corrosive, demoralizing force in all branches of the service, but especially in direct ground combat communities such as the infantry and Special Operations Forces.

Amazon Warrior Myths

The MLDC recommendation that women be assigned to direct ground combat is based on the questionable expectation that if more enlisted and junior officer women are ordered to serve in land combat battalions, gender-based "diversity metrics" eventually will lead to more female three- and four-star generals.

This dubious "trickle-up" premise forgets that female officers often make personal and family choices that do not include the lifelong commitments associated with high rank. But even if the MLDC's assumptions and diversity goals *were* true, it would not be right to sacrifice the best interests of the majority of women, who serve in the enlisted ranks, in order to advance the career ambitions of a few female officers.

In addition to disregarding the opinions and career/family choices of women themselves, expectations and goals of the MLDC project keep ignoring a simple fact: For decades, women have been promoted at rates equal to or faster than men. The February DoD Report admitted: "The Department reviewed all available information from the Military Services and did not find indication of females having less than equitable opportunities to compete and excel under current assignment policy."⁶

Facts such as this did not deter the MLDC from recommending that "diversity" become an "institutional priority" and a "core value" that requires a "standard set of strategic metrics and benchmarks to track progress toward the goal of having...an officer and enlisted corps that reflects the eligible U.S. population across all service communities and ranks..." (pp. 17-18)

This unrealistic goal assigns priority to gender-based demographics in high ranks, without a compelling reason to do so, and regardless of the consequences for the majority of women and the Armed Forces as a whole. The MLDC "diversity" agenda radically departs from constitutional principles behind the historic civil rights movement, which rightly challenges irrational discrimination and promotes recognition of individual merit.

Affirmative efforts to overcome discrimination differ from a system like that being advocated now by the MLDC. Former Joint Chiefs Chairman **General Colin Powell** may have changed his views in recent years, but he had it right in his 1995 book *My American Life*:

"Discrimination 'for' one group means, inevitably, discrimination 'against' another; and all discrimination is offensive." ⁷

Mandatory "diversity" taken to extremes is all about elitist attitudes, ideological groupthink, and Amazon Warrior myths that disregard inconvenient facts. Ancient Greeks and Romans believed in mythical Amazon women, but today's theorists seem to believe in popular culture depicting super-female warriors on television and in feature films. ⁸ This is a genuine concern because, as **George Orwell** recognized decades ago, false beliefs are likely to "bump up against solid reality, usually on a battlefield."

Assignment of Women in Ground Combat Units Research Plan

Presidential or Defense Department orders to achieve discriminatory, gender-conscious "diversity metrics" would undermine core values and the unique culture of the Marine Corps. Nevertheless, because the Defense Department is promoting "diversity as a strategic imperative," it is trying to eliminate all rules that exempt women from direct ground combat assignments. The Marine Corps is following orders, implementing plans for "measured and responsible research" on the consequences of such a change.

Memo for the Marines

On 23 April 2012, Marine Corps Commandant **General James Amos** issued a two-page ALMAR memorandum that echoed the Defense Department's career advancement theme, stressing the need for "*equal opportunities for women to excel.*" ⁹ The memo appeared to define "success" in terms of women's careers, instead of military necessity and the best interests of the Corps. In his memo, Gen. Amos announced a multi-phased research effort called the **Assignment of Women to Ground Combat Units Research Plan**.

The project was designed to a) Monitor and analyze the results of certain exceptions to current policies; b) Survey the opinions of Marines on current policies regarding women in combat; c) Compare the physical capabilities of men and women performing common tasks; d) Test female

volunteers on the Infantry Officer Course (IOC) at Quantico, VA; and e) Review the requirements of closed military occupational specialties (MOSs).

Regardless of Gen. Amos' intent, a close analysis of each component of the research plan reveals problematic elements that the administration and their civilian allies are likely to use in creating an illusion of credibility and military support for MLDC "diversity" goals.

Feminists and their supporters in the media are trying to use the military as a laboratory for the testing of a controversial twentieth-century social science theory -- that men and women are interchangeable in all roles, and any differences that do exist are primarily, if not exclusively, due to socialization. We are watching Pentagon-based ideologues using "perception management" (PM) techniques to achieve pre-determined results; i.e., implementation of the MLDC agenda and affirmation of beliefs that should be called Amazon Warrior Myths.

Will Marine Tests Confirm Combat Realities or Promote Amazon Warrior Myths?

There is no question that female Marines, soldiers, airmen and sailors have served our country with courage and dedication in the wars since the 9/11 attacks on America and before. Some are still deployed as members of **female engagement teams (FET)s** or **cultural support teams (CST)s**, which perform dangerous work with civilian women and families in the Middle East.

The current debate is not about women serving "in harm's way" in warzones. It is whether women should be assigned to direct ground combat – "tip of the spear" battalions that attack the enemy with deliberate offensive action under fire.

It is significant to note that one component of the projects' physical-capability tests, to measure "common skills," already have been scaled back from six to three and adjusted to reduce physical demands and improve women's achievement scores. Remaining events, including the test of female volunteers on the Infantry Officer Course, could be in conflict with laws and regulations mandating ethical procedures in human experimentation.

We don't know whether the Pentagon may have breached official directives barring what is called command interference in the decisions of subordinates. In this case, women are being asked to participate in human experiments that impose great personal risk not for military purposes, but to advance the controversial "diversity" agenda.¹⁰ In addition, some media reports have conveyed the impression that the entire process is pre-determined and being orchestrated by the administration just for "show."

None of the scheduled research efforts will replicate actual land combat conditions, including long-term physical exhaustion without rest, in all weather, followed by attacks on the enemy under fire. Nor are the research tests configured to measure the more intangible but extremely important consequences of assigning women to "tip of the spear" infantry battalions. These

include problems involving demoralizing sexual misconduct that are becoming worse in all other branches of the military. Loading these burdens on the backs of infantry troops will not improve combat effectiveness.

In addition, the Department of Defense is being short-sighted in its disregard for the legal consequences of eliminating women's combat exemptions, particularly with regard to **Selective Service** registration. Should ground combat policies change, the **ACLU** will file another lawsuit on behalf of young men. They will try to persuade a federal court to impose equal Selective Service obligations on young women, and they will probably succeed, without a vote of Congress.

With today's all-volunteer military, young women would be obliged to register or incur penalties for failure to do so. In the unfortunate event that Congress reinstates the draft in a national emergency, federal courts likely would order conscription of young women for combat duty on the same basis as men.¹¹ For this reason, incremental decisions being made by the Defense Department right now ultimately will affect all women, not just a few volunteers.

In September a Marine Corps public affairs officer prepared an 11-page **Information Package**, which outlines various components of the ongoing Women in Ground Combat Units Research Plan, also known as the **USMC Women in the Service Restrictions Review (WISRR)**.¹² The following analysis addresses each element of the research plan, in the same order.

A. Exception to Policy/Pilot Program

In 2012 the Marine Corps began implementing an **Exception to Policy/Pilot Program (ETP)** calling for the assignment of **371** women to administrative, logistics, communication, supply, and motor transport positions in previously all-male direct ground combat battalions.

This program, described on page 3 of the Information Package, creates exceptions to rules and regulations affecting women, and allows them to be assigned to **Navy** and Marine battalion staff headquarters positions that currently are all-male. During this period, "qualitative and quantitative information" will be gathered on the following four qualities:

- **Readiness**

The ETP plan describes military readiness as an important goal, but it is not structured to gather information on a host of issues that affect readiness, such as recruiting and retention, training issues related to gender differences, deployability differences related to pregnancy and family concerns, plus disciplinary problems and sexual misconduct on both sides of the spectrum ranging from assault to fraternization. Because Marine land combat units are unlikely to have more success with these issues than other military services and combat communities, there is

no reason to believe that "gender-diversity" would *improve* readiness in infantry battalions and many reasons to believe that it would degrade it.

- **Cohesion**

The word "cohesion" is not defined. Contrary to misunderstandings among many civilians, "cohesion" is not about social compatibility or being liked. The "Characteristics of Cohesion," analyzed by the 1992 **Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces**, depend on mutual trust for mission accomplishment and survival in combat:

"Cohesion is the relationship that develops in a unit or group where (1) members share common values and experiences; (2) individuals in the group conform to group norms and behavior in order to ensure group **survival** and goals; (3) members lose their personal identity in favor of a group identity; (4) members focus on group activities and goals; (5) unit members become totally dependent on each other for the completion of their mission or **survival**; and (6) group members must meet all standards of performance and behavior in order not to threaten group **survival**." ¹³ (Emphasis added)

The WISRR fails to acknowledge how divisive and destructive of cohesion gender-based "diversity metrics" would be in close combat units where physical capabilities and deployability are more important for survival than they are in other non-DGC communities.

- **Effectiveness**

The term "effectiveness" is described only in relation to "*performance during unit training, physical and field events.*" In gender-mixed training, however, various types of gender-norming techniques measure "equal effort," not equal results. The WISRR tests do not attempt to replicate wartime conditions, but uninformed reporters are not likely to recognize the difference between controlled training exercises and actual combat conditions.

- **Costs**

If women were ordered into infantry battalions, expenses related to "facilities" would be among the least significant. Far more costly would be potential manpower losses due to personnel issues and conflicts that are common in the military: personal misconduct, pregnancy and non-deployability, injuries, attrition related to family choices, etc. The WISRR is not structured to measure or evaluate any of these factors or intangibles of military culture, meaning "how things are done."

The USMC project does not define what the purpose of the "research" is. If the goal is "success" for women's careers, as officials have said, commanders overseeing the ETP process are in a position to adjust their evaluations to reflect what the administration wants to hear.

If "diversity" is the goal, costs are irrelevant. Complications associated with gender integration are considered part of the "cost of doing business" in the "gender-free" military.

Many outside contractors know that absent real definitions there are no real "tests," and no one is looking for real results. Providing expected answers, therefore, with the recommendation that "more research" is needed, improves chances that the DoD will authorize more contracts. Objective research analysts often are co-opted or cut out of the recommendation/decision-making process, and the media hails any individual "success" story as definitive. This is easiest to do when the "test" is a survey of opinion that does not define terms or ask the most important questions.

