



## Combat Fitness Test Fiasco Forces Army to Drop Gender-Neutral Standards

### RAND Report Proves Social Engineers' Promises Have No Credibility

If structural engineers design a bridge that collapses, they figure out what went wrong before they replace the bridge. When a military social experiment collapses, “experts” who designed the experiment never accept responsibility for their miscalculations and mistakes, which they never admit.

This is the real story behind the **U.S. Army**'s decision to scrap previous promises of gender-neutrality in the **Army Combat Fitness Test (ACFT)**. The new, more complicated six-event test was designed after the decision to assign women to combat units in 2015.

The Defense Department and military services repeatedly promised that if women were assigned to combat arms units such as the infantry, training standards would be gender-neutral and as tough as ever. (See excerpts below)

Those promises are now abandoned, due to high failure rates among women when tests began in 2019. The new ACFT, announced on March 21, uses **gender-normed** scores that are different for men and women in specified age groups, and some requirements are lower than before.<sup>1</sup>

The April 1 effective date for this version of the ACFT was apt, since the Army's monumental reversal on gender-neutral standards seemed like an **April Fool's** joke on anyone led to believe that gender-neutral standards would work in the Army Combat Fitness Test.

Officials could not deliver on such promises for three reasons: a) Unchanging physical differences between men and women; b) Unchanging physical challenges and burdens in direct ground combat, and c) the Pentagon's relentless pursuit of “**diversity, inclusion, and equity**” (**DIE**) metrics, another name for “quotas.”

The failed ACFT experiment proves that gender-neutral standards do not work at this level of training. With “diversity” assigned priority in today's woke military, why would gender-neutral standards work any better in advanced training for the infantry or Special Operations Forces?

The significant inability of women to successfully negotiate the test, according to data released by the **RAND Corporation** that belied their own predictions, caused the Army to reverse itself on gender-neutral standards. Members of Congress should reconsider their own beliefs about gender-neutrality in the combat arms and stop trusting social engineers whose claims were proven wrong.

Architects of this fiasco include Joint Chiefs Chairman **Gen. Mark Milley**, who initiated the ACFT project when he was Army Chief of Staff, former Secretary of Defense **Mark Esper**, former Army Secretary (and previous Acting Secretary) **Ryan McCarthy**, and former Sergeant Major of the Army **Daniel Dailey**. Current Army Secretary **Christine Wormuth**, Chief of Staff **Gen. James McConville**, and Sergeant Major **Michael Grinston** also will share responsibility if they perpetuate their predecessors' miscalculations and mistakes in judgement.

## *How the ACFT Social Experiment Began*

In 2011, the Defense Department's **Military Leadership Diversity Commission (MLDC)**, called for elimination of women's land combat exemptions as a way to achieve non-remedial gender-based "diversity metrics," another name for quotas.<sup>2</sup>

The MLDC report admitted that the new diversity management was "*not about treating everyone the same,*" adding, "*This can be a difficult concept to grasp, especially for leaders who grew up with the EO-inspired mandate to be both color and gender blind.*"

In January 2013, Army **General Martin Dempsey**, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, appeared at the Pentagon with Defense Secretary **Leon Panetta** to announce plans for women in combat arms units such as the infantry. Women have served with courage "in harm's way" for decades, but direct ground combat (DGC) units such as the infantry seek out and attack the enemy with deliberate offensive action.

Gen. Dempsey suggested that when women entered formerly all-male combat units, standards perceived to be too high would be questioned, omitted, scored differently, or adjusted to levels that promote gender diversity as the highest priority.<sup>3</sup> Said Chairman Dempsey, "*if a particular standard is so high that a woman couldn't make it, the burden is now on the service to come back and explain . . . why is it that high? Does it really have to be that high?*"<sup>4</sup>

CMR predicted that the "**Dempsey Rule**" would become evident during implementation of the new gender-neutral Army Combat Fitness Test.<sup>5</sup>

## *ACFT Trials, Phases, and Results*

After women became eligible for the combat arms in 2015, the Army decided to replace the longstanding three-event **Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT)** with a gender- and age-neutral Army Combat Fitness Test (ACFT).

