

**ARMY GENDER-INTEGRATED  
BASIC TRAINING  
(GIBT)**



**SUMMARY OF RELEVANT FINDINGS  
AND RECOMMENDATIONS: 1993-2002**

**May, 2003**

## **ARMY GENDER-INTEGRATED BASIC TRAINING (GIBT) 1993-2002**

### **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY OF RELEVANT FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

In a slide presentation prepared for presentation to the Secretary of the Army on March 22, 2002, the Army Training and Doctrine Command claimed that GIBT is “effective” in terms of social benefits. TRADOC also conceded that gender-integrated basic training (GIBT) is an “inefficient” format for basic instruction of recruits. (See Appendix A) Inefficiencies associated with GIBT, some of which were admitted but downplayed by TRADOC in March 2002, include the following:

- Less discipline, less unit cohesion, and more distraction from training programs
- Voluntary and involuntary misconduct, due to an emotionally volatile environment for which leaders and recruits are unprepared.
- Higher physical injury and sick call rates that detract from primary training objectives.
- Diversion from essential training time due to interpersonal distractions and the need for an extra week of costly “sensitivity training.”
- A perceived decline in the overall quality and discipline of GIBT; lack of confidence in the abilities of fellow soldiers; and the need to provide remedial instruction to compensate for military skills not learned in basic training.
- Re-defined or lowered standards, gender-normed scores, and elimination of physically demanding exercises so that women will succeed.
- Additional stress on instructors who must deal with different physical abilities and psychological needs of male and female recruits.
- Contrivances to reduce the risk of scandal, such as changing rooms, extra security equipment and personnel hours to monitor barracks activities, and “no talk, no touch” rules, which interfere with informal contacts between recruits and instructors.
- No evidence of objectively measured positive benefits from GIBT, and no evidence that restoration of separate gender training would have negative consequences for women or men.

An admittedly “inefficient” method of basic training that produces little or no tangible benefits cannot be described as “effective” in military terms. This is especially so when findings of two major blue ribbon commissions on co-ed basic training have indicated otherwise.

GIBT was implemented administratively in 1994. It is possible to restore superior gender-separate basic training, which is both efficient and effective in military terms, in the same way. For the sake of military efficiency and the best interests of Army men and women, this should be done without further delay.

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## ARMY GENDER-INTEGRATED BASIC TRAINING (GIBT)

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U.S. Army Training Center and Fort Jackson, Gender Integrated Training, Presentation to the Secretary of the Army, 22 March 2002, Slides #1 and #12.

## **Appendix B**

U.S. Army Medical Command, PAO, Fort Sam Houston, TX, Army Active Duty Sick-Call numbers and percentages for males and females, PASBA, ASAMEDCOM, Feb. 2001.

## **Appendix C**

Chart comparisons of Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT) results for ROTC cadets at summer Advanced Camp, 1992-1998.

## **Appendix D**

Final Report of the Congressional Commission on Military Training and Gender-Related Issues, Volumes I and III, July 1999, Figures 4-28, 4-32, and 4-43.

## ARMY GENDER-INTEGRATED BASIC TRAINING (GIBT)

### SUMMARY OF RELEVANT FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS: 1993-2002

#### **1. The need for women in the military is unquestioned and not relevant to the issue of Gender-Integrated Training. The real question is whether it makes sense to retain an expensive, inefficient form of Army training that offers minimal benefits in terms of military necessity.**

- The Final Report of the 1999 Congressional Commission on Military Training and Gender-Related Issues noted that “*Whether [gender-integrated basic training] improves the readiness of the performance of the operational force is subjective.*”<sup>1</sup>
- A close look at data and testimony gathered by this and other recent studies indicate that there are no significant benefits from gender integrated basic training, but many problems and complications that detract from the primary purpose of GIBT.