B. Force-Wide Survey

The online survey of Marines, conducted in the summer of 2012 by the **Center for Naval Analyses - Marine Division**, may produce some interesting results. The most significant findings, however, are likely to be eclipsed by media spin and perceptions managed by the Obama Administration.¹⁴

1. Misleading Survey Questions

The WISRR survey included not just one but twelve questions seeking opinions on a "voluntary" women-in-land-combat option.¹⁵ These questions were problematic, since respondents were asked to express opinions on a non-existent policy that would not be workable, desirable, or necessary.

The 1992 **Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces** investigated the "voluntary" option for women in combat and found that the obvious double standard would be demoralizing as well as unworkable:

"In an all-volunteer force, if combat positions are opened to women and men are involuntarily assigned to those combat positions, **then women should also be involuntarily assigned** to those same positions. **Different assignment policies would have a deleterious effect on morale**, as women would have the privilege of volunteering for combat, but not the burden of being involuntarily assigned."¹⁶ (CF 4.13, p. C-127, emphasis added)

If the WISRR survey registers support for women in combat on a "voluntary" basis that is not available to men, media reports will push the Marines to implement that option, regardless of the impact on infantry battalion cohesion. There is not much evidence, however, that if infantry positions were open, significant numbers of women would choose them.

- As of September 2012, only two women had volunteered for the Infantry Officer Course test at Quantico – a key component in the WISRR project that will need close to 100 volunteers to yield useful data.¹⁷
- In 2011, **Australia** responded to a major military sex scandal by allowing the Human Rights Committee Sex Discrimination Commissioner to announce a five-year plan to achieve a "critical mass" of women in combat. As of August 2012, not a single Army woman had volunteered to participate in the experiment. The Human Resources Director suggested that women "could try it for a few months with no obligation."¹⁸ This is not how the American military works.

A preliminary review of the survey instrument reveals other potential flaws:

- Survey questions fail to adequately define the mission of "direct ground combat" battalions, which are at issue today. Everyone in a war zone is serving "in harm's way," but the missions of DGC infantry battalions, which "seek out, close with and attack the enemy with deliberate offensive action under fire," remain unchanged.¹⁹
- The survey instrument includes some questions to identify demographics, occupations, and deployments, but they are not sufficient to identify and document the views of experienced Marine infantry or Special Operations Forces troops. Respondents are asked to indicate "*In which of the following ground combat element units have you ever served?*" Men or women who were collocated with or served in a brigade-level administrative position in the infantry, artillery, armor, and other DGC units might check one or more of those boxes, even though another option in that question inquires about "direct or general support" of the same DGC units. This is not sufficient to isolate the target battalion-level DGC unit personnel, especially since the definition of "combat" is not clear. (Q #8)
- Numbers of infantry/SOF troops are small, but their views should be given more credibility and weight. Instead, they are being asked to tell if they have worked on a regular basis with female Marines. (Q #10) The answers of those answering "no" might be discredited for their lack of experience with women in combat.
- There are several questions inquiring about intent to leave the Marine Corps if rules affecting women change, but responses will not reveal very much. Marines have contractual obligations, investments in their careers, and retirement goals that are unlikely to change, especially in the majority of communities that are not DGC. In addition, retention likely will remain high as long as the economy remains weak.
- Classic Marine advertising campaigns have highlighted the tough, *masculine* image of the Corps as an important tool for obtaining the kinds of recruits it wants. The survey

asks female respondents whether an assignment to a ground combat PMOS (primary military occupational specialty) would result in "Pressure to suppress my femininity." (Q91) It does not ask men whether the integration of women into the infantry might damage the Marines' masculine culture and recruiting "brand."

- Some questions are almost exclusively focused on self-interest and personal feelings, not combat realities or missions. For example, one set of question about "Closed PMOSs" asks about "career opportunities," then "promotion opportunities," then being "treated equally," and "being closer to the action." (Q #81-85) The careerist focus and civilian vocabulary are inconsistent with the combat mission of the Marine Corps.
- There is a question about male Marines "feeling obligated to protect female Marines," but no queries to measure the opposite effect: men becoming increasingly resentful of women if they are assigned to currently all-male infantry battalions. (Q 52) In 1992, military sociologist **Prof. Charles C. Moskos, PhD**, who also served as a member of the Presidential Commission, did a survey of military personnel that identified a significant subset of men he called "egalitarian sexists." Dr. Moskos informed the commission that these men said they favored women in combat because they resented feminists and wanted to punish women by forcing them into combat where they would be hurt and forced to go away.²⁰ In a later article, Moskos' colleague **Laura L. Miller** provided more information about men she identified as "hostile proponents." This group, which swells the numbers of survey respondents favoring women in combat, "...reason that the issue of women in the combat arms will not be put to rest until women have been given the opportunity to prove their incompetence."²¹

The needlessly convoluted survey instrument fails to ask the only two questions that matter:

- 1) *How would the assignment of women to Marine infantry battalions improve combat readiness?*
- 2) *Do you favor or oppose the assignment of women to Marine infantry battalions?*

Without answers to those questions, liberal media will fill the news vacuum and manage perceptions with the desired spin, this time with the apparent but misleading support of military respondents whose full and complete opinions will not be heard.²²

2. Advertising, Market Research, and Recruiting

General **Max Thurman**, who came up with the famous Army recruiting slogan "**Be All You Can Be**," used to say that ours is "*not an all-volunteer Army, but an all-recruited Army.*"²³ There are no indications that recruiting rates would improve if female soldiers were involuntarily assigned to infantry battalions.

- The December 2010 **Youth Poll 20 Report** of the Defense Department **Joint Advertising, Market Research & Studies (JAMRS)** found that the propensity of young women to serve in the military is only about a third that of men.²⁴
- In addition, JAMRS research data that Marine **Col. John Nettles** presented to the **Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS)** on 22 September 2011 showed that if women could serve in combat roles, **29%** of potential female recruits said they would be *less likely* to join the military, compared to **12%** of women who said they would be *more likely* to join.²⁵
- In 2007 the Marine Corps tried an innovative advertising campaign aimed at athletic women in popular magazines such as *Shape* and *Self*, but it was not successful. Response cards were returned by over a thousand "qualified leads," but only two of those turned into enlistments – one of them already interested because of her Navy brother.²⁶

It is difficult to find civilian surveys done since the 1992 presidential commission that provide information on the opinions of potential male recruits on co-ed infantry assignments, should the infantry be made co-ed. If the DoD has such information it should be made available, together with the male respondents' reasons for their opinions.

C. Quantitative Research Process: Laws, Rules and Ethics of Human Experimentation

The briefing that Marine Col. John Nettles presented to the DACOWITS in September 2011 promised that *"Research and testing will be designed and executed within the parameters set by the **Human Research Protection Program (HRPP)** and **Institutional Review Board (IRB)** directives."*²⁷

In addition, the September 2012 USMC Information Package (p. 5) mentions "Research Terms" and "Applicable Regulations" mandating official of review of experiments with humans:²⁸

- ***Institutional Review Board (IRB):***

"The IRB is a committee established to review research to ensure protection of the rights and welfare of human research subjects. The board reviews, in advance, all research proposals involving people as participants, and sets conditions for recruiting."

- **Human Research Protection Program (HRPP):**

"The HRPP oversees research and development activities planned by institutions. It promotes policies and procedures for timely and effective reviews of research, and ensures that approved research is conducted according to applicable rules and ethical guidelines to protect the rights and welfare of the participants."

- **Research Terms and Applicable Regulations**

The 2012 Information Package promises compliance with all Navy, Marine Corps, and Defense Department regulations mandating ethical procedures for experiments with humans. CMR has requested documents verifying that IRB and HRPP observers are independent of the Marine Corps chain of command, and operating in compliance with the following directives:

1. Navy Instruction Re: Human Experimentation

The 21 January 2011, **SECNAVINST 3900.39D** set forth the Department of the Navy's Human Research Protection Program (HRPP) and the oversight/approval role of an Institutional Review Board (IRB). Definitions of "human subject and minimal risk" appear in the instruction's (Enclosure (1)).²⁹

An IRB serves to certify and ensure the safety and welfare of human research subjects, and to make recommendations to the authority that approves human research protocols.³⁰ Ethical requirements of the HRPP are quite clear and defined in Enclosure (1) of SECNAVINST 3900.39D.