Unlike the previous physical fitness test, which involved gender-normed sit-ups, push-ups, and a two-mile run that could be done anywhere, the new six-event ACFT required expensive equipment, gender- and age-neutral standards, three exercises that were difficult to judge, and considerable time to prepare for and administer the test.<sup>6</sup>

Requirements for all participants included the leg tuck (pulling the knees up while suspended on a high bar); a 25-meter sprint, drag, and carry of a 90 lb. sled and two 40 lb. kettlebells; throwing a 10-lb. medicine ball backward over the head; hand-release push-ups (hands and arms lifted at the bottom of the push-up); and a two-mile run.

Minimum scores in each event earned **60** points, for a total of **360** points, with a perfect score of **100** on all six events totaling **600 points**.<sup>7</sup> The original test also included a range of different requirements for **heavy**, **significant**, or **moderate** physical demands in various occupations. An infantry-bound soldier, for example, had to perform **30** hand-release push-ups to earn a minimum score (60 points) on that event, compared to **10** push-ups for others headed for less strenuous occupations.<sup>8</sup>

The test raised questions about the fairness of requiring older soldiers to compete with younger trainees. Why should a 61 year-old 4-star general, a 20 year-old female X-ray technician, and a 24 year-old 82<sup>nd</sup> Airborne soldier have to meet the same Army physical fitness standards?"

Even more controversy emerged when **85%** of female trainees failed the test.<sup>9</sup> The Army pressed on, tweaking test requirements and scoring systems several times.

In response to congressional pressure, **ACFT 2.0** allowed the choice of a two-minute plank exercise instead of the leg-tuck, and an optional **2.5 mile walk** instead of the 2-mile run.<sup>10</sup> Female scores improved, but failure rates remained unacceptably high.

Next came **Version 3.0** of the ACFT, which contrived a system to evaluate women's scores in "performance bands" or "tiers" comparing women's performance to men's.<sup>11</sup>

The **top 1%** of both men and women, for example, would be rated in the **Platinum** group, even though their performance levels were dramatically different. The **top 10%** in each gender group would be categorized as **Gold**, with the **top 25%** in the **Silver** tier. The **Top 50%** would be rated **Bronze**, while the lower half would earn the minimum 360 points and be coded **Green**.

This color-coded "gender-neutral" tiered system fooled no one, especially when women continued to fail at significantly higher rates. Congress ordered a full study of the increasingly controversial ACFT, which the RAND Corporation conducted in 2021.

RAND gathered data from **630,000** tests with **460,000** soldiers, and the results were dismal.<sup>12</sup>

- RAND's independent review found that only **52%** of active-duty enlisted women, compared to **92%** of the men, were able to pass the ACFT. Among officers, women's pass rates were higher – **72%** compared to **96%** of male officers. (Pass rates were lower in the **National Guard and Reserves**.)
- RAND also noted that the top ten MOS pass rates for Regular Army enlisted women ranged from **89%** to **65%** and the bottom ten were from **44%** to **31%**. In comparison, pass rates for Regular Army enlisted men in the top ten MOSs were quite high – **100%** to **98%**. Pass rates for men in the bottom ten ranged from **86%** to **83%**.<sup>13</sup>

The RAND report provided several caveats, but the empirical data were quite clear. Theories about physical gender equality in military combat training simply did not survive objective tests in the real world.

RAND's final report suggested two options for the Army: Either keep the standards and scores gender- and age-neutral, even if greater numbers of women and older personnel failed, or gender- and age-norm the test to make allowances for gender and age differences:

"Norming the [ACFT] test would acknowledge physiological differences between genders, performance differences as soldiers age, and the combat and physical demands of a particular job (if the test were also MOS-normed). Norming the test would ensure parity in pass rates between groups, but it would also **require the Army to accept differences in potential combat readiness among soldiers who are held to different testing standards.**"<sup>14</sup> (Emphasis added)

The Army chose the latter option, rebranding the ACFT as a test to measure overall fitness, not physical readiness for the combat arms.