#### **2. The only argument offered by TRADOC in 2002 in favor of retaining GIBT is that male and female recruits prefer training together for social reasons.**

- Young people entering the services today are more “gender-aware” than generations past, and making recruits happy is not the purpose of basic training. Three years after the return of GIBT, sensational sex scandals involving everything from sexual abuse to consensual but exploitive relationships between cadre and junior trainees made headlines nationwide.
- The 1997 Federal Advisory Committee on Gender-Integrated Training and Related Issues, headed by former Kansas Senator Nancy Kassebaum Baker, found that “*...the present organizational structure in integrated basic training is resulting in less discipline, less unit cohesion, and more distraction from training programs.*”<sup>2</sup>
- The Kassebaum Baker Commission, whose members were largely independent and free of conflicts of interest, voted unanimously that gender-integrated basic training should be discontinued.

#### **3. The 1999 Congressional Commission reported abundant evidence of inappropriate relationships and distractions in GIBT.**

- The Congressional Commission report cataloged numerous policies and practices, made necessary by GIBT, which create inefficiencies and detract from concentration. These include separate changing rooms, loss of informal counseling opportunities (due to the need to meet in the presence of a “battle buddy” on neutral territory), differences in needs and abilities, the need to enforce “no talk, no touch” rules, and miscommunications due to lost messages between platoon leaders. All have placed great stress on already overburdened instructors.<sup>3</sup>
- Collateral policies introduced to cope with these distractions make it more difficult for instructors to enforce necessary discipline.<sup>4</sup> For example, special “hot lines” set up to receive

anonymous complaints have ruined careers, caused several suicides, and driven a wedge between Army men and women. Tolerance of false or exaggerated accusations is as demoralizing as sexual misconduct itself.

#### **4. Problems associated with gender-integrated basic training (GIBT) cannot be resolved with “leadership” or “sensitivity training” alone.**

- Continuing a program that increases costs and complicates the training mission, while providing minimal benefits, is not responsible leadership. Military policy makers should establish basic training programs that encourage discipline, rather than indiscipline.
- Excessive “sensitivity/diversity” training has become a jobs program for civilian “equal opportunity” consultants, paid for with funds diverted from more essential military training. When the 1997 Army Senior Review Panel (SRP) recommended an extra week of sensitivity or “values” education to counter sexual harassment, *Army Times* estimated the cost to be equivalent to that of three battalions of soldiers in the field.<sup>5</sup>
- Given today’s threat environment, the substantial amount of time devoted to sensitivity training in basic training might be better spent on potentially life-saving training in areas such as antiterrorism and force protection.

#### **5. Higher physical injury and sick call rates among female trainees create serious “inefficiencies” that detract from the primary goal of basic training.**

- Prof. Charles Moskos, a respected military sociologist and member of the Congressional Commission, wrote in the panel’s Final Report:

*“I am particularly perturbed by the high physical injury rate of women trainees compared to men. Likewise, I am put off by the double-talk in training standards that often obscures physical strength differences between men and women. The extraordinarily high dropout rate of women in IET cannot be overlooked (nor should the fact that females are more than twice as likely to be non-deployable than are male servicemembers) The bottom line must be what improves military readiness.”*<sup>6</sup>

- In Great Britain in 1997, Army commander noted that co-ed basic training was causing many young women to drop out early, due to injuries to their lower limbs. Restoration of all female platoons for a one-year trial in 1996 reduced women’s injury rates by 50%, and first-time pass rates increased from 50% to 70%.<sup>7</sup> Incidents of sexual misconduct between instructors and recruits also decreased significantly. Col. Simon Vandeleur, commanding officer of the Army Training Regiment at Pirbright, Surrey, said that the move to train women separately “*started as a trial, but has continued unquestioned, due to its success.*”
- Recent Army figures indicate that female soldiers take sick calls at rates double those of men.<sup>8</sup> (See Appendix B)

- Extensive tests conducted with ROTC cadets indicate that a wide gap exists between the physical performance and potential of men and women. Among other things, testimony and charts prepared by training expert Dr. William J. Gregor indicate that only 2.5% of female ROTC cadets were able to attain the male mean score on the 2-mile run, and only 4.5% could do so on the strength test. Only 19% of all cadet women achieved the minimum level of aerobic fitness set for men. (See Appendix C)