The following excerpts, with emphasis added throughout, are relevant to all elements of the Marines' "Quantitative Research" comparing the physical capabilities of female and male volunteers:

- The Navy Instruction applies to: "(1) All biomedical and **social-behavioral research involving human subjects** conducted by Navy and Marine Corps activities or personnel..." (p. 2)
- "(3) Informed Consent. **Voluntary informed consent is fundamental to ethical research with humans.** Informed consent is not simply a document. It is a process that begins with subject recruitment. ...Depending on the research, ongoing discussion with and education of subjects may continue long after the original informed consent is obtained." (pp. 4-5)

- "**Human subject research shall not be initiated until** the institution holds a valid **Assurance for the Protection of Human Research Subjects**; the research protocol has been reviewed by the IRB, and approved by an appropriate research approval authority." (p. 5)
- "(5) **Research-related Injury**. Due to the possibility of injuries arising from participation in human subject research, every project involving **greater than minimal risk** shall include an **arrangement for emergency treatment** and necessary follow-up of any research-related injury." (p. 5)
- "Regardless of the risk level of the research, **no superiors** (civilian supervisors, officers, and noncommissioned officers (NCOs) **shall influence the decisions of their subordinates** (e.g., junior enlisted personnel) whether to participate as research subjects." (p. 6)
- "[Commanders, Commanding Officers, and Offices in Charge are responsible to]...(3) Ensure that subjects' decisions to participate are voluntary and are **protected from undue influence**" (p. 13)

2. *Marine Corps Order on Human Experimentation*

Marine Corps Order (MCO) 3900.18, dated 21 January, 2012, implements the Navy Instruction quoted above.³¹ The following excerpts of MCO 3900.18, with emphasis added, are relevant to the Marines' quantitative research with volunteer women in the "common standards" tests and at the Infantry Officer Course:

- (a) **Informed consent** is an application of the general principle of respect for persons. As stated in reference (a), **voluntary informed consent is fundamental to ethical research with humans**. Informed consent cannot be obtained simply by reading or signing a document; it is a process that begins with subject recruitment. Informed consent includes a thorough discussion with prospective subjects and/or their legally authorized representatives and continues for at least the duration of the research." (p. 2)
- "[All Marine Corps Commanders, COs, OICs, or Heads of Activity Shall]...2. Establish procedures to ensure **all research involving humans** (social, behavioral and educational), and all **operational test and evaluation research** that is supported, sponsored, performed, conducted, or authorized in the Command, is reviewed by an appropriate IRB, and when required, approved by an HRPP IO [Institutional Official]...Marine Corps organizations can request **review from IRB's outside the Marine Corps**." (p. 4)

- "[All commanders shall] Obtain written approval from the appropriate research approval authority **prior to conducting, continuing, or implementing** changes to **human subject research protocols.** " (p. 4)

3. Department of Defense Policy on Human Experimentation

DoD Instruction No. 3216.02 includes more information about safeguards for experiments with humans.³² In addition to several provisions stressing requirements for prior approval and oversight of human experimentation by an Institutional Review Board, the DoD Instruction recommends consultation with scientists or community members with scientific backgrounds:

- (d) For research involving Service members as human subjects that has been determined to be greater than minimal risk, and when recruitment occurs in a group setting, **the IRB shall appoint an ombudsman.**" (p. 23)
- (b) Supervisors...are **prohibited from influencing the decisions of their subordinates** regarding participation as subjects in research involving human subjects covered by this instruction. (p. 24)

The Marine Information Package refers to a **research monitor** who will observe all tests. (p. 6) The DoD Instruction provides more information on the responsibilities of this official:

- "(2) The research monitor may discuss the research protocol with the investigators, interview human subjects, and consult with others outside of the study about the research. The research monitor shall have authority **to stop a research protocol in progress, remove individual human subjects from a research protocol,** and take whatever steps are necessary to protect the safety and well-being of human subjects until the IRB can assess the monitor's report."³³

All of these regulations are particularly important because of the high risk of debilitating injuries that could occur when consenting female officers—and enlisted women—are asked to perform strenuous tasks at levels equal to men.

Recommendations affecting all women Marines, including those in the enlisted ranks, should not be based on flawed, short-term research that is conducted not to *improve* readiness in the combat arms, or to promote national security, but to advance a social agenda and "diversity metrics" favoring a few.

Regulations affecting human experiments should apply and be verified publicly not just in temporary tests, but in long-term training where career-ending injuries are at least twice as likely for female trainees. If and when adjustments are made, they should be honestly

acknowledged, instead of leading others to believe what we *know* to be untrue. As Orwell said, false beliefs "bump up against solid reality, usually on a battlefield."

D. Marine Quantitative Research Elements

The Marine Corps is conducting three tests measuring physical capabilities, consisting of: a) An evaluation of men's and women's performance on common tasks; b) Tests of female volunteers on the Infantry Officer Course; and c) An analysis of closed (all-male) military specialties.

1. Ground Combat Element Common Physical Performance Standards Testing

Marine Training and Education Command (TECOM) is conducting quantitative research to gather data comparing the physical abilities of male and female Marines performing three "common tasks."

The "**Common GCE [Ground Combat Element] Standards** tests will be useful in gathering limited information, but Pentagon officials have allowed the media to misrepresent the research project. Some media have mistakenly reported that the TECOM "common standards" tests will somehow provide evidence that women Marines can and should be assigned to "tip of the spear" infantry battalions. Such a conclusion cannot be justified, especially since plans for the WISRR "common standards" tests were scaled back even before they began.

2. "Common Standards" Tests Modified Since 2011

On 22 September 2011, Marine Col. John Nettles presented to the DACOWITS a set of slides titled "[USMC Women in the Service Restrictions Review \(WISRR\)](#)", summarizing what was planned for a battery of tests of "common skills" that all Marines are expected to master.³⁴ Slide #10 of that presentation listed six tasks that both men and women would be required to perform.

Sometime after the September 2011 briefing, however, three of the original six "common standards" tests were modified or watered down, and the remaining three – tests that would have been more physically demanding – were dropped. The changes reduce the training challenges for men, while making it more likely that women will succeed.

According to the Marine Information Package (p. 7), the current test program, involving 383 male Marines from a Ground Combat Element (GCE) battalion and 378 female Marines in entry-level training, has been in progress since May 2012. All participants – officers and enlisted – volunteered for the "GCE Common Physical Performance Standards" tests administered over a two-day period at Quantico, VA, and Camp Lejeune, NC.

The current common standards tests, which the Information Pack said would be conducted and monitored in compliance with Human Research Protection Program (HRPP) policies, include the following:

- **Heavy Machine Gun Lift:** Marines lift machine gun replica (72.5 lbs.) from the ground to overhead, one repetition, wearing average assault load of 71 lbs.
- **Casualty Evacuation:** Participants, wearing a fighting load of 43 lbs., evacuate (drag) a simulated casualty for a distance of 25 meters (82 feet). The casualty's total weight will be approximately 208 lbs. (rescue mannequin of 165 lbs. plus a 43 lb. fighting load. Participant sprints 25 meters to the casualty.
- **March Under Load:** Wearing average assault load (71 lbs.) completes 20 km march (12.4 mi.) in 5 hours or less. ³⁵

These tasks are considerably less demanding than the original list that Col. Nettles presented on slides to the DACOWITS on September 22, 2011. Slide #10 of the September 2011 WISRR presentation, headlined "**Common GCE (Ground Combat Element) Standards - Dismounted,**" indicated that there would be six events required for completion of the test – not just three. The original six combat-related challenges were designed to measure strength, endurance, and the capability of all Marines to perform common skills in combat:

- **Original Event 1: Mk-19 Lift** - This test would have required the mounting and manipulating of a heavy machine gun and ammunition (83 lbs.) on an M-3 tripod (44 lbs.), with an 83 lb. assault load.
- **Original Event 2: Move a Casualty** - This event would have required an individual to carry a "165 lb. avg. Marine casualty with 83 lbs. assault load on him, carrying [his] own 83 lb. assault load for a 20m (65 ft.) distance. Total casualty weight: 248 lbs."
- **Original Event 3: March Under Load** - The original test required a "20 km (12.4) march in 5 hours with an 83 lb. assault load."

The following three events, as shown on Slide #10 of the September 2011 DACOWITS presentation, would have been far more physically demanding than the three tests being used at the present time. All three were omitted from the current Common Standards tests:

- **Missing 2011 Event: Perform Individual Movement Techniques** - "crawl, sprint, negotiate obstacle, etc., with 83 lb. assault load"
- **Missing 2011 Event: Defend a Position** - "by fire and armed/unarmed close combat if required, with 83 lb. assault load"

- **Missing 2011 Event: Construct a Machine Gun Fighting Position** - "to specified dimensions; time standard TBD; wearing standard body armor (43 lbs.)"

The purpose of training is to prepare all Marines for land combat conditions. Crawling, taking cover, sprinting, defending a position while carrying an 83 lb. assault load, as well as constructing a machine gun fighting position, are physically demanding tasks that are critical for *survival* in combat.

The Mk-19 heavy machine gun, which fires grenades, is in service in both the Army and Marine Corps. The Mk-19 can be used on the ground, mounted on the M-3 tripod (44 lbs), or on a vehicle that is equipped with the appropriate mounting cradle. The task requires considerable strength to lift the heavy weapon and to handle the mounting mechanism and ammunition, especially in harsh weather under actual combat conditions.³⁶

The task of digging a "fighting position," which used to be known as a fox hole, is even more laborious. Constructing a machine gun fighting position in the ground requires a lot of digging to accommodate the heavy machine gun, tripod and a two- or three-man gun crew.³⁷

Lives and the success of land combat missions depend on individual movements in battle zones, marches under heavy loads, the digging of fighting positions, lifting and mounting machine guns, lugging cans of ammunition rounds, and throwing grenades. **Prof. Kingsley Browne**, author of *Co-Ed Combat: New Evidence that Women Shouldn't Fight the Nation's Wars*, suggests that to be more like actual combat, the long march in rough terrain should come first, the machine gun lift next, and the casualty move last, with no time to rest in between.³⁸ Instead, TECOM decided to drop three key tasks replicating land combat, and made the remaining three tasks less demanding.

TECOM's omission of the toughest events and weakening of the rest will improve the level of "success" in the pass/fail research effort, but the revisions will obscure combat realities that should be at the center of any objective discussion of physical capabilities in the military.

3. Marine Infantry Officer Course, Quantico, VA

The U.S. Marine Corps has invited female officers to volunteer for a research training program at the exceptionally tough, all-male Infantry Officer Course (IOC) located at Quantico, VA.³⁹ The IOC test of female volunteers is problematic for many reasons – none of which reflect on the bravery, ability, and sacrifices of Marine women themselves both before and after 9/11.

Despite wide publicity, only two women volunteered to participate in the program that started late in September. According to a Pentagon spokesman (contrary to some news reports) the

Marines intend to collect data from more than **90** female volunteers on the Infantry Officer Course, not just two.⁴⁰ (Regardless of IOC test results, the infantry MOS will remain all-male.)

Marine Commandant Gen. James Amos is expected to make recommendations to President Obama by November 2012, but the lack of a sufficient number of female volunteers for the IOC research program means that it cannot yield credible information for a long time – certainly not before the end of the year. Misinformation and heightened expectations, unfortunately, will make it very difficult for Gen. Amos to discuss findings objectively, without being pushed to endorse the MLDC recommendations for women in direct ground combat.

a. *Pretending to Equalize Inequality*

Defense Department and Marine officials have claimed that training standards in the short-term test of women in infantry training would be "gender-neutral" and "exactly the same" for both men and women. One colonel told the *New York Times* that he had no special concerns about the course prepared to accept women: "Nothing more so with women than with men." Other Marine officials have needlessly confused the issue by using the word "combat" in an imprecise way.