### ***Army Combat Fitness Test 4.0***

After release of the RAND report, the Army announced **ACFT 4.0**, which reneged on previous promises to implement gender-neutral standards.<sup>15</sup> ACFT 4.0 implements the Dempsey Rule with gender-normed training events and scores, making them more "fair," mostly *unequal*, and lower than before.

The new gender-normed test dropped the leg-tuck event all together. It also abandoned the pretense of using the test to "match the person to the job" with previously higher scoring requirements for persons going

into heavier occupations.<sup>16</sup>

- Under ACFT 4.0, a young female must deadlift **120 lbs.** (positioned on a hexagon-bar) to earn the minimum 60 points. Lifting **210 lbs.** earns the maximum 100 points. A male soldier in the same age group must deadlift between **140 and 340 lbs.** to get the same number of points.
- A woman throwing a 10 lb. ball backward **3.9 meters** earns the minimum 60-point score, but a man must throw the ball backward by **6 meters** to get the same score.
- Only the timed plank is scored the same for men and women, ranging from a **1 minute 30 second** minimum to a **3 minute 40 second** maximum in the 17-21 age group.<sup>17</sup>

ACFT 4.0 goes back to square one by measuring physical fitness, not readiness for advanced combat training. This reluctant recognition of reality raises a fair question: If the “experts” could not deliver gender-neutral standards on the ACFT, why should anyone believe similar assurances that gender-neutral standards will be maintained in the combat arms?

Thanks to current pressures to meet diversity mandates, the Army’s stunning reversal set a new precedent likely to be extended to all combat arms communities, regardless of previous promises made or the needs of the military.

### *Promises Made but Not Kept*

In 2013, top military leaders and civilian officials repeatedly promised that women would not be assigned to formerly all-male combat units unless they could meet gender-neutral performance standards.<sup>18</sup>

These promises intensified just before and after **President Barack Obama** and Secretary of Defense **Ash-ton Carter** made the ill-advised decision to open all military occupational specialties (MOSs) to women.

In August 2015, the high-pressure push to change rules affecting women focused on the **Ranger School** graduation of three female soldiers at **Fort Benning**. The women deserved congratulations for getting through the tough course.

However, Ranger-trained author **James Haddon** reported in his book *Stand Down* that in some cases the female trainees were forgiven major errors that would have caused male trainees to be dropped from the course.<sup>19</sup>

On December 3, Secretary Carter overruled the best professional advice of then-**Marine Commandant Gen. Joseph Dunford**, who exercised his option to request that the infantry, special operations forces, and other close combat units remain all-male.<sup>20</sup> Gen. Dunford’s reasonable request was backed by empirical data gathered over three years of scientifically monitored studies.

Nine months of field tests set out to prove the hypothesis that men and women *could* serve equally well in direct ground combat units. Resulting data, however, *disproved* the thesis. Among other things, all-male units outperformed gender-mixed ones **69%** of the time, in **93 of 134** tasks simulating ground combat.<sup>21</sup>

Now the Army is trying to sweep under the rug promises about gender equality, like the ones cited below, which disarmed critics in 2015 who thought that Secretary Carter should have honored Gen. Dunford’s research-supported request for exceptions.

## *Promising the Impossible*

At his December 2015 news conference, Secretary Carter said that every service member would have to meet the standards of the jobs they wished to fill, and **“there must be no quotas or perception thereof.”**<sup>22</sup>

On the same day, RAND released a report purporting to advise the **Marine Corps** on ways to successfully integrate women into the combat arms:

“. . . If women can pull their own weight, they will likely be accepted as members of the team. **Conversely, if women cannot keep up or if women are given preferential treatment, they will have a harder time establishing themselves as effective members of the unit, and therefore task cohesion will likely be negatively affected.** Consequently, **it is critical to continue to develop validated gender-neutral standards**, regularly update those standards, and enforce them equally.” (Emphasis added)<sup>23</sup>

Early in 2016, the military services filed implementation plans for gender integration in the combat arms, including **Special Operations Forces** such as the **Army Ranger Regiment** and **Navy SEALs**.