**6. Every commission study since 1992, including the 2002 TRADOC report, found evidence that real or perceived double or relaxed standards are demoralizing to all who are aware of them.**

- In the aftermath of the 1996 Aberdeen scandals, then-Army Secretary Togo D. West, Jr., formed a Senior Review Panel (SRP) to study the issue of sexual harassment. The SRP was staunchly supportive of Secretary West's policies (which several members had helped to formulate), but nonetheless reported disturbing findings.
- Among men surveyed, 60% were either "not sure" or "disagreed" that *"The soldiers in this company have enough skills that I would trust them with my life in combat."* The combined figure for women was 74%. In response to *"If we went to war tomorrow, I would feel good about going with this company,"* 63% of the men said they weren't sure or disagreed, while 76% of the women said the same.<sup>9</sup>
- A 1997 congressionally authorized RAND study on GIBT was released in an edited version that differed greatly from the original draft.<sup>10</sup> RAND originally found, for example, that gender-norming reduces female injuries but heightens resentment of double standards and degrades morale. In the chapter on "cohesion," the study declared "success" under a civilianized "workplace" definition, instead of the classic principle that *"...group members must meet all standards of performance and behavior in order not to threaten group survival."*<sup>11</sup>

**7. There is no empirical evidence that GIBT improves the quality of military training for male or female trainees.**

- According to surveys conducted by the Congressional Commission, 48% of Army recruit trainers said that the quality of basic training declines when men and women are in the same units.<sup>12</sup>
- When asked about the current quality of entry-level graduates compared to five years ago, 74% of Army leaders who responded to the survey indicated that "Overall quality" had declined, and 80% said that "Discipline" had declined.<sup>13</sup> (See Appendix D)

**8. GIBT always requires adjustments in standards to accommodate physical differences. Gender-normed qualification requirements reduce excessive stress fractures and other injuries among female trainees, but also have the effect of making training less rigorous for men.**

- Training standards frequently measure "team" accomplishments rather than individual performance, which contributes to mutual trust, teamwork, and genuine unit cohesion. Under this concept, which is stressed in the TRADOC slide presentation, stronger members fill in for weaker ones, and recognition is given for "equal effort" rather than equal accomplishment.

- This means that some trainees are allowed to graduate simply by *trying* to accomplish given training tasks, such as scaling high walls or throwing practice grenades, even if they do not succeed. Claims that women’s training is “exactly the same as men” ignore the reality of gender-normed scores and qualification standards that are inherently demoralizing.
- The concept is inherently dubious, since trainees know that there are extra step stools, protective barriers, or gender-normed scores on the battlefield. Attempts to ignore that reality have hurt the credibility of Army leadership.

**9. There is no evidence that GIBT would be more successful if women are actually “held to the same high standards as men.”**

- This argument disregards the effect of political pressures from feminists who demand “equality,” but are the first to demand “fairer” gender-normed standards so that women will not fail. In the past two decades, attempts to toughen training or match the person to the job were withdrawn because organized civilian feminists perceived them as threatening to women’s “career opportunities.”<sup>14</sup>
- The Army tried twice in the early 1980s to implement realistic strength standards, commensurate with wartime demands, in occupations rated from light to very heavy. In both instances, tests showed that most women were unable to meet the standards for nearly 70% of Army occupational specialties. The recommendations were never implemented as planned because the former Defense Advisory Committee on Women in the Services (DACOWITS) complained that such systems would have a “disproportionate impact” on the careers of female soldiers.<sup>15</sup>

**10. Numerous military and civilian studies done in the United States and in other countries have documented significant differences in male and female physiology that are relevant to military performance.**

- Numerous American studies have confirmed that in general, women are shorter, weigh less, and have less muscle mass and greater relative fat content than men. Women are at a distinct disadvantage because dynamic upper torso muscular strength is approximately 50-60% that of males, and aerobic capacity (important for endurance) is approximately 70-75% that of males.<sup>16</sup>
- A test of Army recruits found that women had a 2.13 times greater risk for lower extremity injuries and a 4.71 times greater risk for stress fractures. Men sustained 99 days of limited duty due to injury while women incurred 481 days of limited duty.<sup>17</sup>
- In the United Kingdom, major studies were ordered in 1998 to ascertain the feasibility of co-ed basic training. Army doctors found that eight times as many women as men were being discharged during basic training, due to injury rates that doubled following the introduction of identical training programs for both sexes. Differences in strength, bone mass, stride length and lower body bone structure caused women to suffer disproportionately from Achilles tendon problems, knee, back and leg pain, and fractures of the tibia, foot, and hip.