Such statements sincerely reflect current intentions and respect for women Marines. The problem is that some reporters will continue to raise expectations that women are virtually interchangeable with men in the infantry course, as well as in actual combat. Reporters who fail to understand (or admit) the difference between direct ground combat and the experience of serving in a war zone are prone to ask, "*So why shouldn't women be in the infantry?*" More precise language, defining what infantry combat really means, would help to explain why.

Data on physiology and performance differences, which the Marines presented to the DACOWITS on September 22, 2011, do not support unrealistic expectations. Slide #7 of that briefing, headlined "**USMC - OPT Preliminary Considerations**," reported the following disadvantages in women's physical capabilities:

Physiology & Performance Differences (on avg)

- **20%** lower aerobic capacity
- **40%** lower muscle strength
- **47%** lower lifting strength
- **26%** slower road march speed

In addition,

- Female attrition/injury rates during ELT [entry level training] - **2X rate** of males
- Female discharge (break) rates for career force - **2X rate** of non-GCE males

- Female non-deployable rates - **3X rate of males**

The slide-deck also highlighted concerns about the effect of involuntary assignments on recruiting and retention, the need for additional research on the Australian Defense Force's five-year plan for women in combat, and the possible impact of policy changes on social and unit cohesion. Most of those issues, plus deployability, pregnancy, personal misconduct, and long-term disability, are not being explored during the current WISRR process.

The DACOWITS briefing data reconfirm the findings of comprehensive studies conducted over the past thirty-years. **William J. Gregor, PhD**, a Professor of Social Sciences at the School of Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth, KS, has prepared an Information Paper listing these studies, which were based on empirical evidence rather than theory. Not one of them supported or proved the theory that women can be trained to be the physical equals of men in direct ground combat. ⁴¹

Data such as this should have halted the push for women in the infantry right there. But the DACOWITS and advocates of "gender diversity" are pushing a social experiment intended to test feminist theories, not an exercise that would improve combat effectiveness in our military.

During the first test of female volunteers on the Infantry Officer Course (IOC), most media focused on the novelty of the co-ed infantry test instead of its substance. The online version of *USA Today* article included a video showing the two women on the course, viewed only from the back to protect their privacy. ⁴²

Both of the unnamed officers quickly washed out along with approximately 30 of 109 male trainees. ⁴³ They deserve respect for their spirit and willingness to try, but the statement at the end of the video, which praised the women's "historic opportunity," needlessly glamorized the test. Infantry training is not a television reality show.

Over-confidence or media illusions could cause misunderstandings among potential volunteers for the training experiment, and raise expectations in the media that essentially paint the Marines into a corner. The problem began in the Pentagon, not at Quantico. Marine officers would not be exposing women to potentially career-ending, debilitating injuries were it not for the Administration's push for gender-conscious "metrics" to promote social/political goals.

b. British Confirm: Gender-Free Training Does Not Work

If the Marines actually try to implement a system of identical treatment in physical training, serious injuries among women are likely to skyrocket. This is what happened when the British Army conducted an 18-month test of "gender-free" training in 1997-98, in which the British attempted to train men and women with identical "gender-free" standards.

This experiment with "gender-free" training was expected to make the case for women in land combat, but due to the high level of female injuries, together with other factors, British military authorities reached the *opposite* conclusion. The **Gemmel Report**,⁴⁴ published in the **Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine**, concluded:

"Despite reducing the number of women selected, the gender-free policy led to higher losses from overuse injuries. This study confirms and quantifies the excess risk for women when they undertake the same arduous training as male recruits, and highlights the conflict between health and safety legislation and equal opportunities legislation."
(emphasis added)

There is no reason to believe that American women are stronger than their British counterparts. The November 1997 **US Army Research Institute of Environmental Medicine** report, referred to as the Natick Study, did not meet expectations of its sponsors. The research effort only demonstrated that some women, if given specialized training, will achieve at minimal strength levels normally achieved by untrained men. Broader inferences are not justified, due to several flaws in the experiment's methodology and conclusions.⁴⁵

Feminists who insist that they want to hold women to the same standards as men are the same people who rail against "barriers" in training that limit women's careers. They also demand that gender-mixed units have a "critical mass" of women (usually 15%), not just a few. "Diversity metrics" and a critical mass of women in close combat units could be achieved only by adjusting expectations and gender-norming training scores so that women can succeed.

The obstacle course used by officer candidates at Quantico provides some insight into what might happen if female trainees were required to perform at the same level as men.

c. Officer Candidate School (OCS)

The **Officer Candidate School (OCS)** obstacle course, like many on other bases, has two side-by-side paths with barriers that trainees must climb over – one for males and one for female officer candidates.

Photos of the OCS obstacle course clearly show that a high bar on the female course is 12 inches lower than a similar bar on the men's side. Discrete wooden "assists" nailed to side posts and the fronts of a climbing wall provide toe-hold help for women climbing over barriers on that side.⁴⁶

A former Marine instructor shared with CMR a typical ROTC class's test score results in 2005. The instructor noted that the difference in performance was most visible on the combat readiness test (CRT). Even with the female assists and longer time or lower mileage requirements in running exercises, **63%** of the women failed that class's CRT, compared to **1%**

of the men. (15 women, 3 men) On overall physical fitness scores, **46%** of the females failed, no males did. Attrition was roughly double.⁴⁷

This type of gender-norming in officer training helps to reduce female injuries, but it is based on the presumption that female Marines will not be serving in infantry battalions. If that rule should change, special training allowances, assists, and gender-normed scores would have to be dropped as well. This is where theory clashes with reality, with potentially disastrous consequences.

A test of enlisted women Marines in 2007 indicated that the result would be more career-ending injuries for women. In the alternative, men could be challenged in training less.⁴⁸ How would a replay of flawed policies benefit the Corps?

d. Male/Female Physiology

Rear Adm. Hugh P. Scott, MC, USN (Ret.), an expert in undersea medicine and physical standards who has done extensive research on medical issues facing women in the military, expressed his concerns about the physical and physiological differences between men and women in a June 22, 2012, [letter to House Armed Services Committee Chairman Howard P. "Buck" McKeon](#).⁴⁹

In his letter, Dr. Scott praised women in the military for repeatedly demonstrating great courage, determination and skill both in training and during deployments. Then he explained in medical terms why physical differences between men and women cannot be overcome with tougher training, and why it would be "inappropriate" to assign them to units that are required to seek out, close with, and kill the enemy:

"While men and women have an equal number of muscles and muscle fibers, the strength difference relates exclusively to muscle size that is determined by testosterone levels. Because women have ten times less the amount of testosterone than men, they have smaller muscle fibers that result in the development of small-size muscles; in effect, women have less muscle to activate. That also is the reason why women develop less muscle when training with weights and exercising."

The only way to achieve "equality" for women in tough training is to use gender-normed scoring systems that measure "equal effort," not equal results. Another way is to quietly drop some of the more demanding exercises while pretending that nothing has changed. This already happened, apparently, when the WSIRR "common tasks" research project to compare physical capabilities of men and women was reduced from six tests to three.

e. Combatives, Land Combat, and Violence Against Women

Amazon myths about women warriors date back to Greek mythology, but many are amplified by contemporary culture and liberal media. The *Los Angeles Times*, for example, published an article about female soldiers participating in a "cage fighting" tournament at **Fort Hood**, TX, last February.⁵⁰

Military combative cage matches involve hitting and wrestling an opponent to the floor, but not closed-fist punching or the wearing of heavy gear. Three hundred men and 25 women competed for four days, sometimes in mixed-gender matches. Three women were carried out on stretchers and only one, **Staff Sgt. Jackelyn Walker**, made it to the finals.

SSG Walker also ended up being removed from the competition on a stretcher, her eyes rolled back after an artillery sergeant hit her hard. Upon release from the hospital SSG Walker nevertheless declared, "*We can be just as tough as the guys. We can do it.*" Really? Even if SSG Walker had become a tournament champion, the case would not be made for women in land combat.

Cultural questions also arise when men are taught aggressive fighting tactics against female opponents. Male soldiers taught to brawl with women also attend classes to prevent sexual assaults. Do we as a nation really want to desensitize and train men to hit women, or to condone violence against them, as long as it happens at the hands of the enemy?

This was the question raised by former Army **SPC Jessica E. True** in a letter she wrote to **House Armed Services Committee** leaders in May 2008. SPC True told them of the disproportionate physical stress and injuries she suffered when she was placed in an all-male field artillery unit in 2004. At that time, the Army was placing women in a number of units in violation of Defense Department rules.⁵¹

SPC True was strong and healthy when she joined the Army, but she suffered back and neck injuries when she was forced to carry weight on her back identical to the men's. A man who had been taught to treat a woman exactly like a man tried his "combat moves" on True, inflicting excruciating pain while others just watched.

True told the HASC that potential recruits should be warned: "Men are becoming accustomed to inflicting violence against women. It's like feminism is really the legalization of brutality against women. Feminism seems to have been invented by men as a way of cruelty and sold to women as 'equality.'" In a communication with CMR five years later, she reported that injuries she suffered while in service worsened over time. She is now severely disabled and limited in her daily activities.

f. Gender-Specific Health Concerns

Military women are brave, but there is no reason to believe that all or even a majority of them are eager to serve in direct ground combat. **Capt. Katie Petronio, USMC**, wrote a widely-circulated, clear-thinking article for the *Marine Corps Gazette* that warned of the dangers of treating women in uniform exactly like men.⁵²

An accomplished veteran of deployments to Iraq and Afghanistan, Capt. Petronio described the debilitating physical damage she suffered during deployments, including infertility and other physical problems that can only be managed or overcome with expensive medical treatments that will continue for the rest of her life. Capt. Petronio's article, which went "viral" in July 2012, should be required reading for every official or member of Congress who carelessly describes land combat as a "career opportunity" for women.