The **Department of the Army** claimed to be prepared for a cultural shift in previously all-male career fields, saying this in its official **Gender Integration Implementation Plan**:<sup>24</sup>

“(4) **Conduct and Culture** . . . The military assimilates change by relying upon the enduring values of the profession of arms. **Concerns about possible reductions in combat effectiveness** can be addressed by effective leadership and **gender-neutral standards**. (Emphasis added throughout)

“(5) **Talent Management** . . . Recruiting, retaining, and advancing talented women in highly physical fields will demand careful consideration – but **adherence to a merit-based system must continue to be paramount**. As the Military Services and **USSOCOM** [Special Operations Forces] move forward with implementation, leaders **must not use special preferences or undue pressure to increase numbers at the expense of merit.**”

The **Air Force**, Navy, and Marine Corps used near-identical language in their Implementation Plans, with the Air Force adding,<sup>25</sup>

“Our occupational physical standards are linked to our operational mission requirements which are our most critical physical tasks . . . There **will be no quotas, critical mass, or special preference based on gender.**”

**Navy Special Warfare Command** reinforced the point:<sup>26</sup>

“**Any deviation from the validated, operationally relevant, gender-neutral standards would undermine true integration**, disrupt unit cohesion, impact combat effectiveness, and be a disservice to those exceptional candidates willing to test and serve against the required and validates standards . . . **Focusing on gender-neutrality of standards is the number one effective measure to continue successful gender integration in the force.**”

In February 2016 testimony, Secretary of the Army **Patrick J. Murphy** and Army Chief of Staff Gen. Mark Milley misled the Senate with equivocal testimony:

“We will implement published, measurable, **gender-neutral standards** based solely on combat requirements and that **will not be compromised for any reason.**”<sup>27</sup>



All these promises must have been made with fingers crossed behind the speakers' backs.

### *Is There a Better Way?*

The 1992 **Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces** followed a fundamental principle in writing recommendations: *“Equal opportunity is important, but if there is a conflict between equal opportunity and the needs of the military, the needs of the military must come first.”*

The Commission considered several training options and concluded that gender-norming is acceptable in basic, pre-commissioning, and entry-level physical fitness/wellness training, provided that gender-normed programs are not used to qualify personnel for advanced combat training.

The commission also opposed the assignment of women to combat arms units such as the infantry, armor, artillery, and special operations forces. Such policies, which the Defense Department maintained through 2013, precluded any need for gender-norming in direct ground combat units with heavy physical demands.

Now that policies exempting women from the combat arms have been totally eliminated, gender-normed tests and scores are no longer tenable.

In view of the Army's failure with the ACFT, policy makers should re-examine the premises and misperceptions that supported and fueled the entire experiment with women in the combat arms.

### *Inverted Priorities in Special Operations Forces and All Military Services*

Designers of the ACFT confidently predicted that gender-neutral standards would work, but they did not. Group thinking Army leaders nevertheless are moving forward with even more experiments to “prove” that men and women are interchangeable in the combat arms, under the Defense Department's prevailing mantra: *“Diversity is a strategic imperative.”*<sup>28</sup>

As CMR reported previously, Army **Gen. Richard D. Clarke**, Commander of the **Special Operations Command (SOCOM)**, issued a paradigm-changing **Diversity & Inclusion Strategic Plan**, which has changed “norms” in training to ensure that women will not fail.<sup>29</sup>

*Air Force Times* reviewed and reported on a detailed letter written by a whistleblower, which claimed that an unnamed female combat controller trainee was failing the tough Special Tactics course and tried to quit twice.<sup>30</sup> Unlike the **70%- 80%** of men who fail to meet commando requirements and are routinely assigned elsewhere, this woman was invited back and scheduled to resume her training in April.