- The “gender-free” system was ended in January 2002 because stress fractures for women rose from 4.6% to 11.1%, compared to less than 1.5% for male trainees. <sup>18</sup>

**11. Contrary to the claims of GIBT proponents, studies conducted by the Army Research Institute (ARI) in 1993-1995 did *not* confirm that mixed training produced better results.**

- After a 1993 pilot test at Fort Jackson, SC, commanders recommended the *continuance* of gender-separate training because they observed no improvements in fitness and military proficiency for men or women.
- Later in 1993, the Army ordered a new 3-year study from ARI, this time to include an assessment of soldiers’ *attitudes* toward mixed or separate training. Inquiries centered on measures of social/psychological interest (i.e., how well do people get along together?) instead of measures of military interest (i.e., how well will people trained in this way fulfill their duties, especially under crisis conditions?) <sup>19</sup>
- The latter 1993 ARI study proclaimed GIBT superior because it was found in separate-gender focus groups that the morale of women improved by 14 points. At the same time, however, the men’s morale *dropped* by 17 points. The gap narrowed somewhat when subsequent focus groups were gender-mixed. ARI questions still focused on “touchy-feely” questions, i.e., whether interviewees “like being in the platoon,” “feel very close,” “like and trust another,” or “make others want to do a good job.” <sup>20</sup>

**12. There are no empirical studies showing that women perform better in GIBT than they formerly did in separate-gender training prior to 1994.**

- After the initial 1993 study, the Army never again compared results of mixed versus separate training formats. Tests thereafter were to determine the best mix of males and females in a platoon (75/25, a ratio almost never observed). Even before the ARI surveys of “attitudes” were complete, the Army announced its decision to discontinue gender-separate training, except for ground combat trainees, in August 1994.
- When GIBT was implemented in 1994, the training regimen was adjusted to reduce the risk of injuries among female recruits. Meanings of the words “soldierization” and “proficiency” were re-defined, physical requirements were de-emphasized, and “success” was measured with new training exercises that would not disadvantage women, such as map reading, first aid, and putting on protective gear. <sup>21</sup>
- The Army informed the Congressional Commission, in response to a specific demand by Congress, that it has not, and does not plan to, objectively measure or evaluate the effectiveness of GIBT. <sup>22</sup> Many officials taking this position were responsible for implementing and making a “success” of GIBT in the first place.

**13. The Army slogan “Train as We Fight” is an important goal in advanced training. For basic training, however, “Train to Transform” is a more appropriate slogan. Basic training is the first step in a progressive, building block process of training soldiers to serve, fight, and win.**

- Within only a few weeks, young civilian recruits must learn to wear a uniform properly, have respect for authority, observe proper customs and courtesies, and accept and live by the core values of the service. Operational commanders should not have to spend time for remedial training in these matters, due to inadequacies at the basic level.
- Maj. Gen. William Keys, USMC (Ret.), a member of the Congressional Commission, wrote in a statement to Congress that *“Basic training teaches basic military skills such as physical fitness, close order drill and marksmanship. It is a military socialization process—civilians are transformed into soldiers, sailors, airmen and Marines. This training provides recruits the basic military skills needed to integrate into an operational unit. It does not teach war-fighting skills nor should it be the staging ground for “gender” etiquette skills.”*<sup>23</sup>
- The slogan is also inconsistent with special “lights out” security alarms and other security measures, as described on Slide #18, which are not available in an operational environment. These include barracks guards who conduct “bed-checks” of GIBT trainees every 30 minutes and are changed every two hours.