4. Closed Military Occupational Specialty (MOS) Analysis

The most puzzling element of the three-part Marine Quantitative Research program calls for a review of existing physical performance standards and graduation requirements, with an eye toward making recommendations for "potential assignments" for women. This analysis requires a healthy dose of reality and a conscious effort to consider what the point of the exercise is.

The WISRR project continues to stress the popular but highly-misleading cliché about warfare: "*There are no more front lines.*" There is no guarantee, however, that future warfare will be limited to operations like those in Iraq and Afghanistan, particularly in the past four years.

Major policy changes should not be rooted in the belief that a direct ground combat action like the liberation of **Baghdad** in the spring of 2003, **Fallujah** in November 2004, or even **Camp Bastion** in **Afghanistan** in September 2012, will never happen again. If that is the operative assumption, the Marine Corps may as well disband or change its culture to become more like peacekeeping forces in **Europe, Australia, or Canada**.

The physical requirements and missions of closed MOSs listed on page 9 of the Research Plan Information Package, such as "Marine Corps Security Force guard," "forward air controller," and "main battle tank/light armored reconnaissance vehicle repairer/technician" have not changed. It is not clear why they should be considered for recoding, other than to advance gender-conscious "diversity metrics," regardless of the consequences.

An infantry officer recently explained what the armored tank repair MOS entails:

“Some of the wrenches used in this job are the length of a man's arm and they are made of cast iron or steel. One of the bigger challenges for tank (and self-propelled artillery) mechanics is the process of "breaking track." This requires a "tanker bar" which is a 5 or 6 foot crow bar designed to be used as a wedge between tracks. This process is demanding and requires consistent, applied strength under ideal conditions (i.e., in a stateside motor pool, which is the only time I've done it on a Bradley) and it can be hell if done in the mud and rain. Just as every infantryman has his favorite uphill road march in the freezing rain story, every tanker has a story about breaking track in a foot of mud.

“Those wrenches would be used by one man. They are so long because it provides leverage. Nonetheless, there are already female mechanics that service Bradleys and Abrams tanks from the FSC [forward support company]. They simply don't do the hard stuff.”⁵³

Dr. William J. Gregor, an expert in the field of military training, has prepared a detailed analysis explaining why there is no way that infantry and Special Operations Forces training can be made co-ed without negative consequences. These include lowering standards, subjecting women to crippling injuries in training, or simply changing the definition of "qualified.”⁵⁴ In his paper, titled *Why Can't Anything Be Done? Measuring Physical Readiness of Women for Physical Occupations*, Dr. Gregor noted,

"The data clearly reveals a very large gap between the physical strength, aerobic capacity and size of Army men and women. Training men and women correctly improves the performance of both [male and female] groups but it also widens the gap in performance."

If this were not the case, highly-trained female athletes would be competing against men in the **Olympics**, and the **National Football League** would be recruiting female players to boost their teams' "diversity metrics." The **NFL** does not expose female players to bone-breaking non-lethal combat on the gridiron. There is even less justification for expecting women to fight in lethal ground combat – violent offensive action in which lives and missions are at risk.

Debates about women in combat often include discussions of Marine and Army female engagement teams (FETs) or cultural support teams (CSTs). "**Lionesses**," as they are sometimes called, perform hazardous missions that men cannot do, searching or working with Muslim women and children in warzones and gathering valuable intelligence.

The lionesses deserve full recognition and career rewards for their courageous and valuable service "in harm's way." Still, their missions do not fit the definition of direct ground combat: attacking the enemy with deliberate offensive action under fire.

The WISRR project also seeks insight from the experiences of other countries. A few allied nations have no restrictions regarding women in combat units, but they are not the equal of the United States. An objective review of egalitarian policies in those countries does not support efforts to order women into direct ground combat battalions.

a. Great Britain

In May 2002, the **British Ministry of Defence** issued a report titled ***Women in the Armed Forces***, which explained the rationale for the decision to retain women's exemption from direct ground combat.⁵⁵ The study concluded that "only **0.1 percent** of female applicants and **1 percent** of trained female soldiers" would reach the required standards to meet the demands of direct ground combat roles. The report continued:

"The military viewpoint was that under the conditions of a **high intensity close-quarter battle**, group cohesion becomes of much greater significance to team performance and, in such an environment, the consequences of failure can have far-reaching and grave consequences. **To admit women would, therefore, involve a risk with no gains in terms of combat effectiveness to offset it....**"

"[T]he Secretary of State for Defence concluded that the case for lifting the current restrictions on women serving in combat roles has not been made for any of the units in question. Taking the risk that the inclusion of women in close combat teams could adversely affect those units in the extraordinary circumstances of high intensity close combat cannot be justified." (emphasis added)

Eight years later, the British reviewed the issue again, and came to the same conclusion. Among other things, the 2010 U.K. Ministry of Defence ***Report on the Review of the Exclusion of Women From Ground Close-Combat Roles*** reaffirmed that "[Women's] capability in almost all areas is not in doubt...But these situations are not those typical of the small tactical teams in the combat arms which are required deliberately to close with and kill the enemy."⁵⁶

If the United Kingdom was able to apply sound principles to this issue not once, but twice, the American Department of Defense should be able to apply sound principles and do the same.

b. Australia

The Australian push to assign female soldiers to land combat units was the direct result of a sex scandal at the nation's military academy. In April 2011, amid the fallout from a series of military scandals at home and abroad, Defense Minister **Stephen Smith** proposed that all military positions be opened to women, including the infantry and Special Operations forces.⁵⁷

The Australian **Human Rights Commission's** Sex Discrimination Commissioner, **Elizabeth Broderick**, seized the opportunity to produce a report recommending that sexual harassment and abuse be remedied by ordering gender "diversity" for women in all-male combat units.⁵⁸

Broderick's report, titled *Review Into the Treatment of Women in the Australian Defence Force*, is full of attractive photos of smiling women in uniform and a list of 21 recommendations. This report (and a second one that the Australian Department of Defence recently presented to the DACOWITS) primarily promote combat assignments as the best way to reduce problems with sexual harassment and assault and to promote women's careers.⁵⁹ Neither report offers a solid rationale for the five-year plan in terms of military necessity, other than "*the Army is going to do this.*"

Due to a lack of interest among Australian women – not a single one volunteered for the new positions – Human Rights Commissioner Broderick recommended that women be offered a "try before you buy" 12-month sign-up option.⁶⁰ Ms. Broderick also recommended that "occupational segregation" be countered with programs to recruit a "critical mass" of women, and to offer them flexible "workplace" schedules.⁶¹

Far from being "ahead" of the United States, Australian leaders are implementing flawed priorities for the wrong reasons, adopting the full range of "remedies" that have not worked to mitigate social problems in our own military. Australia is a valued ally, but it should not become a role model for radical cultural change in America's armed forces.

c. Canada & Other Countries

National Public Radio recently prepared a useful summary showing that most of the smaller countries that "allow" women to serve in close combat units are not directly involved in aggressive combat actions comparable to those led by the United States.⁶² The 1992 Presidential Commission interviewed representatives of several NATO allies, and produced similar findings.

Circumstances varied widely, but the Presidential Commission reported, "Historically, those nations that have experienced or actually placed women in close combat situations, (**Soviet Union, Germany, and Israel**) [did so] during times of grave threats to their national survival. After the crisis passed, each nation adopted policies which excluded the employment of women in combat."⁶³ (In 2001, Germany complied with an order of the **European Court of Justice** to eliminate restrictions on women in their military.)

In Israel, which has conscription and exists under constant threats, most able-bodied citizens, including women, serve in the military. Women who train men for combat positions are considered "combat multipliers," not combat soldiers. Some women have been deployed to patrol the border, but these missions do not involve direct ground combat against the enemy.⁶⁴

In establishing equal opportunity as the primary consideration in formulating military personnel policies, representatives of countries such as **Denmark** and the **Dutch Armed Forces** clearly stated that their primary concern was equal opportunity, not combat effectiveness.⁶⁵ After meeting with a Canadian delegation, the Presidential Commission reported,

"In a 1989 decision by the **Canadian Human Rights Tribunal**, all combat positions in the Canadian Forces (CF), except submarines, were opened to women. The primary consideration was equal opportunity. No attempts were made to consider the impact on operational readiness or unit effectiveness. No credence was given to a military study (SWINTER), ongoing during the time of the decision, which indicated difficulties would be anticipated."⁶⁶

Countries that have decided previously or in recent years to assign women to combat positions in the ground, naval, and air forces have done so primarily for reasons of "equal opportunity," (now called "diversity") rather than military necessity. Unlike Denmark, the Netherlands, Canada, and other allied nations, the American Armed Forces cannot afford to make similar tradeoffs, elevating "equal opportunity" above military necessity – especially when potential adversaries in a dangerous world are not operating under the same "diversity" rules.

d. Misconceptions and Reality

The "Common Misconceptions" section of the WISRR Information Packet makes some points worth noting. The issue today is not women being in war zones, where they have been without question serving "in harm's way." The issue now is assignment of women to direct ground combat units, such as infantry battalions and Special Operations Forces that attack the enemy.

Any decision to change assignment policies should be based on the needs of the Marine Corps and national security, not media pressure or the ideological goals of mostly-civilian "diversity" advocates.

A female Marine gunnery sergeant who spoke to the 1992 Presidential Commission was asked whether women should be in the infantry. "*Not if it's not good for the Corps, Ma'am.*" The gunnery sergeant's concise reply, repeated today, shows more wisdom than the entire Military Leadership Diversity Commission Report.