Air Force Special Operations Forces Commander **Lt. Gen. James Slife** criticized the unknown whistleblower and insisted that standards had not changed, even though facts the whistleblower revealed have not been contradicted and “norms” did change under SOCOM diversity mandates.

The Army established its DIE credentials with its **Army Equity and Inclusion Agency**, which operates under an official motto: *“Diversity is the Force, Equity is the Goal, Inclusion is the Way.”*<sup>31</sup> The Navy pledged full commitment to DIE goals with its **Task Force One Navy** report, which is full of woke vocabulary jargon and promotion of diversity goals.<sup>32</sup>

This is not the first time that dubious predictions of social policy benefits have not worked out. In the early 1990s, feminist activists claimed that if women entered tactical aviation and other combat units, rates of sexual harassment and assault would decline.

Gen. Martin Dempsey repeated that claim at his January 2013 news conference, predicting that ground

combat assignments would increase respect for women and reduce assaults.<sup>33</sup>

Instead, the opposite happened. Annual Pentagon reports have shown that sexual harassment and assault cases have accelerated to new heights every year since 2007, with no end in sight.<sup>34</sup>

Unlike structural and other engineers who must respect rules of physics in the real world, social engineers constantly ignore the science of human biology and behavior. Academic “experts” and un-credible advocates who are blinded by ideology should not be making policy for our military.

### ***What Should the Next Congress and President Do?***

The Army has reluctantly recognized inconvenient realities in the ACFT project, but gender diversity quotas could still lead to unnecessary casualties and mission failures in environments where physical strength matters.

Lessons learned should inspire Congress and the next President to re-examine miscalculations and restore sound priorities. For example, policy makers should:

- Hold Pentagon officials and social engineers accountable for fiascos like the ACFT.
- Abolish Pentagon Diversity, Inclusion, & Equity mandates and offices that promote percentage-based quotas instead of non-discrimination and recognition of merit.
- Conduct congressional hearings with independent witnesses, not just Defense Department and military officials who defend their own policy decisions.
- Visit military bases, giving all personnel permission to speak candidly about social changes in the military, both negative and positive, provided they have a rationale.
- Re-evaluate female assignments in direct ground combat units, to include consequences of disproportionately higher rates of injuries, attrition, and non-deployability.
- Eliminate policies that force the military to deploy marginally qualified personnel who are less strong, less deployable, and more likely to be injured during combat missions.
- Obtain, review, and make public General Dunford’s 2015 request for exceptions, and consider future implementation of sound policies that Gen. Dunford had requested.
- Revisit recommendations of the Presidential Commission on the Assignment of Women in the Armed Forces regarding training programs at basic and advanced levels.

Social engineers who keep claiming success for failed policies should not be allowed to make resulting problems even worse. The next Congress and President have a solemn responsibility to restore high, uncompromised standards and sound priorities in the only military we have.

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<sup>1</sup> Davis Winkie, *Army Times*: [Army Combat Fitness Test Debuts With Major Changes to Scoring](#) April 1, Mar. 23, 2022.

<sup>2</sup> Military Leadership Diversity Commission report: [From Representation to Inclusion: Diversity Leadership for the 21<sup>st</sup> Century](#), Mar. 15, 2011, p. 18 and Appendix C, Recommendation #9, p. 127. The Defense Department endorsed the MLDC’s egalitarian report at a Pentagon news conference on February 9, 2012, and officials have quoted it many times. The MLDC’s concept of equity was a radical departure from the military’s honorable tradition of recognizing individual merit – the key to successful racial integration long before the civilian world. The “new diversity” is not about individual rights; it’s about percentage-based group rights.