**14. The Marine Corps has demonstrated that a well-designed single-gender basic training program, with same-sex drill instructors, can be tailored to challenge male and female trainees to the limit.**

- Separate sex training increases “rigor” for all soldiers, forces female recruits to be self-reliant, and reduces the risk of demoralizing injuries that cause female recruits to drop out.
- The Kassebaum Baker Commission found that the Marines’ single sex approach was producing *“impressive levels of confidence, team building and esprit de corps in all female platoons at the Parris Island base.”*<sup>24</sup>
- The Congressional Commission found that female Marine trainees scored significantly higher than any other group in commitment, group identity and respect for authority—all of which are important elements of military cohesion.<sup>25</sup> (See Appendix D)
- Separate housing and instruction improves the ability of male and female recruits to concentrate on transformation. As stated by then-Marine Assistant Commandant Richard I. Neal, *“We don’t want them to think about anything else than becoming a Marine.”*<sup>26</sup>

**15. There is no evidence that restoration of gender-separate basic training would “reinforce negative attitudes and stereotypes,” or hurt morale among female soldiers.**

- On the contrary, members of the Congressional Commission noticed that GIBT might be *reinforcing*, rather than eliminating, stereotypes. Female trainees frequently said that they liked training with the men because *“The guys really help us.* When asked how, they typically

answered, “*They motivate us. They lift heavy stuff for us. We trade—we do their ironing, and they clean our floors.*” Women Marines, by contrast, have to do every task themselves, without passing off dirty or difficult jobs to men. They must team up and find a way to lug heavy objects, and are motivated to climb walls by other women who have demonstrated that it can be done.<sup>27</sup>

- Separate-gender training develops self-reliance and confidence as well as teamwork. In the Marine Corps, female trainees must find ways to accomplish basic training tasks on their own, without assistance from male trainees to assist them with heavy loads.
- Military historian S.L.A. Marshall has noted that “*Authentic morale does not grow in its own soil, [with] combat efficiency as a mysterious by product....[Rather,] high morale flows when the ranks are at all times conscious that they are service in a highly efficient institution.*”<sup>28</sup> Attorney Adam G. Mersereau amplified the point as follows:

*“[M]orale without combat efficiency is most likely an inauthentic form of morale, brought on by false confidence...To try to build a military’s morale without first, or at least concurrently, establishing a foundation of unshakable efficiency is a dangerous error.”*

- The Congressional Commission found that among male soldiers in training, the most frequently mentioned recommendations for change were to separate males and females during basic combat training (BCT), make the training harder; and require recruiters to tell the truth. Female recruits called for an end to “battle buddy” restrictions, improved barracks, and more sexual harassment training.

#### **16. Army women deserve the same high quality training as women Marines have today, and Army women had prior to 1994.**

- The drawbacks of GIBT conflict with the tradition of Army discipline and the current concept of Transformation, which depends on personnel who are stronger, more versatile, and better prepared.
- Short-term costs for returning to single sex basic training would be minimal, and long-term savings related to fewer disciplinary problems and injuries could be substantial.
- Sound policies regarding basic training should not be based on unrealistic theories or feminist ideology, including the belief that men and women are interchangeable in all military roles. Nor should gender integration be considered an “end” in itself. The Army needs to encourage competence in training, not egalitarianism at all costs.

#### **17. It is possible that restoration of separate gender training would have a positive effect on recruiting for the volunteer Army.**

- The 1998 Youth Attitudes Tracking Study (YATS) found that the great majority of both men (83%) and women (77%) said it would make no difference to them whether basic training was conducted with or without the opposite sex. The YATS also found that young men, who constitute 80% of enlistees, are more interested in seeking physical challenge than young

women, and they perceive the Air Force and the Navy as less physically challenging than the Marine Corps and the Army. Members of the Congressional Commission concluded that:

*“Only the Marine Corps and the Army have all-male training, and it is not unreasonable to suppose that this enhances their image of being physically challenging. Overall, the results of the 1998 YATS suggest that the Army, Navy, and Air Force probably would suffer no loss in terms of recruiting (and might gain) if they decided to change, in whole or in part, from gender-integrated training to gender-separate training.”*<sup>29</sup>