Prof. Kingsley Browne, author of ***Co-Ed Combat*** and numerous other books about relationships of men and women in the military and in other working environments,⁶⁷ has written an analysis of the MLDC report and recommendations of the DACOWITS that were the sole support of much of it:

"The MLDC report is profoundly irresponsible. It cavalierly made recommendations that could have devastating effects on the effectiveness of the United States military with only a cursory nod to any of the serious problems that sexual integration would cause and a complete neglect of most of them. When it felt it lacked information on an issue, it did not seek to obtain it; instead, it dismissed concerns as unproven. No policy maker should rely on this report in considering whether to eliminate the exclusion of women from ground-combat arms."

Informed by his background in physical anthropology, Prof. Browne has analyzed realities of war that the DACOWITS ignores, including the impact on men in the combat arms if they begin to feel betrayed by leaders who put "equal opportunity" above military effectiveness – and their own lives.

This effect may be showing up already in the 2011 **Center for Army Leadership Annual Survey (CASAL)**. Only **26%** of active Army leaders from sergeant to colonel believe the Army is heading in the right direction, down from **33%** in 2010 and **38%** in 2006. According to *Army Times*, a number of respondents cited the negative influence of government policy makers (outside the Army), and "senior Army leaders who felt the need to bow to 'politically correct solutions' to appease policy makers." The same survey reported that **40%** of junior NCOs, compared to **10%** of field grade officers, were aware of disciplinary problems. CASAL authors suggested (with caution) that many senior Army officers are insulated from disciplinary problems ⁶⁸

Army Chief of Staff **Gen. Ray Odierno** reportedly plans to promote "diversity" by gender-integrating **Ranger** training, which could cause Army confidence levels to sink even more. ⁶⁹

It is obvious that the Marines are being pressured by outside policy makers who are demanding that the new, redefined concept of gender-conscious "diversity" be elevated above combat effectiveness and the needs of the military. Any decision to endorse these flawed, discriminatory priorities would put the Marines on the road to radical cultural change, implemented on an incremental basis. High standards and core values that set the Corps apart eventually would become a thing of the past.

Conclusion

The quantitative research physical tests currently in progress may produce credible data that puts an end to speculation about women being assigned to infantry battalions. The facts, however, may be eclipsed by media perception management and a dilemma that the Obama Defense Department created during the 9 February news conference, when it endorsed the women in combat recommendations of the MLDC report.

Marines have pledged to keep standards on quantitative research project tests exactly the same for both women and men. But due to unalterable anatomic and physiologic differences

affecting strength and endurance, truly "gender-free" training of average male and female officers and enlisted personnel will not be possible.

Thirty years of studies have repeatedly shown that gender-related differences limit the level of performance capabilities of women in training exercises that replicate direct ground combat assignments. Any plan that ignores these realities will result in serious injuries that are known to occur at rates double those of men.

Still, with expectations of "diversity" having been raised so high, if Marine officials will have difficulty answering advocates of gender diversity who will demand that women's combat exemptions be dropped on an incremental basis, if not all at once.

Regardless of current intentions, Marines might be ordered (or pressured by the media) to drop all combat exemptions for women, and to achieve gender-based "diversity metrics" in promotions to high rank. Since the announced goal is "equal opportunity to excel," officials will find a way to ensure that women will "excel," no matter how many compromises are made to achieve that result.

Following precedents set in other military branches and communities, trainers eventually will drop or modify exercises that injure women at rates far greater than men. This would require various gender-norming techniques, such as reducing the demands of some exercises, eliminating some altogether, or using a scoring system that rewards "equal effort" instead of "equal results." Within a single generation, few will remember the previous regimen, resulting in infantry training programs that are less challenging for male Marines.

Keeping standards as tough as they are on today's infantry course may create a conflict with ethics rules regarding human experimentation. Weakening standards to make them more "fair," however, would forever end the unique ethos and warrior culture of the Marine Corps. As of now, not a single Pentagon official or MLDC official has explained how full implementation of the MLDC Diversity Report would actually benefit or improve the effectiveness of Marine infantry ground combat units.

The incremental decisions made at this time will not only have a large impact on the health and careers of enlisted Marines and officers, but the very future of the Corps. As Gen. Amos once said, "Change doesn't come easy to the United States Marine Corps . . . But when it does, when it's rooted, it lasts forever."⁷⁰

Civilian women as well as Marines have a stake in this matter. Flawed recommendations, implemented as official policy, will directly affect all ground combat communities, and the legal status of women that underlies their exemption from Selective Service obligations. Congress and the public need to understand the potential consequences of the MLDC Report

recommendations, and take action *before* irreversible public policy decisions weaken the culture of the only military we have.

Pentagon appointees, politicians, academics, and ideologues have created this dilemma, ordering military leaders to disregard serious conflicts between sound military values and a controversial social experiment. The solution won't be easy, but it might be found in adherence to core values: Honor, Courage, and Commitment.

There is no need to apologize for basing personnel policies on sound principles that advance combat effectiveness, not ideological beliefs, while protecting the unique culture of the Corps. Under the United States Constitution, duty is owed not just to the Executive branch of government, but to the Congress, which represents the American people.

Civilian authorities, the Commandant, and all officials in the chain of command have an historic opportunity—and the professional obligation—to defend high, uncompromised standards, and to do what is best for the Marine Corps and the nation as a whole.



The Center for Military Readiness is (CMR) an independent, non-partisan, 501(c)(3) educational organization, founded in 1993, which concentrates on military/social issues. More information is available at www.cmrlink.org.

Endnotes:

¹ [Department of Defense Briefing Transcript](http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4974), February 9, 2012, available at <http://www.defense.gov/transcripts/transcript.aspx?transcriptid=4974>.

² The Center for Military Readiness reported this story starting in 2005. CMR Policy Analysis, [Rubber Stamp RAND Report Promotes Women in Land Combat](http://www.cmrlink.org/CMRNotes/CMRPA0907.pdf), available at <http://www.cmrlink.org/CMRNotes/CMRPA0907.pdf>.

³ [Report to Congress on the Review of Laws, Policies and Regulations Restricting the service of Female Members in the U.S. Armed Forces](http://www.defense.gov/news/WISR_Report_to_Congress.pdf), February 2012, available at http://www.defense.gov/news/WISR_Report_to_Congress.pdf. On page 15, the document says that the Defense Department will: 1. Eliminate the collocation exclusion from the 1994 policy; 2. As an exception to policy, allow Military Department Secretaries to assign women in open occupational specialties to select units and positions at the battalion level (for Army, Navy, and Marine Corps) whose primary mission is to engage in direct combat on the ground; 3. Based on the exception to policy, assess the suitability and relevance of the direct ground combat unit assignment prohibition to inform future policy decisions; and 4. Pursue the development of gender-neutral physical standards for occupational specialties closed due to physical requirements.

⁴ The latest **Congressional Research Service** Report, titled [Women in Combat: Issues for Congress](http://timemilitary.files.wordpress.com/2012/04/crs-wic.pdf) states the problem with the entire exercise succinctly: "Notably absent in this language is any mention of the effects on military readiness such changes may produce." April 9, 2012, p. 9, available at <http://timemilitary.files.wordpress.com/2012/04/crs-wic.pdf>.

⁵ [From Representation to Inclusion, Diversity Leadership for the 21st-Century Military, Final Report](http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=11390), March 15, 2011, available at <http://www.hsdl.org/?view&did=11390>. Instead of being blind to racial and gender differences, the MLDC report recommends race and gender consciousness. It repeatedly pushes for "diversity metrics," which are supposed to enforce race- and gender-conscious "inclusion" that goes beyond EO, and "needs to become the norm." (p. 18)

⁶ [Report to Congress on the Review of Laws, Policies and Regulations Restricting the service of Female Members in the U.S. Armed Forces](#), *supra* note 3, Executive Summary, p. iii.

⁷ *My American Life*, pp. 591-592, quoted in [amicus brief filed by the Hon. Allen B West](#), Member of Congress and Lt. Col., United States Army (Ret.) in support of Petitioner, *Abigail Noel Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin*, No. 11-345, currently pending before **U.S. Supreme Court**. Available at http://xa.yimg.com/kq/groups/2526464/1499017139/name/11-345_tsac_Honorable_Allen_B._West.pdf.

⁸ Tom Long, *Detroit News*, "Women Heroes Get In On the Action," Oct. 13, 2012, p. 8C. Long reported that four of the top 15 box office hits of 2012, such as "Hunger Games," "Brave," and "Snow White and he Huntsman," centered on female action heroes.

⁹ Gen. James Amos, ALMAR, April 23, 2012, [Assignment of Women to Ground Combat Units](#), available at <http://www.marines.mil/News/Messages/MessagesDisplay/tabid/13286/Article/109426/assignment-of-women-to-ground-combat-units.aspx>.

¹⁰ Michael Doyle, McClatchy Washington Bureau, ["Tough Talk by Marine Commandant James Amos Complicates Sexual Assault Cases,"](#) Sept. 13, 2012. Inappropriate pressures to prosecute accused offenders in sexual assault cases are different from the WISRR situation, but the Navy and Marine Corps regulations cited by WISRR leaders include repeated prohibitions against pressures that might border on "command interference" in the decisions of subordinates asked to volunteer for high-risk experiments favored by superiors in their own chain of command.

¹¹ The 1992 **Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces**, of which the author was a member, researched this issue thoroughly and approved several findings recognizing the legal consequences of dropping women's exemptions from direct ground combat. For example, Commission Finding (CF) #4.3 reported, "Based on the U.S. Supreme Court ruling in *Rostker v. Goldberg*, where the Court found that male-only draft registration was primarily for a 'pool of combat troops,' excluding women from ground combat positions by statute or policy may allow the Court to uphold the ruling that women are not required to register or be subject to conscription, even if other combat positions are open to them." Report of the Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces, November 15, 1992, ISBN 0-16-038236-X, p. C-125.

¹² U.S. Marine Corps, ["Assignment of Women to Ground Combat Units Research Plan,"](#) prepared by Maj. Shawn Haney, M & RA PAO, available at [http://cmrlink.org/CMRDocuments/InfoPackage_WomeninCombatUnits\(4Sep\)\(2\).pdf](http://cmrlink.org/CMRDocuments/InfoPackage_WomeninCombatUnits(4Sep)(2).pdf).