- <sup>3</sup> General Martin Dempsey, Pentagon News Conference with Defense Secretary Leon Panetta, Jan. 24, 2013.
- <sup>4</sup> CMR: [Seven Reasons Why Women-in-Combat Diversity Will Degrade Tough Training Standards](#), Apr. 21, 2013.
- <sup>5</sup> David Brown, ClearanceJobs: [Army Combat Fitness Test Fiasco! Slides Reveal 84% of Women Failing ACFT](#), Oct. 5, 2019.
- <sup>6</sup> Rick Montcalm, Modern War Institute, [The Good and the Bad of the Army's New Physical Fitness Test](#), Jul. 13, 2018.
- <sup>7</sup> Previously, an infantry-bound man had to perform 30 hand-lift push-ups to earn the minimum 60-point score, while someone in a "moderate physical demand" unit or MOS would perform only 10 hand-lift pushups to earn the minimum 60 points. Under ACFT 4.0, the minimum requirement is reduced to 10 pushups for all trainees.
- <sup>8</sup> Meghan Myers, *Army Times*, [Here's An Early Draft of the Army's New Fitness Test Standards](#) (see scoring chart) and Matthew Cox, Military.com, [Army Confirms: Leaked Standards for New Fitness Test Are Accurate](#), Aug. 2, 2018.
- <sup>9</sup> CMR: [New Army Combat Fitness Test: 84% of Women Fail](#), Nov. 3, 2019.
- <sup>10</sup> Matthew Cox, Military.com: [Bill Would Force Army to Halt ACFT Until It Can Study Impacts](#), Dec. 15, 2020.
- <sup>11</sup> Ben Wolfgang, *Washington Times*: [Army Pulls the Pin on 'Gender Neutral' Combat Fitness Test; Creates Separate Tiers for Men, Women](#), Mar. 22, 2021.
- <sup>12</sup> RAND: [Independent Review of the Army Combat Fitness Test: Summary of Key Findings and Recommendations](#), Table 3.1, p. 20. Also Davis Winkie, *Army Times*, [Army Combat Fitness Test Debuts With Major Changes to Scoring](#), April 1, Mar. 23, 2022, and Lolita Baldor, AP, [Army Drops One-Size-Fits-All Physical Fitness Tests](#), Mar. 24, 2022.
- <sup>13</sup> *Ibid.*, Table 3.2 and Table 3.3, pp. 20-22.
- <sup>14</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 29.
- <sup>15</sup> U.S. Army: [Army Combat Fitness Test](#); also see Steve Beynon and Thomas Novelly, Military.com: [Gendered Scoring, No More Leg Tucks: Army Unveils New Fitness Test. Here's What You Need to Know](#). Mar. 23, 2022.
- <sup>16</sup> Army Combat Fitness Test, Mar. 2022, [Scoring Scales](#).
- <sup>17</sup> [Army Combat Fitness Test](#) and [Frequently Asked Questions](#), Mar. 2022. Tests began in April, but individual scores will not become part of individual records until Oct. 1, 2022.
- <sup>18</sup> Memorandum from Army Gen. Martin Dempsey, Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff, [Women in the Service Implementation Plan](#), Jan. 9, 2013, p. 1.
- <sup>19</sup> James Hasson, [Stand Down: How Social Justice Warriors Are Sabotaging America's Military](#), Regnery-Gateway, Sept. 2019. One of the female trainees, for example, received a passing grade even though she had lost track of one of soldiers while on patrol, forcing officials to terminate the entire mission.
- <sup>20</sup> [Fact Sheet: Women in Service Review \(WISR\) Implementation](#), Department of Defense, p. 3. The DoD has denied all requests to release an unredacted copy of Gen. Dunford's Memo to Navy Secretary Ray Mabus asking for exceptions, which would show his rationale, but this previously undisclosed Defense Department Fact Sheet indicates that he asked that the following MOSs and units remain all-male. MOSs: Infantry Officer, Infantry Weapons Officer, Rifleman, Light Armored Vehicle Crewman, Reconnaissance Man, Machine Gunner, Mortarman, Infantry Assaultman, Antitank Missileman, Infantry Squad Leader, Infantry Unit Leader, Special Operations Officer, Critical Skills Operator, Fire Support Man). Units: Infantry Regiments and below, Reconnaissance Battalions, Light Armored Reconnaissance Battalions, Force Reconnaissance Battalions, Marine Raider Companies, Combat Engineer/Assault Companies.
- <sup>21</sup> [Marine Corps Force Integration Plan: Summary](#), Aug. 2015, and Brig. Gen. George W. Smith, Jr., USMC [Memorandum to the Commandant](#), August 18, 2015. These documents summarized significant findings resulting from Marine Corps research over three years. The Defense Department did not post or release them to the public.
- <sup>22</sup> Rowan Scarborough, *Washington Times*, [Ashton Carter Promises Same Standards for Women in Combat Roles](#), Dec. 3, 2015.