**18. Military personnel policies are bi-partisan, but there is evidence of political support to “fix the clock” on this and other social policies implemented during the previous administration.**

- During the 2000 Presidential Campaign, the *American Legion Magazine* asked then-Texas Governor George W. Bush about his views on co-ed basic training. Candidate Bush replied, *“The experts tell me, such as Condoleezza Rice, that we ought to have separate basic training facilities. I think women in the military have an important and good role, but the people who study the issue tell me that the most effective training would be to have the genders separated.”*<sup>30</sup>
- Dr. Rice, who is now National Security Advisor to President, Bush, voted with all other members of the 1998 Kassebaum Baker Commission to end co-ed basic training.
- A mandate for change was evident in votes cast by military personnel, their families, and supporters, who were told by Governor Bush’s running mate, Dick Cheney, that *“help is on the way.”*

**19. GIBT can and should be eliminated administratively, without further delay.**

- GIBT was not authorized by Congress after careful deliberation, but imposed by administrative directives written by former Assistant Secretary of the Army Sara Lister, a civilian lawyer who notoriously depicted the Marines as “extremist.”
- No one has seen a written order setting forth a logical rationale for the Army’s action.<sup>31</sup> Indications are, however, that the decision was accepted as a trade-off to head off even more egregious mandates being promoted by Sara Lister at the time; i.e., gender integration of multiple launch rocket systems (MLRS) and special operations helicopters.<sup>32</sup>
- In 1994, uniformed leaders of the Army implemented GIBT without dissent. One brigade training commander told the *Washington Post* that it was necessary to take the *“Attila the Hun approach”* with drill instructors that resisted. *“I told them that gender integration was our mission, and any outward manifestation of noncompliance would not be tolerated.”*<sup>33</sup>
- Having invested so much in the process, some Army officials lobbied hard to defeat legislation, which passed the House in 1998, to implement recommendations of the Kassebaum Baker Commission. Nevertheless, during the March 17, 1998, HNSC hearing, senior officers representing the armed forces had difficulty making a convincing case for gender-mixed basic training.<sup>34</sup>

**20. This is not a question of turning the clock backward or forward. If the clock is broken, it should be fixed.**

- A five-year experiment with GIBT during the Carter Administration was summarily terminated in 1982 not because of lack of confidence in women's abilities to become soldiers, but because women were suffering injuries in far greater numbers, and men were not being challenged enough.<sup>35</sup> Contemporaneous news reports indicated that GIBT was eliminated in order "to facilitate the Army's toughening goals and enhance the soldierization process."<sup>36</sup>
- Civilian oversight of the military includes the responsibility to set policies for the future, not to continue flawed policies of the past.

**Endnotes:**

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- <sup>1</sup> Final Report of the Congressional Commission on Military Training and Gender-Related Issues, July, 1999, Volume I, p. 122.
- <sup>2</sup> Report of the Kassebaum Baker Commission, December 16, 1997, p. 15.
- <sup>3</sup> Congressional Commission Report, Volume I, pp. 267-268.
- <sup>4</sup> Rowan Scarborough, *Washington Times*, "Military Policing of Sexes Eats Time: Instructors' Focus Taken Off Training," January 18, 2000, p. A-1.
- <sup>5</sup> Sean D. Naylor, *Army Times*, "Values Education to be Added to Basic Training," September 22, 1997.
- <sup>6</sup> Congressional Commission Report, Volume I, p. 190.
- <sup>7</sup> London Sunday *Times*, Feb. 8, 1999, and *Newsweek*, Feb. 9, 1999. About 800 women were expected to graduate to advanced training, compared to 534 during the previous 12 months.
- <sup>8</sup> Active Duty Army Sick Calls by Gender for FY 2000 (October 99 – September 00), quoted by Paul Hornak, Watertown (New York) *Daily Times*, March 13, 2001, and analyzed by Iain Murray, Statistical Assessment Service (STATS). March 8, 2001. (See Appendix B)
- <sup>9</sup> Senior Review Panel Report on Sexual Harassment, Volumes I and II, released September 11, 1997, pp.A-19 A-29. The majority of the 7 members and 8 consultants were either staunch proponents of the feminist agenda, close associates of Secretary West, or officials whose duties should have alerted them to serious problems long before the Aberdeen scandal broke in 1996.
- <sup>10</sup> RAND, "New Opportunities for Women: Effects Upon Readiness, Cohesion and Morale," released by the Office of the Secretary of Defense on October 21, 1997.
- <sup>11</sup> Report of the Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces, November 15, 1992, Finding 2.5.1, p. C-80.
- <sup>12</sup> Congressional Commission Report, Volume III, Figure 4-43, p. 124. (See Appendix C).
- <sup>13</sup> Congressional Commission Report, Volume I, Figure 4-28, p. 117, and Figure 4-32, p. 119. (See Appendix C)