¹³ Presidential Commission Finding (CF) 2.5.1, p. C-80.

¹⁴ This is what happened in 2010, when the Obama Defense Department circulated a survey of the troops on the issue of gays in the military. A subsequent Department of Defense Inspector General investigation reported that DoD General Counsel **Jeh Johnson**, Co-Chair of the Pentagon Working Group that produced a report on the issue, was polishing an Executive Summary of survey results in July 2010, *before* the instrument was sent out. A version of that summary, suggesting that "70%" of surveyed troops did not object to repeal, was leaked prematurely to the *Washington Post*. Resulting headlines eclipsed actual survey data to the contrary, especially from Marine and

Army land combat respondents. See CMR Policy Analysis, [DoD IG Report Reveals Improper Activities to Repeal Gays-in-Military Law](http://cmrlink.org/CMRDocuments/CMR_PolicyAnalysis062111-A.pdf), June 2011, available at http://cmrlink.org/CMRDocuments/CMR_PolicyAnalysis062111-A.pdf.

¹⁵ Survey Instrument prepared by the Center for Naval Analysis, Marine Corps Manpower Team, provided to CMR on June 25, 2012.

¹⁶ Presidential Commission, *supra* note #11, CF 4.13, p. C-127.

¹⁷ Email message to Elaine Donnelly, September 6, 2012, on file. The Armed Forces Press Service and AP had reported, in error, that the experiences of only two women on the IOC would support the Commandant's recommendations in November. The misinformation remained uncorrected.

¹⁸ Misha Shubert, *Sydney Morning Herald*: "[Women To 'Try Before They Buy' Combat Roles](http://www.smh.com.au/action/printArticle?id=3584203)," Aug. 26, 2012, available at <http://www.smh.com.au/action/printArticle?id=3584203>.

¹⁹ USMC Close Combat Manual MCRP 3-02B, available at <http://www.combatival.com/p/overview-of-close-combat.html>, provides this definition: "Close combat is the physical confrontation between two or more opponents. It involves armed and unarmed and lethal and nonlethal fighting techniques that range from enforced compliance to deadly force. The purpose of close combat is to execute armed and unarmed techniques to produce both lethal and nonlethal results. Unarmed techniques include hand-to-hand combat and defense against hand-held weapons. Armed techniques include techniques applied with a rifle, bayonet, knife, baton, or any weapon of opportunity." The Presidential Commission reported this definition, quoting MCO 1300.8P, in CF 1.9, p. C-34: "For assignment purposes, direct combat action is defined as seeking out, reconnoitering, or engaging in offensive action." The other services provided similar definitions that distinguished deliberate offensive action from the experience of being "in harm's way" in a war zone.

²⁰ In a major survey on this issue done for the 1992 Presidential Commission, **Prof. Charles Moskos**, a noted military sociologist and member of the commission, found that over 70% of women in all ranks supported the "voluntary option," but only 10-14% of them would have volunteered themselves. Transcript of testimony, Sept. 21, 1992.

²¹ Laura L. Miller, "Not Just Weapons of the Weak: Gender Harassment as a Form of Protest for Army Men," *Social Psychology Quarterly*, Mar. 1997, 60, 1: Research Library, p. 43. Dr. Miller, now a researcher with RAND, noted in the same article that military men are extremely reluctant to say anything critical or opposed to women in close combat. During focus group interviews most would recite the "party line." Only when pressed would "their true feelings burst forth." (p. 48, quoted by Prof. Browne in *Co-Ed Combat*, p. 218)

²² See note #14, *supra*. Page 74 of the Comprehensive Review Working Group (CRWG) report indicated that "Nearly 60% of respondents in the Marine Corps and in Army combat arms said they believed there would be a negative impact on their unit's effectiveness in this context; among Marine combat arms the number was 67%." These significant findings were eclipsed by the *Washington Post* headline suggesting that "70%" of surveyed military troops were not concerned about repeal of the 1993 law, and by nuanced interpretations of indirect inquiries that did not ask the most important question: "Do you support the current law or do you think it should be repealed?"

²³ Quoted by Christopher L. Kolokowski, Letter to Naval Institute *Proceedings* magazine, "Winning the Battle, Losing the War," September 2012, p. 83.

²⁴ [Joint Advertising, Market Research & Studies](#), (JAMRS), Report No. 2011-05, September 2011, Table 3-4, Propensity by Race and Ethnicity, Gender, p. 3-7, available at <http://www.jamrs.org/reports.php>. This estimate of female propensity probably is on the high side, since males are recruited at rates 6 or 7 times those of women.

²⁵ [USMC Women in the Service Restrictions Review, DACOWITS Brief, 22 Sep 2011, Col. John Nettles](#)
Slide #8, titled "Women Involuntarily Assigned to GCE - Impact on Recruiting and Retention?" Available on the DACOWITS website, <http://dacowits.defense.gov/>, Reports & Meetings/Documents. This briefing also noted that **55%** of women said that changing the rules would not "change the likelihood" of their joining the military, discrediting the argument that a social experiment with women in land combat justifies radical disruption of the culture of the military.

²⁶ Douglas Quenqua, *New York Times*, ["Sending in the Marines \(to Recruit Women\)"](#) April 21, 2008.

²⁷ Slide #9, titled "USMC Senior Leadership Guidance for Deliberate Research Plan," Col. John Nettles briefing before the DACOWITS, Sept. 22, 2011, *supra* note #25.

²⁸ The package provided links to the DoD, Navy, and Marine regulations that govern experimentation with human beings, referenced below, and a [Marine Administrative Message 522/08](#), titled "Compliance with the Department of the Navy Human Research Protection Program (DON HRPP), Sept. 2008, available at <http://www2.marines.mil/news/messages/Pages/MARADMIN522-08.aspx>.

²⁹ [SecNav Instruction 3900.39D](#), available at <http://doni.daps.dla.mil/Directives/03000%20Naval%20Operations%20and%20Readiness/03-900%20Research,%20Development,%20Test%20and%20Evaluation%20Services/3900.39D.pdf>. **16. Minimal Risk.** The probability and magnitude of harm or discomfort anticipated in the research are not greater in and of themselves than those ordinarily encountered in daily life or during the performance of routine physical or psychological examinations or tests. (p. 3) **25. Risk.** Any possibility of harm, discomfort, or injury (physical, psychological, sociological, or other) as a consequence of any act or omission. (p. 5)

³⁰ *Ibid.* The Navy Instruction defines "Certification" as "*The official written notification by the performing institution that a research project or activity involving human subjects has been reviewed and approved by an IRB per an approved assurance.*" (Enclosure (1), p. 1) In addition, a "*Human subject means an individual who is or becomes a participant in research...[who] may be either a healthy human or a patient.*" (Enclosure (1), p. 2) "*Research includes, but is not limited to, any project, task, test, pilot study, experiment, investigation, study... evaluation, developmental effort or similar undertaking, whether or not conducted or supported under a program that is officially considered research.*" (Enclosure (1), p. 4)

³¹ [Marine Corps Order \(MCO\) 3900.18](#), available at <http://www.med.navy.mil/bumed/humanresearch/Documents/HRPP/Resources/ReferenceMaterial/MCO%203900.18%20-%202021%20Jan%202011.pdf>.

³² [Department of Defense Instruction 3216.02](#), Number 3216.02, Nov. 8, 2011, USD(AT&L), p. 15, available at <http://www.dtic.mil/whs/directives/corres/pdf/321602p.pdf>.

³³ DoD Instruction, *Ibid.*, (Enclosure 3, p. 24).

³⁴ Note #20, *supra*, Slide #10, titled "Common GCE (Ground Element Standards Dismounted) Standard." Posted on DACOWITS website, <http://dacowits.defense.gov>, Committee Reports & Meeting Documents, 2011.

³⁵ Slide briefing provided to the Center for Military Readiness on June 25, 2012.

³⁶ A website titled [Ground and Vehicle Mounts](http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/23-27/Ch3.htm) illustrates the complexity and difficulty of mounting the Mk-19 on a vehicle in combat, available at <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/policy/army/fm/23-27/Ch3.htm>.

³⁷ The Army Field Manual (3-21.75, Chapter Six) provides a better idea of what is involved with the construction of various battlefield fighting positions: [Soldier Combat Skills - Chapter Six, Fighting Positions](http://www.soldiercombatskills.com/chapter-6-fighting-positions/), available at <http://www.soldiercombatskills.com/chapter-6-fighting-positions/>.

³⁸ Prof. Kingsley Browne, [Co-Ed Combat, The New Evidence That Women Shouldn't Fight the Nation's Wars](#), Sentinel, 2007, ISBN 978-59523-043-0.

³⁹ James K. Sanborn, *Marine Corps Times*: "[USMC Four-Star - Women to Attend Infantry School](#)," April 18, 2012, available at <http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/2012/04/marine-corps-women-infantry-combat-dunford-amos-041812/>.

⁴⁰ Following the appearance of Gen. Amos' at the National Press Club on August 28, two major news organizations, the Armed Forces Press Service and AP, claimed that the experiences of only two female volunteers would be sufficient to draw conclusions about women's potential abilities on the IOC. See Jim Garamone, AFPS, "[Marines Consider Increased Role for Women in the Corps](#)," Aug. 28, 2012, available at <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=117669>. But in a September 6 email message to Elaine Donnelly, a Marine spokesman said that the reports, which remained uncorrected, were erroneous.

⁴¹ An **Information Paper** titled [Physical Suitability of Women for Assignment to Combat and Heavy Work Military Occupational Specialties](#), prepared by **William J. Gregor, PhD**, Professor of Social Sciences at the School of Advanced Military Studies at Fort Leavenworth, KS, lists some of the studies done by military leaders in several countries. It is available at <http://cmrlink.org/CMRDocuments/Gregor-Info-Paper-20120508.pdf>. None of the studies concluded that average women might achieve "equality" in tough infantry training, much less in actual combat operations: "Gender-free" training results in a) female injuries at far higher rates than among men, or b) less challenge for men, due to modifications in required tests so that women can "succeed."