- <sup>23</sup> [RAND: Implications of Integrating Women into the Marine Corps Infantry](#), Dec. 3, 2015, pp. 142-143. The primary author of this RAND report, Agnes Gereben Schaefer, has been nominated to be Under Secretary of the Army for Manpower & Readiness.
- <sup>24</sup> [HQDA Execution Order 097-16 to the U.S. Army Implementation Plan 2016-01 \(Army Gender Integration\)](#) Mar. 9, 2016, pp. 3-4.
- <sup>25</sup> Department of the Air Force, [Final Implementation Plan for Full Integration of Women in the Air Force](#), Dec. 29, 2015, p. 5; Department of the Navy Female Integration Implementation Plans, U.S. Fleet Forces Command, Dec. 14, 2015, U.S. Naval Surface Force, Dec. 13, 2015, U. S. Fleet Forces Command (Submarine Forces), Dec. 14, 2015, Navy Special Warfare Command, Female Integration Implementation Plan for Naval Special Warfare, Dec. 3, 2015; and [Marine Corps Force Integration Implementation Plan](#), Dec. 16, 2015, p. 2. (Not all printed documents are still available on DoD websites.)
- <sup>26</sup> Navy Special Warfare Command, Female Integration Implementation Plan for Naval Special Warfare, Dec. 3, 2015, pp. 1-2.
- <sup>27</sup> [Statement](#) of Army Secretary Patrick J. Murphy and Army Chief of Staff, Gen. Mark Milley, Senate Armed Services Committee, Feb. 2, 2016, p. 3.
- <sup>28</sup> The first official to speak the mantra, in 2006, was then-Chief of Naval Operations Adm. Mike Mullen, who later became Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff: Navy.mil, [CNO Calls Diversity a Strategic Imperative](#), Jun. 30, 2006.
- <sup>29</sup> [USSOCOM Diversity & Inclusion Strategic Plan](#) 2021, Mar. 3, 2021, and CMR: [“Diversity & Inclusion Strategic Plan” Will Weaken Special Operations Forces](#), Apr. 22, 2021. A March 28, 2021, letter signed by Gen. Clarke declared in its first sentence, “All of us understand diversity and inclusion are operational imperatives.” The woke Strategic Plan provided no evidence of that, but the mantra was repeated twelve times on twenty pages.
- <sup>30</sup> Rachel S. Cohen and Kyle Rempfer, *Air Force Times*: [Air Force Accused of Pushing Woman Through Elite Commando Training After She Quit, Spurring Investigation](#), Jan. 7, 2022, and CMR: [Hold SOCOM Leaders Accountable for Female Commando’s Special Treatment Under “Diversity & Inclusion” Strategic Plan](#), Jan. 31, 2022.
- <sup>31</sup> Army Equity and Inclusion Agency, [U.S. Army Project Inclusion](#), July 2019.
- <sup>32</sup> [Task Force One Navy Final Report](#), Feb. 2021, and Andrea Widburg, *American Thinker*, [Our United States Navy Is Now a Woke Institution](#), Feb. 14, 2021.
- <sup>33</sup> Anna Mulrine, *Christian Science Monitor*, [Women in Combat Units: Could It Reduce Sexual Assault in the Military?](#) Jan. 25, 2013.
- <sup>34</sup> CMR: [Are Military Social Experiments Increasing Sexual Assaults on Men and Women?](#) Sep. 10, 2019.

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