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- <sup>14</sup> Presidential Commission Report Finding 22, p. C-138, also Paulette Walker, *Army Times*, “New Physical Standards Would Stress ‘Fairness’”, August 21, 1995, p.2.
- <sup>15</sup> The Charter of the old DACOWITS was allowed to expire on February 22, 2002. A new committee with the same name is now operating under a different Charter.
- <sup>16</sup> Presidential Commission Report, Findings 2.1.1, 2.2.2, and 2.1.3, and Congressional Commission Report, Volume I, pp. 213-218.
- <sup>17</sup> Presidential Commission Report, Finding 2.1.5.
- <sup>18</sup> Nigel Hawkes, London Sunday *Times*, “Equal Opportunity ‘Damages Health of Women Soldiers,’ January 3, 2002.
- <sup>19</sup> Congressional Commission Report, Volume I, pp. 228-230.
- <sup>20</sup> ARI slide presentation on 1993 test, dated January 1994, as presented House Armed Services Committee staff members in mid-1994.
- <sup>21</sup> U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences. 1995 Gender Integration of Basic Combat Training Study, Study Report 97-01, Dates Covered: August 1993-September 1995, released February 1997.
- <sup>22</sup> Congressional Commission Report, Volume I, p. 238.
- <sup>23</sup> Congressional Commission Report, Volume I, p. 235.
- <sup>24</sup> Kassebaum Baker Commission Report, p. 16.
- <sup>25</sup> Congressional Commission Report, Volume III, pp. 95-97.
- <sup>26</sup> Testimony before House National Security Committee, March 17, 1998.
- <sup>27</sup> Congressional Commission Report, Volume I, p. 246, footnote 334.
- <sup>28</sup> Military historian S.L.A. Marshall, quoted by Adam G. Mersereau. Holy Cross Journal of Law and Policy, “Women in Combat: the Deadly Inefficiency of Current Law and Policy,” Fall 1998.
- <sup>29</sup> Congressional Commission Report, Volume I, pp. 242-243.
- <sup>30</sup> Rowan Scarborough and Bill Gertz, *Washington Times* “Inside the Ring,” January 31, 2003.
- <sup>31</sup> David Burrelli, Congressional Research Service, response to questions on behalf of Congressional Commission, from U.S. Army Center of Military History, January 15, 1999.
- <sup>32</sup> Congressional Commission Report, p. 222, and Eric Schmitt, *New York Times*, June 17, 1994, “Generals Oppose Combat by Women—Secretary [Togo West] Withdraws Plan After Bitter Disagreement,” p. A-1.
- <sup>33</sup> Bradley Graham, *Washington Post*, “In Coed Training, Army Revisits a Basic Strategy,” November 21, 1994.
- <sup>34</sup> See comments by HASC Personnel Subcommittee Chairman Steve Buyer (R-IN) and Rep. Gene Taylor, (D-MS).
- <sup>35</sup> Presidential Commission Finding 2.2.1A, p. C-78.
- <sup>36</sup> R.D. Gersh, AP, Fort Monroe, VA “Army to Return to Single-Sex Companies in Boot Camps,” May 4, 1982.