⁴² C. J. Chivers, *New York Times*, "[A Grueling Course for Training Marine Officers Will Open Its Doors to Women](#)," July 8, 2012; and Jim Michaels, *USA Today*, "[Marines Experiment Puts Women on Infantry Course for First Time](#)," Oct. 3, 2012. In the online version of the *USA Today* article, Col. Desgrosseilliers, a decorated veteran, commented, "*The performance of women in combat is validated...They haven't been in the infantry though.*" Many reporters, unfortunately, do not draw distinctions between the experience of serving "in harm's way" and the missions of direct ground combat infantry that attack the enemy with deliberate offensive action under fire. The courage, accomplishments, and dedication of uniformed women have indeed been validated and are not in question. This does not mean, however, that they have been in or should be assigned to infantry battalions. Articles available at

<http://www.nytimes.com/2012/07/09/us/grueling-course-for-marine-officers-will-open-its-doors-to-women.html?pagewanted=all>, and <http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/world/2012/10/02/women-marines/1600271/>.

⁴³ Andrew deGrandpre, *Marine Corps Times*, "[USMC Drops Second Female From Infantry Course](#)," Oct. 15, 2012, available at <http://www.marinecorpstimes.com/news/2012/10/marine-corps-womem-infantry-officers-course-101512/>

⁴⁴ Ian M. M. Gemmell, JR SocMed 2002 Jan. 95(1):23-27. PMID: PMC 1279143, *Journal of the Royal Society of Medicine*, Jan. 2002, [Injuries Among Female Army Recruits: A Conflict of Legislation](#), Abstract, p. 1, available at <http://cmrlink.org/CMRDocuments/gemmell-JRSocMed2002.pdf>.

⁴⁵ U.S. Army Research Institute of Environmental Medicine, Natick, MA, US Army Medical Research and Materiel Command, Report No. T98-1, AD A330237, Nov. 1997, available at <http://cmrlink.org/CMRDocuments/T98-1-EHarman1997.pdf>. The [Natick Study](#) was funded with \$144,000 dollars inserted in the 1995 defense budget by **Rep. Patricia Schroeder** (D-CO). Announced in February of 1995, the five-month study chose 41 civilian women and subjected them to extensive Olympic-style conditioning far more demanding than the "body-shaping" routines typically practiced by women at health clubs. Among other things, the women did running, hiking with backpacks and barbells 90 minutes a day, five days a week. Test subjects apparently began the study larger and stronger than most women, and generalized conclusions about the effects of specialized training are merely speculation. More background information is available in the CMR Report titled [The Amazon Myth - Natick Study Stretches Science](#), available at <http://cmrlink.org/CMRDocuments/TheAmazonMyth-April1996.pdf>.

⁴⁶ [Photos](#) of referenced OCS obstacle course are available at <http://cmrlink.org/CMRDocuments/QuanticoOCS-ObstacleCourse.pdf>.

⁴⁷ Correspondence on file with the author, December 2005.

⁴⁸ Daniel W. Trone, MA, [Negative First-Term Outcomes Associated with Lower Extremity Injury During Recruit Training Among Female Marine Corps Graduates](#), Vol. 172, Jan. 2007, pp. 83-89, available at <http://cmrlink.org/CMRDocuments/MilMed-Jan2006-FemaleUSMCinjury.pdf>.

⁴⁹ Letter from Rear Adm. Hugh P. Scott, MC, USN (Ret.), to Rep. Howard P. McKeon, Chairman, House Armed Services Committee, June 22, 2012, available at <http://cmrlink.org/CMRDocuments/hscott-mckeeon-wicc.pdf>.

⁵⁰ David S. Cloud, *Los Angeles Times*, ["Denied Combat Roles, Army Women Battle Men in Cage Fighting,"](#) Mar. 15, 2012, available at: <http://articles.latimes.com/print/2012/mar/15/nation/la-na-women-cage-fights-20120316>. Photographs of the competition at Fort Hood were included in a *London Daily Mail* available here: <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2117135/Army-women-turn-cage-fighting-denied-line-combat.html>.

⁵¹ [Letter](#) from former Army SPC Jessica E. True, May 12, 2008, available at <http://cmrlink.org/CMRDocuments/JTrue-WJones051208.pdf>.

⁵² Capt. Katie Petronio, USMC, *Marine Corps Gazette*, [Get Over It -- We are Not All Created Equal](#), July 2012, p. 29, available at: <http://www.mca-marines.org/gazette/article/get-over-it-we-are-not-all-created-equal>.

⁵³ Prof. Kingsley Browne has quoted RAND researcher Laura Miller who interviewed soldiers with similar views in 1997: "As one enlisted man complained to Laura Miller, "Today all you hear in the Army is that we are equal, but men do all the hard and heavy work, whether it's combat or not." Browne, *supra* note #38, p. 210.

⁵⁴ Dr. William Gregor, [Why Can't Anything Be Done? Measuring Physical Readiness of Women for Military Occupations](#) Paper presented at the 2011 International Biennial Conference of the Inter-University Seminar on Armed Forces and Society, Chicago Illinois, 21-23 October, 2011, available at <http://cmrlink.org/CMRDocuments/GregorWJ-01October2011.pdf>.

⁵⁵ [Women in the Armed Forces](#), Directorate of Service Personnel Policy Service Conditions, Ministry of Defence, May 2002, available at http://www.mod.uk/NR/rdonlyres/10B34976-75F9-47E0-B376-AED4B09FB3B3/0/women_af_summary.pdf.

⁵⁶ [UK Ministry of Defence Report on the Review of the Exclusion of Women From Ground Close-Combat Roles - 2010](#), November 10, 2010, p. 5, Point #18 and #19, available at <http://cmrlink.org/CMRDocuments/RptOnReviewOfExclusOfWomenFromGrndClose-CombatRoles-Nov2010.pdf>.

⁵⁷ Matt Siegel, *New York Times*, "[Australia Says It Will Open Combat Roles to Women](#)," Sept. 27, 2011, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/28/world/asia/australia-will-allow-women-to-serve-in-frontline-combat.html?_r=1&pagewanted=print. "In the most notorious case, a male cadet at the elite Australian Defense Force Academy was caught streaming video of himself having sex with a female cadet to his friends via Skype without her knowledge." Also see: BBC News Asia, "[New Sex Scandals Hit Australia's Military Forces](#)," 15 Jan. 2012, available at <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-16524952?print=true>. This article reported over 100 incidents in the previous year, many of which involved pornography, rape, and predatory behavior involving young children.

⁵⁸ Elizabeth Broderick, [Review Into the Treatment of Women in the Australian Defence Force](#), Australian Human Rights Commission, 2012, available at http://www.humanrights.gov.au/defencereview/ADF_report/.

⁵⁹ Australian Government Department of Defence, Brief to DACOWITS 27 Sept. 2012, "Changes to How Women are Employed in the Australian Defence Force,"

⁶⁰ Misha Schubert, *supra* note #18.

⁶¹ Broderick report, *supra* note #58, p. 31. In *Co-Ed Combat*, *supra* note #34, Prof. Browne noted that the Superintendent of the Naval Academy called for 20% women at the academy in order to create a "critical mass." (p. 269).

⁶² Joshua Keating, National Public Radio, "[Foreign Policy - Women on the Front Lines](#)," February 13, 2012, available at <http://www.npr.org/2012/02/13/146802589/foreign-policy-women-on-the-front-lines>.

⁶³ Presidential Commission Report, Commission Finding (CF) 1.72, p. C-53. CF 1.98 through 1.103, pp. C-60 through C-61.

⁶⁴ *Ibid*, CF 1.80 through 1.91, pp. C-56 through C-58. CF 1.100 through 1.103, pp. C-60 through C-61; and CF 1.112 through 1.123, pp. C-63 through C-65.

⁶⁵ *Ibid*, CF 1.104A, 1.105, 1.106, 1.125, 1.129, pp. C-61 through C-67, and Canadian Trip Report, 28-31 July and International Trip Report, 16-25 September, pp. C-21 through C-31.

⁶⁶ *Ibid*, CF 1.129, p. C-67.

⁶⁷ Kingsley R. Browne, Wayne State University Law School, "[The Report of the Military Leadership Diversity Commission: An Inadequate Basis for Lifting the Exclusion of Women from Direct Ground Combat](#)," April 2012, p. 33, available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2151965; also [Co-Ed Combat, The New Evidence That Women Shouldn't Fight the Nation's Wars](#), *supra* note #38.

⁶⁸ Michelle Tan, *Army Times*, "[Crisis of Confidence](#)," Aug. 13, 2012, p. 26, available at <http://cmrlink.org/data/sites/85/CMRDocuments/ArmyTimes081312.pdf>, [2011 CASAL Main Findings, Technical Report 2012-1](#), May 2012 pp. 36-38, and pp. 51-52, Exhibit 30, available at http://usacac.army.mil/CAC2/Repository/CASAL_TechReport2011-2_ArmyEducation.pdf.

⁶⁹ Lolita Baldor, AP, "[Army Brass Mulls Sending Women to Ranger School](http://www.armytimes.com/news/2012/05/ap-army-leaders-mull-sending-women-ranger-school-051612/)," May 16, 2012, available at <http://www.armytimes.com/news/2012/05/ap-army-leaders-mull-sending-women-ranger-school-051612/>. Gen. Odierno has suggested that Ranger training would improve women's chances of rising to 3- or 4-star rank. Neither Gen. Odierno, nor Joint Chiefs Chairman **Gen. Martin Dempsey**, have earned Ranger tabs.

⁷⁰ Military.com, "[Marines Testing Women in Combat Jobs](http://www.military.com/daily-news/2012/08/29/marines-testing-women-in-combat-jobs.html)," Aug. 29, 2012, available at <http://www.military.com/daily-news/2012/08/29/marines-testing-women-in-combat-jobs.html>.